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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Aircrew Adaptive Decision Making: A Cross-Case Analysis
Although the accident rate for military aviation has declined significantly 
from earlier decades, during the i990's it reached a plateau. Human error in the 
cockpit still accounts for over 80% o f the aircraft mishaps resulting in loss of life or 
over one million dollars in damage. Decision error has been a contributing factor for 
approximately 60% o f these mishaps. The purpose o f this research was to 
investigate aircrew process performance variables as predictors o f decision-making 
outcomes.
This study was modeled on elements o f  previous research in naturalistic 
decision making. Data were collected for cross-case analysis o f the role experience 
plays in efficient decision strategy selection and use in an uncertain, dynamic high 
stakes environment. Multiple raters evaluated eight novice and eight experienced 
military aircrews at seven decision points in a 20-minute flight scenario conducted in 
a full motion flight simulator. Other raters independently rank ordered the quality of 
the final outcome. A comprehensive approach to collecting and analyzing data 
included: (1) development and use o f  a behaviorally-anchored assessment 
instrument, (2) use o f a digitally integrated presentation o f  audio/video and flight 
data, and (3) development o f context-specific analytical frameworks and models of 
observed behaviors and metacognitive processes. Results included inferential and 
descriptive statistics o f  process/outcome scores, instructor comments, excerpts of 
cockpit recordings, participant interviews, and field notes.
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The study findings were: (1) high individual and collective crew experience 
had a significant positive effect on process and outcome scores, (2) there was no 
statistically reliable difference in process scores between experience levels in the 
three procedurally-based events, (3) experienced crews performed better than novice 
crews in the four less structured events, (4) novice crews' process/ outcome 
correlation did not approach significance, (S) a strong positive correlation of 
process/outcome scores was found for experienced crews in the two most 
challenging (i.e., unstructured) scenario events, (6) qualitative analysis revealed 
strong relationships between performance and crew interactions/attributes, and (7) in 
dynamic, time critical situations, the use o f adaptive decision-making strategies led 
to better performance outcomes.
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CHAPTER ONE 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Introduction
Time critical, adaptive decision making used to rapidly assess non-routine 
dynamic situations underpins success in the dynamic aviation environment. This study 
explored decision-making approaches o f Navy faced with recognizing and controlling 
unplanned and emergency situations within seconds or minutes given conflicts and gaps 
in critical information. Research was conducted to investigate the use of adaptive 
decision-making approaches by novice and experienced aircrews in a specific simulator 
context representative o f their decision-making domain.
The decision-making process explored lies on a decision making continuum 
between the time consuming, linear, analytical approach at one extreme, and a reactive, 
procedurally-based approach on the other end. The focal point on this continuum for this 
study is an adaptation to these decision strategies. Somewhere in the center o f this 
continuum is an intuitive adaptive decision making approach that synthesizes domain 
experience with insightful knowledge for use in atypical contexts that require immediate 
problem resolution.
In order to better understand the relationship o f  the use o f  adaptive decision 
strategies and aircrew performance under stressful conditions data were collected in a 
simulated flight event along with the aircrews’ self-reported cognitive processes in the
1
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event debrief. Data analyses were performed to determine if: (a) previous “like-kind” or 
transferable experiences in the aircraft are critical to how aircrews remember and report 
their interpretations of vague and concurrent cues, (b) aircrew experience levels 
determine the differences in thought patterns of aircrews, and (c) a correlation exists 
between aircrew situational assessment, decision-making processes and related decision 
process outcomes.
Background
In 1996, the U.S. Navy's most senior aviators chartered a Human Factors Quality 
Management Board to discover best practices worldwide and conceive interventions to 
forestall human error from the proximate (cockpit) level to the resource (organizational) 
level. After a year o f military and commercial aviation program reviews o f safety and 
operational readiness strategies, several initiatives were adopted. One o f these initiatives 
by the Naval Safety Center created a Human Factors Analysis Classification System 
(HFACS) utilizing Reason’s Model ofHuman Error (Reason, 1990). This mishap 
causal factor taxonomy was created and populated with discrete behaviors and conditions 
proven to cause aircraft mishaps. Using the HFACS taxonomy, an analysis was 
conducted by the o f 110 (81 Tactical Air/ 29 Helicopter) Navy/Marine Corps Class “A” 
(those involving one million dollars or more and loss o f life) aviation mishaps that 
occurred from 1990 through 1996.
The results o f this analysis o f tactical fixed wing aircraft Class “A” mishaps 
found that 63 % o f the mishaps included decision errors. These decision errors were 
categorized to include one or multiple decision errors per mishap as follows: (a) wrong 
response in an emergency (16 mishaps), (b) improper use o f flight controls (12 mishaps),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(c) poor decision (7 mishaps), (d) exceeded pilot/aircrew ability (5 mishaps), (e) 
misdiagnosed emergency (5 mishaps), (f) misinterpreted/misused instruments (5 
mishaps), (g) inappropriate maneuver (4 mishaps), (h) failed to recognize extremis (3 
mishaps), (i) improper approach/landing (3 mishaps), (j) improper takeoff (1 mishap), 
and (k) used incorrect data (1 mishap).
Meeting the goal o f eliminating human error mishaps demands the adoption o f 
more effective instructional strategies, along with better organization climate, increased 
supervision and accountability across the span o f naval aviation aircraft platforms and 
functional areas. The need for improved shore-based and shipboard-training capabilities 
has become increasingly critical as the Navy increases its operational commitments with 
fewer, less experienced personnel. This need created a triad o f  powerful training 
initiatives from the operational level for training aircrews: (a) use advanced technology 
and software applications to systematically capture and measure aircrew performance,
(b) inclusion o f human factors and performance measurement and analysis in instructor 
training, and (c) employment o f advanced curriculum development methodologies to 
integrate critical thinking and problem solving applications throughout the aviation 
training continuum.
Statement o f the Issue
While the military aviation accident rate has declined significantly from earlier 
decades, it has reached a plateau since 1991. Human error still accounts for over 80% o f 
incidences in both military and civilian flight mishaps. United States Naval Safety 
Center analysis o f  military aircrew accidents in 1998 revealed insignificant change over 
time in the percent o f mishaps attributed at least in part to decision-making errors and
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lapses o f judgment by aircrews. In 1998, aircrew decision-making errors contributed to 
almost 60% o f all Class “A” mishaps. Since current policy and levels o f technology 
restrict data collection during actual flight environments (i.e., most military aircraft are 
not equipped with cockpit voice recorders or “black boxes” nor do they always operate in 
environments observed by radar which makes for comparatively easy flight 
reconstruction) it is difficult to observe aviators under stressful conditions o f  uncertainty 
in their natural decision making environments. Modeling the most proficient decision 
makers in a particular domain requires access to their cognitive and behavioral data. The 
best available setting to this researcher for collecting aircrew performance data and 
providing decision-making experiences to aircrews is currently in the fiill-motion flight 
simulator. To date, there has been little progress in the approach to improve the 
decision-making capabilities o f aviators beyond assessment o f  overt decision making 
capabilities. Much o f the research used to support aviation training has been done 
largely with novices in non-flight environments (e.g., Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1988; 
Prince, Hartel, & Salas, 1992; Stokes, Kemper & Kite, 1997).
Several problem areas impede decision making data collection in realistic 
aviation environments for practical as well as theoretical use. First, most research in 
decision making thought processing patterns related to probabilities and outcomes has 
been highly structured using content impoverished stimuli (e.g., use o f gambling 
simulations by Payne et al., 1988). Second, Bowers, Jentsch, and Salas (2000) point out 
that there is a misconception that that a universal skill set is appropriate for all aviation 
platforms and operational contexts. Third, without the use o f  sophisticated data 
collection and analysis tools it is difficult to collect and replicate detailed flight data to
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support metacognitive recall o f processes reflecting considerations and actions by 
aircrews in time-critical processes. Fourth, limitations in obtaining time and access to 
experts in realistic work environments have made field research with any experts, much 
less aviators, difficult (Shanteau, 1988).
In aviation contexts, investigations must begin to include methodologies that 
produce data that capture how aviators adapt their decision-making processes as they 
gain flight experience to effectively manage uncertainty and risk in the cockpit.
Shanteau (1986) found that expert (I.e., more experienced) decision-makers make 
decisions differently than non-experts (i.e., novices). More experienced aviators are 
more likely to have an experiential knowledge base that is used to identify exceptions to 
rules, to assess situations quickly and define how much time to allot to problem solving. 
They take more calculated risks to manage outcomes. These differences are important; 
they open an area o f research that can better definition o f training requirements for 
aviators at all levels o f experience.
Previous practical investigation o f experienced aircrews’ implicit decision 
making processes as proposed in this study has been limited to cognitive task interviews. 
Designed to elicit decision-making thought protocols based on past experience and “what 
if?” paper-based scenarios, these analyses have been extremely valuable; however, they 
lack the real-time, detailed data that can be observed and collected in a flight simulator or 
actual flight event (e.g., verbal protocols, information-acquisition behavior, task 
shedding, and response times). Since content influences psychological processes 
(Tetlock, 1985), an actual flight event in a high fidelity aircraft simulator would produce 
a more realistic context for the study o f  collective expert and novice aircrew decision
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making especially under conditions in which aircrews, as teams, face uncertain 
conditions.
Study Purpose
The purpose o f study was to collect observational and metacognitive data from 
aircrews to identify adaptations to decision making strategies as articulated by better 
performing crews. Furthermore, data was sought that would illuminate the relationship 
between aircrew characteristics and aircrew functioning processes relative to multi­
crewed cockpit performance.
This study addressed the utility of multi-method data collection and analysis to 
capture aircrew decision-making considerations and flexibility in assessing and planning 
approaches to resolve flight related problems in time critical situations. Technical and 
crew coordination data were collected to measure aircrew processes; latency and quality 
o f decision outcome data were studied to discover possible relationships between these 
study variables. Consequently, results were reviewed to determine and clarify essential 
skills, procedures, and strategies required to train more effective aircrews facing similar 
situations.
Hypotheses and Research Questions
This study proposed three hypotheses and three research questions that form a 
starting point o f  the cumulative process to explore and identify variables in an 
environmentally valid situation (i.e., a realistic scenario representative o f a natural 
situation). In this context, potentially relevant variables were observed and considered 
by both the research team and the participants. The study hypotheses were tested using 
inferential statistics to explore possible relationships between the performance process
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variables and outcome variables and aircrew experience level. Combined analysis and 
interpretation o f quantitative and qualitative data served as the basis for a possible 
integrative theoretical and training approach that may have relevance beyond the one 
naturalistic situation represented by the study scenario.
The research hypotheses and questions related to a single flight scenario were:
Hypothesis I : Experienced aircrews will receive better process ratings (i.e., technical 
skill, workflow, information sharing, consensus building, operational risk assessment and 
management and back-up routines) than novices in handling a specific in-flight 
emergency situation involving uncertainty.
Hypothesis 2: Decisions (i.e., outcome rankings) made by experienced aircrews in an 
uncertain situation involving a specific in-flight emergency are rated as being o f higher 
quality than those made by novice aircrews.
Hypothesis 3: Aircrew process ratings are correlated with the decision outcome ratings 
for a specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty.
Research Question 1: What adaptive recognitional/metacognitive decision-making 
strategies emerge from aircrews in a specific in-flight emergency situation involving 
uncertainty?
Research Question 2: In what way do adaptive/metacognitive decision-making patterns 
differ among successful and less than successful aircrews challenged with a  specific in­
flight emergency involving uncertainty?
Research Question 3: What characteristics/factors seem to define the most successfiil 
aircrew outcomes in a specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty?
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This research study investigated whether experienced military aircrews from the 
fleet with at least 700 hours of flight experience in a particular aircraft had different 
metacognitive approaches to identify, assess and resolve airborne problems than less 
experienced crews in the same aircraft. The 700-flight hour level is the total amount 
o f  flight time accumulated by an S-3 aviator with at least one year in a fleet 
squadron. The hypotheses aimed at investigating possible relationships between 
experience level and various aspects o f specific aircrew behaviors and skills that 
might correlate with approaches and biases in judgments and decision-making. 
Aspects of aircrew performance (e.g., technical skills, procedural skills, inter­
personal skills, higher level cognitive skills, crew coordination, etc.) within and 
among the two different experience levels studied were rated by expert observers and 
analyzed for statistically significant correlation with final mission outcome. 
Qualitative analysis methodology was used to create situational awareness and 
decision taxonomies representing aircrew actions and thought processes during 
critical decision points in the scenario.
Methodology
This field-based comparative case study o f aircrew decision making under 
conditions o f uncertainty was conducted at a  United States naval aviation training facility 
in San Diego. Aircrews flying the S-3B model aircraft in routine training syllabi at the 
basic (i.e., novice) and advanced (i.e., experienced) levels o f  naval aviation carrier-based 
training were asked to volunteer as study participants.
A case study approach was designed and adopted to explore the relationship 
between aircrew situational awareness and decision-making processes and the outcomes
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of experienced and novice aircrews. A flight scenario in a full-motion simulator was 
used to trigger two dangerous event conditions in an ambiguous, information-limited 
context that gave the aircrews little to immediate response time. Unexpected changes in 
the flight and landing environment were followed with greater instability and novelty to 
assess whether aircrews would change their information gathering/use and decision­
making strategies. Data were analyzed to determine i f  there was a meaningful or 
statistically significant correlation between aircrew flight experience and the successful 
handling o f sequentially more problematical emergency situations.
Study data consisted o f quantitative performance assessments during the realistic 
20-minute simulator scenario followed by participant interviews related to crew decision 
processes and outcomes. Process variables were comprised o f technical and crew 
resource management tasks; decision outcome data consisted o f aircraft configuration 
and position at the end o f the scenario. Up to five subject matter experts that collected 
observational data used a behaviorally-anchored Likert scale instrument designed for the 
study. Evaluation criteria reflected both general team process and event-specific 
standards o f  performance. These subject matter experts served as independent 
observers/assessors. They were senior instructors at the training command for the model 
aircraft flown by the participant crews.
Immediately following the 20-minute scenario, semi-structured, recorded 
debrief/interviews between 40 and 60 minutes m duration were conducted with aircrews 
to collect data related to the research questions. To enhance recall o f cues and decisions 
in the scenario for both participants and independent observers, a  stimulated recall 
strategy was employed during the post-scenario debrief/interview. A computerized
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digital replay o f  selected instruments in the aircraft instrument panel, aircraft aspect, as 
well as audio and video o f  the aircrew over every minute o f the scenario event was 
available and used during portions o f the debrief/interview to initiate recall o f  technical 
data as well as the participants’ reactions to events and their situational awareness and 
decision making during the study scenario.
Conceptual Framework 
Over the last 15 years, studies involving complex decision-making style adaptations 
in response to uncertain, dynamic conditions with various populations in real-world 
domains have contributed to the movement away from the classic “rational” model o f 
decision making. There is now a new focus on the type o f decision making built on an 
individual’s intuitive recognition and resolution of atypical situations using his 
experience base. This recognitional approach to decision making is known as naturalistic 
decision making (Klein, 1993, 1998; Zsambock, 1997). The decision making process in 
uncertain situations can be generally categorized by assigning it to one o f three groups 
with strategy shifts occurring with the number o f  options (Payne, 1982) and time 
constraints: (a) procedural or rule-based (e.g., use o f standard operating procedures, 
checklists, etc.) typically used to for automatic, rapid responses, (b) analytical which 
consumes much time in an attempt to gather all available information in various 
combinations and assigns a fixed set o f possible meanings to cues/information to weight 
all possible outcomes, and (c) adaptive or creative problem solving which is a  process 
that attempts to deal with limitations in information gathering and processing in time 
critical situations.
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In adaptive problem solving the first available action that satisfies the immediate 
need for a desired outcome or “end game” is selected to meet the situations time 
constraints. Adaptive decision-making processes often synthesize intuition, experience, 
and a tailored application o f the normal procedures and/or techniques to obtain the 
desired objective. Early indications in work using the Recognition-Primed Decision 
(RPD) Model (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986; Klein, 1989,1993) has 
provided evidence through deep interview techniques and field observations that there are 
differences in the way experienced and inexperienced people working as teams recognize 
and respond to problems in high stress environments. In general, research has found that 
experienced persons rely on their long-term memory and make time-critical, high stakes 
decisions in potentially volatile situations by using sophisticated strategies based on 
recognition and reactions to trends and patterns from their experiences. Inexperienced 
people, by contrast, tend to rely on various recalled preferences and ignore or 
prematurely discount alternative hypotheses or options. An extension o f  the Klein et al 
(1986). RPD model is the Recognition/Metacognition (R/M) model that describes a set of 
critical thinking strategies to verify results o f recognition and problem correction in novel 
situations through metacognitive processes (Cohen, Adelman, Tolcott, Bresnick, & 
Marvin, 1993; Cohen, Freeman, & Wolf, 1996). This model was developed using critical 
incident interviews with U.S. Army infantry personnel and U.S. Navy shipboard 
personnel. Both the RPD and R/M models o f naturalistic decision making along with 
Zsambok’s (1997) Aviation Decision Process Model, which specifies cognitive processes 
involved in aviation decision making, were o f primary importance in conceptually 
framing this research.
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Definition o f Terms 
For the purposes of this study, variables were operationally defined as follows: 
Adaptive Decision Making
Adaptive decision making involves a shift in decision-making strategy from procedural 
or analytical approaches to meet the demands o f a time-critical, threatening, dynamic 
situation with an undefined structure. This shift in decision strategy is utilized because 
procedural or analytic approaches are too time consuming in a real-time, dynamic 
situation. The requirement to accelerate the decision making process is typically brought 
about by a need to trade accuracy for speed, shifting decision criteria, and task shedding. 
Naturalistic Decision Making
This type o f  decision making is concerned with how individuals use their 
knowledge to make decisions in the face o f unruly problems embedded in dynamic task 
contests. Eight factors characterize decision making in naturalistic settings: ill-structured 
problems, uncertain dynamic environments, shifting, ill defined or competing goals, 
action/feedback loops, time stress, high stakes, multiple players, and organizational goals 
and norms. It is not likely that all eight factors will be at their most difficult levels in any 
one situation or setting but often several o f these factors will complicate the decision task 
(Orasanu & Connolly, 1993).
Creative problem solving
This process requires the use of critical thinking skills when no response is 
readily available as a  standard operating procedure, there is no guidance for dealing with 
the malfunction in the aircraft: operating manuals, and when the crew has not been trained 
to assess or manage the situation. “ In these cases they must invent a candidate solution
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to meet their goals and evaluate its adequacy in the light o f  existing constraints”
(Orasanu, 1997, p.54).
Metacognition
This term bridges the areas between (a) decision making and memory, (b) 
learning and motivation, and (c) learning and cognitive development. It describes our 
“knowledge about how we perceive, remember, think, and act - - that is, what we know 
about what we know" (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1996, p. xi). It is the ability o f a person 
to reflect on his or her conscious awareness o f judgments and experiences. It is a 
supplemental recognition process used to verify and improve recognition o f a situation. 
Meta-recognition
Meta-recognitional skills probe for flaws in recognized assessments and plans, try 
to patch up any weaknesses found, and evaluate the results. Meta-recognitional 
processes include: (a) identification of evidence-conclusion relationships (or arguments) 
within the evolving situation or plan, (b) processes o f critiquing that identifying problem 
in the arguments that support the situation model or plan which can result in the 
discovery o f problems o f incompleteness, unreliability, or conflict, (c) processes o f 
correcting that respond to these problems, and (d) a control process called quick test, 
which regulates critiquing and correcting. The quick test considers the available time, the 
costs o f  error, and the degree o f uncertainty or novelty in the situation (Cohen & 
Freeman, 1996).
Limitations o f the Study
The findings o f this study are limited to identification, description, and analysis 
o f participant aircrews’ decision-makingprocesses and outcomes in a single case
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scenario. This study did not attempt to predict the success o f  various decision-making 
styles found to be used in the study scenario to other situations or domains. The case 
study approach was used to focus on the patterns o f  aircrew experiences in a particular 
naturalistic situation. Each case may provide data to expand the cognitive schema but 
there is no attempt to generalize findings to other flight situations or populations. 
Additionally, because the study participants may not be representative of the S-3B 
aircraft population there is also no attempt to generalize study findings to the S-3B 
aircraft aircrew population. However, the relevancy o f the findings may be useful to 
enhance specific cognitive skill training approaches and naturalistic decision making 
theories.
Significance o f  the Study 
Results o f the study are useful to practical aircrew and instructor training 
applications. The larger issues addressed in this research are those o f when and how 
adaptive decision making employment has been successful in meeting immediate 
operational needs in an unstable environment. Study data collected via combined 
qualitative and quantitative approaches resulted in gaining  more details of various 
aircrew problem recognition and problem solving approaches than either method 
employed separately. Advanced levels o f description that emerged from the study 
provide details that will assist training practitioners in extending the depth o f process and 
performance feedback to aircrews and instructors. Evidence presented serves as a 
summary delineating aircrews’ behavior and functioning used to assimilate, process and 
investigate various information (cues) with particular attention being paid to methods for 
dealing with uncertainty. Practical aircrew and instructor training  applications could be
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designed to provide models and discussion points for training in operational best 
practices to include risk assessment and management.
Significant advances in aircrew training require domain-specific information that 
is used to predict, explain, and understand aircrew decision-making biases in their 
problem solving strategies under conditions o f  uncertainty and limited response time. 
Recent U.S. Air Force aircrew studies (Spiker, Tourville, Silverman & Nullmeyer, 1996; 
Spiker, Silverman, Tourville & Nullmeyer, 1998; Nullmeyer & Spiker, 1999) have 
shown that there is variability in performance processes and outcomes among even the 
most experienced aircrews. The data analysis from the present study provides more data 
on experienced/novice decision-making processes and also extends the analysis to 
provide additional metacognitive and inferential data on several variables not targeted in 
similar combinations in other studies with military aviators. The findings o f this study 
may shed more light on why some aircrews succeed in a given situation while others do 
not. Additionally, the study research design, methodology and results could be useful in 
complementing other specific measures of performance, measures o f effectiveness 
research, and training applications that have only used explicit data. Finally, 
interpretations from analyzed data captured in this domain-specific case study could be 
constructive in providing generalizations that contribute to individual and team 
behavioral decision theory. Results o f the study were also used as feedback to the 
training command and squadrons.
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Summary
Current administrative and training approaches do not routinely address aircrew 
deficiencies in decision making. Improvements in training critical thinking skills will 
most certainly lead to improvements in mission performance, saved equipment, and 
ultimately, saved lives. Investigations that capture effective cognitive approaches, 
thought protocols, and performance behaviors o f the most successful aircrews in time- 
critical decision making situations require combined data collection and analysis 
methodologies. This research study integrated three naturalistic decision making models 
(i.e., Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model, the Recognition/Metacognition (R/M) 
model, and the Aviation Decision Process model) that allowed an in-depth examination 
o f a single situation across and between novice and more experienced aircrews. This 
framework assisted in the discovery o f  rich, thematic connections between aircrew 
experience levels and decision processes and outcomes.
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
Despite training military personnel in analytical and procedural approaches to 
decision making, these strategies do not consistently result in optimal performance under 
varying dynamic conditions with variable degrees o f  complexity and stress. Emerging 
analyses from recent research studies (Pounds & Fallesen, 1995; Pascual & Henderson, 
1997; Zsambok, 1997; Bainbridge, 1999) have found that military personnel are using a 
recognitional approach to find solutions when they have had an experience with a similar 
problem type. Although other decision-making strategies are commonly used, the 
recognitional, or adaptive, naturalistic decision-making style has been found to dominate 
in dynamic environments. Findings from these decision-making studies have determined 
that expert decision-makers naturally leaned toward using experienced-based approaches 
rather than time consuming, concurrent comparisons o f options. Using the perspective 
that risky decision making is highly sensitive to variations in the task environment,
Payne (1985) suggests that an approach for studying risky choice involves examining 
several stages o f  information processing behavior that are highly contingent upon task 
and context variables.
17
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Cognitive approaches to decision making that focus on information processing 
have become a more dominant force over normative decision theory in recent years as 
reported by Maule (1985). The focus for much o f  the research has been, and continues to 
be, along two paths. First, an information processing focus to identify the separate stages 
o f information processing and explain how each operates. Second, a bigger picture focus 
on “complex cognitive skills like problem solving and considering how stages operate 
and interact in the execution o f  these skills” (p. 62).
Humphreys and Berkeley (1985) point out that one area that has received little 
attention is the motivation behind preferred decision-making strategies o f individuals 
within a team that may affect team performance. They suggest it is important to 
investigate “where uncertainty enters into the process o f conceptualizing a decision 
problem, thus enabling discussions on how it is handled by the decision maker at each 
point” (p.258). In real life decision problems, individuals conceptualize decision 
problems and then gage their ability to act upon an uncertain situation. To manage the 
inherent uncertainty, individuals select from coping mechanisms such as trial and error, 
use o f feedback, and treating uncertain parts o f  the decision problem as certain to attempt 
to manage a resolution.
Theoretical Framework
Within the literature examined, four processes underpin the theoretical 
framework o f the research: adaptive decision-making strategies, situational awareness, 
and effects o f experience on aircrew performance, and team performance and evaluation. 
These four areas will be discussed as they relate to the research proposed to examine the 
influence o f  experience in situational assessment and decision making with experienced
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and novice aircrews in a situation involving uncertainty, high stakes, and time constraints 
in a representative naturalistic setting.
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) is the study o f how people use their 
experience to make decisions in field settings (Zsambok, 1997) and this approach is 
“often informed by practical problems as opposed to testing hypotheses derived from 
theories” (p. 12). There are several features that distinguish the descriptive theories 
associated with naturalistic decision making from analytical or procedural approaches to 
problem solving or decision making under conditions o f risk. In time-critical situations 
where information is uncertain, a simplified task-shedding strategy that includes 
tradeoffs between speed and accuracy is often used. The variation in decision-making 
strategy used by experienced decision makers results in selection o f the first option that 
satisfies immediate requirements as compared to more analytical or procedural decision 
making approaches (Klein, 1993; Orasanu, 1999). The NDM approach calls for this 
phenomenon to be studied within meaningful contexts using participants with a range of 
experience in the domain studied as distinguished from normative models o f decision 
making that originated for use in economics and statistics.
The naturalistic, or adaptive, decision-making strategy is a more useful approach 
to studying decision making under stress in aviation than traditional research offered 
with normative analytical strategies (e.g., Baysian probability theory). NDM provides a 
framework for meaningful, relevant research structure and interpretation o f study results. 
The following criteria have been established for using the NDM approach for research: 
(a) context rich circumstances, (b) the use o f  expert participants, (c) the purpose o f  
research is to discover strategies rather than trying to detect deviations from rational
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standard, and (d) the locus o f  interest within decision episode includes situational 
awareness rather than a restriction to the choice alone (Zsambock 1993, 1997).
A number o f NDM theories have been examined in military and aircrew settings. 
Decision making analyses (Cohen & Freeman, 1996; Lipshitz 1995; Sarter & Woods, 
1997; Kuperman, 1998; Leedom, Adelman, Murphy, 1998) have been conducted to gain 
insight into how military decision makers reacted to situations and generated responses, 
and to determine what kind o f  information was seen as significant to the decisions. 
Several models o f naturalistic decision making strategy have been advanced in the last 
decade that assist in explaining real-world decision-making. Naturalistic decision 
making models and theories maintain that the decision maker’s expertise plays a central 
role in recognizing that a problem exists, in shaping the problem and in responding to the 
problem (Zsambok, 1997).
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) Models
Naturalistic decision models are used to investigate, describe, and predict 
decision-making styles across domains and provide the theoretical framework for this 
study. O f primary interest is work by Klein (1989,1993,1997) that acknowledges use o f 
other decision styles, such as analytic or option comparison, but emphasizes that these 
are less effective in time critical or high stress situations. As Klein points out, the issue 
is "how people develop and use experience, and the types o f strategies that are adapted to 
take advantage o f experience" (2000, p.165). Klein (1997) found that people tend to 
follow what appears to be their “instincts” or their “gut reaction” in time-critical, 
unfamiliar situations in order to save tune and effort in situational assessment and in 
comparing options when time is short and stakes are high.
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Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model. The dominant model used to 
examine naturalistic decision making is the Recognition-Primed (RPD) model (Klein et 
al., 1986) that underscores the importance o f domain-specific knowledge or experience 
required to generate and evaluate an effective course o f  action in a time-critical situation. 
This three step descriptive model o f  naturalistic decision making focuses on situational 
assessment required to accurately classify an unfamiliar situation rather than trying to 
determine which option will most likely result in a successful outcome. In the first step, 
once the problem has been appropriately classified the problem solver can then look for 
patterns or similarities to other situations in which he or she was able to negotiate a 
successful outcome.
The RPD model traces the use o f the decision maker’s experience in guiding this 
initial step and focuses on the decision maker’s expertise o f domain knowledge (i.e., 
critical cues and causal factors). This model differs from the approach taken in the 
classical model o f decision making which requires the decision maker to “decompose the 
situation into basic elements and perform analyses and calculations on the elements. The 
model departs most sharply from the majority o f classical models o f  decision making in 
its attempt to trace the use of experience” (Beach, Chi, Klein, Smith & Vicente, 1997, p. 
30).
The adaptation by the decision-maker to a naturalistic approach serves to reduce 
information overload, confusion, and assists in establishing accurate expectations. The 
second step o f  the RPD model is to select from a serial presentation a solution that will 
work. The final step in the model requires a mental rehearsal o f the action to identify 
potential problems (Lipshitz, 1995). In. this model, rule-based decisions require the least
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amount o f cognitive work while multiple responses that must be evaluated in light o f 
constraints and outcomes require more work (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993). The 
greatest amounts o f cognitive work are required i f  no response options are available and 
a response must be invented and evaluated for accuracy. This RPD model provides a 
frame for identifying weak links and biases in aviation decision-making processes.
Recognitional/Metacognitive (R/M) model. Another area o f analysis in decision 
making is concerned with the way people characterize circumstances or assess situations. 
Cohen, Freeman, & W olf (1996) argue that the standard normative approaches of 
assessing outcomes on the dimensions o f its subjected value or utility and its perceived 
likelihood o f  occurrence or subjective probability, as represented by the subjective utility 
theory or Baysian probability theory, miss the capability o f decision makers to construct 
stories to use their experience to consider pieces o f evidence in context. Rather, the 
assessment o f information is weighed in the context o f the plausibility o f a self- 
constructed “story” rather than taking the average o f the weighted items to construct 
probability estimates that are problematical and time consuming to use. The 
Recognitional/Metacognitive (R/M) model serves as an extension o f  the descriptive RPD 
model by adding another framework in which to study naturalistic decision making, 
“metarecognition is a cluster o f skills that support and go beyond the recognitional 
processes in situational assessment...” (Cohen, Freeman & Thompson, 1997, p. 258). 
The R/M model integrates meta-level controlled recognitional schemas used by decision 
makers to self critique then mental processes (i.e., assess response for p ro b le m s  of 
incompleteness, unreliability, or conflict), correct, and apply a “quick test” to give
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insight into adjustments they may need to make to take advantage o f  available resources 
and opportunities (Cohen & Freeman, 1996; Cohen et al., 1997).
Aviation Decision Process (ADP) model. Orasanu and Fischer (1997) developed 
an Aviation Decision Process (ADP) model, is also based on RPD model, which served 
as a frame for analyzing crew performance in the simulator. The ADP model is a  
conceptual framework that allows “for the prediction o f which decisions demand the 
greatest amount o f cognitive work, and where decision errors are most likely” (Orasanu, 
1997, p.49). This model consists o f  two major components: ambiguity in situational 
assessment and uncertainty in choosing a course o f  action.
Using a combination o f observations o f flight crews performing in high fidelity 
simulators and the Aviation Safety Reporting System database, Orasanu and Fischer 
(1997) conducted research on the relationship between stressors, decision errors, and 
accidents. The investigation integrated decision event data from major commercial 
airline mishap analyses from 1982 through 1997 with decision strategy in context data 
from two separate simulator studies. The result o f this effort was the creation o f  a 
decision event taxonomy that includes only components that are observable in crew 
performance. Orasanu (1997) concludes that the combined study analysis discovered 
that more effective crews were more flexible in their “application o f a varied repertoire 
o f  strategies” while less effective crews “did not appear to distinguish among the various 
types o f decisions, applying the same strategies in all cases regardless o f  variations in 
their demands” (p. 356). The Aviation Decision model is tailored to this taxonomy and 
includes a range o f  decision-making strategies from “rapid intuitive decisions to
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analytic, option comparison, and creation o f novel solutions for unfamiliar problems” 
(Flin, p. 2, 1998).
Experience and Performance Differences 
Research has indicated a need to identify the effect o f different experience levels 
on team behavior and performance because studies done to extract training needs from 
individual members has been unreliable depending on the experience level a team 
member has with a particular behavior. “Research grounded in normative decision 
models tends to ignore the enormous power conferred by domain expertise” (Orasanu, 
1993, p. 152) that is critical in crew time and workload reduction. This finding is 
supported by Cohen & Freeman (1996) who discovered related evidence that experience 
in efficient encoding and retrieval o f  domain-specific information is critical to 
interpretation o f vague/nondiagnostic cues along with cues that may also be conflicting 
or difficult to interpret in context. Additionally, research has shown that metacognitive 
skills o f experts are superior to novices. These skills include self-monitoring skills, 
better structure o f domain knowledge (Patel & Groen, 1991) as well as the superior 
ability to perceive meaningful patterns and to retrieve domain-relevant facts (Glaser & 
Chi, 1988). Experts are more likely to terminate a problem solving strategy that is not 
meeting situational requirements (Larkin, 1983) because they are using their highly 
developed metacognitive skills.
Comparing Expert and Novice Performance
Orasanu and Fischer (1992) found that more effective commercial airline crews 
reduced communications as their workload demand increased and when commands were 
issued the content o f the communication was directed towards future events. In another
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study on the effect o f  experience level on decision outcomes o f commercial airline pilots 
Stokes, Kemper and Kite (1997) used desktop flight simulation and cognitive testing to 
test the adequacy o f traditional views o f decision making in aviation. This research 
found that although experienced commercial pilots generated 30% more action 
alternatives than novice pilots and were far more likely (71% of the time) to carry out the 
first option that satisfied the circumstance, the experience level o f the pilot was not the 
best predictor o f decision-making performance in the scenario; rather it was the number 
o f relevant cues detected.
Prince, Hartel, and Salas (1992) conducted an empirical study using military 
aviators. Thirty crews o f undergraduate Naval aviators, o f  different experience levels, 
were used to investigate the relationship between team decision making-strategies and 
performance. There were two major findings of this investigation that are most relevant 
to this study. First, some crews tended to use the same strategy for all decisions they had 
to make in the cockpit; usually these were the least experienced crews. Second, the same 
strategy for decision-making is not equally effective for all decisions.
Team/Aircrew Performance and Evaluation
Although decision-making data is the primary focus of this study, it cannot be 
researched in isolation. Most successful decision-making strategies in organizations are 
dependent on assessing the current situation and determining/predicting which 
information will prove most useful in meeting immediate goals (Janis, 1989). Similarly, 
the interplay between decision-making, situational assessment, and crew coordination are 
primary dynamics in safety o f  flight, management o f  emergencies and critical decisions 
in the cockpit, hi aviation contexts it is essential to consider the process o f  team
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coordination as it affects cockpit situational awareness, shared problem models, decision­
making processes and decision outcomes. Effective crew communication and 
coordination are integral to the interpretation, exchange, and use o f situational cues and 
are a major focus for the collection and analysis o f the data related to flight crew 
performance.
Results o f  a  meta-analysis (Hartel, Smith & Prince, 1991) o f Navy and Marine 
Corps mishaps that occurred between 1980-1990 revealed that decision-making errors 
contributed to 188 mishaps, problems in situational awareness contributed to 229 
mishaps, and crew coordination errors contributed to 316 mishaps during the 10 year 
period covered by the meta analysis are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1.




Contributing Factor in Percentage of 
Total Class “A” Mishaps 80% 60% 50%
Additionally, research conducted by the Naval Air Warfare Center examined 
these constructs and determined that (a) training in these complex cognitive, advanced 
team skills needed to be mission and context specific and that (b) these skills were 
perishable, thus requiring refresher training. Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas and 
Volpe (1993) conclude that theorizing about team performance and training has not 
yielded generalizable principles that have practical application. This is so partly because 
o f  the complexity o f  the team arena and in part because o f  the number o f  variables and
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constructs that must be considered in the study o f teams in their dynamic work 
environments.
Approaches to Team Research
Several empirical approaches to increasing knowledge o f team behavior and 
strategies in measuring team performance are briefly discussed below as they relate to 
the theme o f understanding and measuring team performance. The first two studies 
examined the use cognitive approaches to investigate links between team members’ 
thinking processes and perceptions o f  team behavior importance. The third and fourth 
studies addressed the need for further theoretical development through applied research 
with a focus on the construct validity o f measures o f teamwork. This research uses 
military aircrews in simulated missions to address requirements to clarify and measure 
those process variables that are important to team functioning. A similar series o f studies 
conducted with United States Air Force aircrews focused on measuring a wide range of 
individual and team processes as they relate to mission outcomes. Other research 
methodology and data analyses techniques discussed were employed in investigating 
team performance in incident management and modeling experiments that generated and 
validated mathematical models to predict optimal fusion o f information for team 
performance are presented.
Team member experience levels and teamwork knowledge. A  study by Rentsch, 
Heffner & Duffy (1994) explored the relationship between teamwork knowledge, or 
teamwork schemas, and team experience. This research investigated team members with 
varying levels o f experience to determine whether this variable o f  experience played a 
role in teamwork conceptualization and subsequent team behavior. The methodologies
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used in. this investigation o f  teamwork knowledge in relation to teamwork experience 
were nontraditional to the organizational science literature. Although the methods used 
were “based on methods accepted by cognitive and education scientists who study 
schemas” (p. 455) practical implications from this study, which are “consistent with 
contemporary expert-novice literature” (Rentsch et al., 1994, p. 450), suggests that team 
training should be designed and delivered based on a person’s prior teamwork 
knowledge and experiences. Additionally, the authors conclude that organizational 
managers and team leaders need to consider potential team members’ experience levels 
when making team assignments. These authors deduced that if  team members think 
about work differently depending on their level o f experience, then team training should 
be focused toward team experience level. One o f  the limitations o f this study that has 
implications for future research is that a median split was used to differentiate higher and 
lower self-reported team experience levels o f  participants. Researchers may need to 
identify other means to measure experience levels o f  individuals other than assignment 
to, and time spent on, various teams.
The team literature reviewed recognizes an established need to institute metrics 
for identifying critical team training needs. The purpose of the Baker and Salas (1996) 
study was to investigate the effects o f experience on perceptions o f team behavior 
importance in accomplishing a  mission. In their literature review Baker and Salas found 
that “the effects o f experience have been documented for individual tasks. . .  but 
research has yet to investigate the extent to which team member experience affects 
perceptions o f team behavior importance” (Baker & Salas, 1996, p. 238). In the Baker 
and Salas study with aviators, five dimensions o f team behavior commonly used in task
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and team performance analysis (i.e., criticality of error, difficulty, time spent, difficulty 
in learning, and importance for training) were rated by pilots on questionnaires 
developed to reflect specific teamwork requirements. These requirements were 
previously generated from a series o f critical incident interviews with military pilots. 
Respondents included U.S. Navy instructor and student pilots randomly selected from a 
primary flight training organization. Pilots with varying degrees o f  flight experience 
used a seven-point relative rating scale to rate the five dimensions as they related to team 
behavior in their aircraft. Data were analyzed by correlating each behavioral dimension 
(dependent variables) with the pilot’s overall importance rating. Job experience served 
as the independent variable.
In general, results o f the study support the hypothesis that experience level would 
factor into team members’ emphasis in the importance of various team dimensions. Less 
experienced crewmembers placed greater emphasis on difficulty on performing a team 
behavior while more experienced crewmembers judged time spent performing a behavior 
to have more criticality in overall team behavior importance. However, it is important to 
note that the less experienced aviators emphasized difficulty in performing a task rather 
than learning the task as posited by the first hypothesis in this research. These results 
suggest, “different team behaviors should be the target o f training, depending on the 
experience level o f the trainees” (Baker & Salas, 1996, p. 243).
Team performance measurement. A study by Reinartz (1993) explored issues in 
the development o f  methodology and analysis techniques to study how teams cope with 
multi-fault incidents. To achieve the aim o f the team behavior research Reinartz 
explained that “it was necessary to develop both (a) a methodology to obtain behavioral
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data and (b) analysis techniques to elucidate knowledge about this behavior which could 
be applied to the design o f control rooms, procedures, and training systems” (1993, p. I). 
In preparing the experimental design, a  literature review included identification o f the 
methodological approaches to studying complex decision making, procedural tasks, and 
protocols for data collection in a nuclear power plant. Actual workplace observations 
were used to create complex procedural scenarios for use in the experiment. During the 
experiment, scenarios were videotaped to ensure all data were collected. Additionally, to 
ensure a robust cognitive process trail, operators verbalized procedures that might have 
interfered with task-related interaction and led to confusion among team members. The 
verbal protocols collected from the operators as they performed their work greatly 
assisted in the analysis o f  teams’ cognitive processes (i.e., planning, decision-making and 
problem solving) related to coping behavior. However, Reinartz discovered that sub­
problem areas (e.g., defining team strategies, information choices and obstacles) were 
difficult to define with the data analysis approaches used. So through what the author 
describes as “... an iterative process o f becoming more familiar with data, especially 
technical aspects o f  an incident handling” (1993, p. 7) a clearer direction to analysis 
evolved. Determining specific team behaviors o f  interest and their levels o f description 
were accomplished using an “heuristic strategy o f  an ad hoc level o f description and 
making use o f  all the discernible and recognizably useful information” (p. 7). A 
hierarchical task analysis was then developed and used to build up hierarchical team goal 
structures. This methodology, in concert with videotaping scenarios, assisted in 
examining individual and team activities in a  chronological order. Reinartz also 
discovered that recording start and end times o f  operator behavior that added a
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significant cognitive contribution to the team’s subgoal/goal revealed differences in 
operators’ strategies in handling a complex problem. This unconventional approach was 
found more useful than previous methodologies in documenting team behavior in 
complex non-procedural situations.
The same concern for the precision required in understanding the nature of 
effective team performance was addressed in a series o f experiments designed and 
carried out by Kleinman, Luh, Pattipati, and Serfaty (1992). A major objective o f this 
endeavor was to show that the normative-descriptive modeling approach to decision 
making, previously used in static situations, is a valid and powerful method for building 
quantitative models for team performance.
The first o f  a series o f experiments was designed using two independent variables 
that the normative model predicted would affect the information-combining processing. 
U.S. Navy shipboard tactical teams were used to record activities that included the 
blending and integration o f  different internal and external sources o f information. Data 
analysis by Kleinman et al. (1992) identified four cognitive biases in the team 
information fusion process that are useful in accurately predicting how team members 
weigh and combine sequential information from distributed sources of varying quality. 
Using mathematical models team member biases were quantified and integrated into a 
normative-descriptive model that predicted the actual experimental data far better than 
the normative model did. As the researchers concluded, there was a  significant amount 
of knowledge gained in the insight into the human decision-making process by altering 
the normative model to capture human behavior. The subject’s information sources,
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including other team members, were received by the subjects with varying degrees o f 
bias.
The findings o f  this research indicate a need to make team members aware o f 
their potential to use poor decision-making strategies through faulty information 
integration. As reported by Kleinman, et al. (1992), subjects in groups o f two and three 
in these studies had a pattern of: (a) consistently overweighing the most recent 
information; (b) continually placing some weight on prior knowledge; (c) not 
discounting common prior knowledge in communication updates; and (d) undervaluing 
the information received from their partner(s). These findings are important in providing 
a framework for further research in studying limitations and biases that may limit 
decision-makers.
Although data collection on team performance is usually restricted to simulated 
environments and controlled settings, this has not been as much o f a restraint to research 
in team performance as the lack o f measurements available to validate applicable team- 
related theories and models and decision strategies. According to Fowlkes, Lane, Salas, 
Franz and Oser (1994) the “slow headway made in understanding team performance may 
be attributed in large part to the lack o f sound measurement approaches. Significant 
advancement requires theoretically based and psychometrically sound methods of 
observing and quantifying team performance” (p. 48).
The purpose o f the team process measurement experiment by Brannick, Prince, 
Prince, and Salas (1995) was to document an approach used to develop and evaluate a  set 
o f tools to measure team process. Process was chosen over outcomes because, “in 
theory, process variables can be altered or effectively managed more easily than outcome
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variables” (p. 642). In effect, process variables may present a “truer, richer picture o f 
team functioning than outcome variables and they show promise for improving team 
functioning” (p. 641). The three central questions o f  this study were: (a) can judges 
provide psychometrically sound evaluations o f  teamwork (b) can those evaluations be 
correlated with more traditional expert evaluation, and (c) do such evaluations show 
good convergent and discriminant validity over occasions (i.e., scenarios)?
Participants in this study were 51 teams o f Navy instructor and student pilots who 
were assigned randomly to one o f  18 graduate student judges who evaluated crew 
coordination in each team in two simulated flight scenarios. The process indices used in 
this research were communication, cooperation (cohesion) and coordination as they are 
related to team effectiveness. In addition to subject matter expert scores two other 
methods o f data collection were used. Two forms were also created and used in an 
attempt to attain a high degree o f  convergent and discriminant validity across judges. 
These forms were used to assign observable behaviors to specific dimensions and link 
behaviors in a dimension to evaluations o f the behavior.
Data analysis was conducted to compare instructor and student pilot performance 
in the two scenarios using individual two-sample independent r-tests. Results o f  aircrew 
scores showed the means o f instructor pilot ratings were generally larger than the mean 
ratings given to the student pilots in the same scenario and between scenarios. Although 
researchers refer to the rating difference as “significant”, they did not report the 
magnitude o f  the statistic o f  difference between the two sample means that would justify 
rejecting the null hypothesis.
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Data-based training. Evaluation o f aircrews in a simulator by experts using 
evaluative criteria has been validated in many aviation-related studies. Most recently, 
this methodology has assisted in finding major effects between aircrew coordination and 
performance processes and mission outcomes in several aircrew studies in the United 
States Air Force (Spiker, et al, 1996; Nullmeyer et al., 1999).
Several U. S. Air Force-sponsored studies using a behavior-based and data driven 
approach have begun to pay major dividends for tactical military aircrew training. An 
Air Force sponsored experimental study conducted by Thompson, Tourville, Spiker, and 
Nullmeyer (1999) observed mission qualified crews as they planned and executed a 
mission in a high fidelity simulator. The purpose of this study was to examine the 
relationship between Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) skills (which include 
situational awareness and decision-making) and successful mission performance. 
Findings o f  this study using sixteen experienced MH-53J special operations aircrews 
were consistent with previous U.S. Air Force studies in various platforms such as the C-5 
(Spiker, Tourville, Bragger, Dowdy, & Nullmeyer; 1999) and B-52 (Thorton, Kaempf, 
Zeller, & McAnulty, 1992) that represented an advancement in a practical descriptive 
approach to investigating and documenting aircrew behavior and performance. In the 
Thompson et al. study (1999), sixteen fleet crews’ CRM behaviors and mission 
performance were independently rated by two Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) during 
specific mission phases using behaviorally anchored rating scales (BARS). Overall 
CRM ratings were then correlated with overall mission performance ratings to assess the 
role o f  CRM in mission performance. This study adds to the previous work that 
identified relevant crew CRM behaviors as different for diverse aircraft and mission
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performance. Although the research methodology was weakened by lack o f  inter-rater 
reliability since only one rater was used for each criterion within the CRM and 
performance variables, the data collection instruments used are a valuable addition to 
both training and research methodology. Evaluation instruments defined specific aircrew 
behaviors at different phases o f  flight/the mission that consistently and reliably predict 
effective flight and mission accomplishment. The findings in this study were consistent 
with previous research using military aviators as study subjects. The conclusions o f the 
study that have training and operational importance are: (a) CRM can be measured and 
analyzed when defined in terms o f  measurable behaviors, (b) CRM and mission 
performance are highly related (75% of variance accounted for and statistically reliable 
(p <. 001), (c) the quality o f the mission preparation predicts performance during mission 
execution, and (d) the specific behaviors associated with high or low CRM ratings were 
typically not covered in traditional Air Force training programs.
Summary
As discussed, the literature review describes a wide range o f perspectives on 
designing and conducting decision making research in a team environment. The 
combination o f theoretical frameworks and methodologies for studying the effect o f 
experience on performance has been advanced but has only begun to meet the challenges 
o f studying individuals and teams in their dynamic work environments. It is apparent 
that data collection methodologies and analytical techniques need to be improved and 
new ones generated to meet further research requirements as well as to generate effective 
training in adaptive decision making.




The purpose o f this chapter is to describe in more detail than Chapter I the data 
collection and analytical strategies for this mixed design comparative case study. The 
study design participants, procedures, instruments, and data analyses are discussed. 
Techniques o f  data management are described, as are statistical assumptions and 
analytical techniques.
Design and Rationale
The design of this study employed both quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies to gain insight into themes that emerged in aircrew/team decision-making 
strategies and performance. This comparative case study approach integrated data 
collection and analysis strategies. Theories o f  naturalistic and aviation decision making 
processes, expert/novice performance, and team training literature guided the research.
Quantitative data analysis demonstrated the differences in novice and 
experienced aircrew process and outcome performance that were then decomposed 
descriptively. This strategy provided for a richer understanding o f the data and is used 
extensively by behavioral and social scientists (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The focus 
o f data analysis was on the effects o f aircrew prior knowledge and experience in the 
detection, assessment, and risk management o f  atypical situations in-varying degrees o f  
uncertainty and time constraints.
36
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This study used a within case analysis, as typical for multiple case treatment, and 
provided a thematic description o f each crew group experience. As expected, each 
successive case analysis informed a deeper understanding o f subsequent analyses so an 
iterative approach was undertaken that guided a thematic cross-case analysis. The 
qualitative structure o f this study centered on the use o f an inquiry method that was 
distinctively suited to reveal the nature o f the circumstances and the thoughts 
experienced by aircrews. The context rich environment forced aircrews to assess risk 
and manage non-standard approaches to problem resolution by recognizing and dealing 
with ambiguous cues and multiple failures in a series o f  dynamic situations.
Data collection and analysis triangulation used a diversity o f sampling and 
analytical strategies by multiple observers, interviewers, and analysts. Aircrew 
experience level served as the dependent variable for the study. The independent 
variables were process ratings in seven observable scenario tasks as well as outcome 
performance rankings based on final disposition o f  the crew and the aircraft.
The following study hypotheses and research questions framed the relationship 
between aircrew experience and phenomena related to effective aircrew situational 
assessment and decision making under varying degrees o f  uncertainty and time 
constraints:
Hypothesis It  Experienced aircrews will receive better process ratings (i.e., technical 
skills, workflow, information sharing, consensus building, operational risk assessment 
and management and back-up routine) than novices in handling a specific in-flight 
emergency situation involving uncertainty.
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Hypothesis 2: Decisions (i.e., outcome rankings) made by experienced aircrews in an 
uncertain situation involving a specific in-flight emergency are rated as being o f higher 
quality than those made by novice aircrews.
Hypothesis 3: Process ratings are correlated with the decision outcome ratings for a 
specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty.
Research Question 1: What adaptive recognitional/metacognitive decision-making 
strategies emerge from aircrews in a specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty?
Research Question 2: In what way do adaptive/metacognitive decision-making patterns 
differ among successful and less than successful aircrews challenged with a specific in­
flight emergency involving uncertainty?
Research Question 3: What characteristics/factors seem to define the most successful 
aircrew outcomes in a specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty?
Participants
This research study was conducted in a field setting at a naval aviation training 
facility using active duty aircrews in a high fidelity flight simulator. The target 
populations for this study were experienced and novice aviators (pilots and naval flight 
officers (NFO’s) who serve as copilot tactical coordinators (COTAC's)). This study was 
limited to an S-3B aircraft non-tactical mission using only two o f  the three 
crewmembers. (The third crewmember serves as a weapons system officer (TACCO) in 
tactical environments.) For the purpose o f  this study, the non-essential TACCO position 
was unoccupied. Since the study scenario did not involve a tactical mission element the 
primary responsibility for the Naval Flight Officer, or COTAC, was to serve as the 
navigator and to provide safety o f flight back up for the pilot.
i  ■
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Sixteen 2-person crews (1 pilot and 1 COT AC) were represented in the final data 
set in this study. Eight crews were made up of students nearing the end o f  initial S-3B 
qualification training. The other 8 crews were experienced aviators undergoing annual 
refresher training. Operational flight trainer and student availability were the prime 
considerations for novice crew participation. Trainer availability and annual flight 
standardization (i.e., NATOPS check) requirements were the main considerations of 
crews paired and scheduled from fleet squadrons.
Novice pairings o f aviators for the non-syllabus event were in the same class 
group and were o f equal military rank with similar flight hour levels. Experienced 
participants in the study represented four fleet squadrons and one aircraft carrier ship’s 
company staff billet. Fleet squadrons were requested to pair the most experienced pilots 
and COT AC’s. Most experienced participants used the study scenario as part o f their 
annual NATOPS re-qualification training requirements. Fleet pairings o f aviators 
generally had higher ranking, more experienced pilots paired with lower ranking 
COTAC’s and all but one crew o f fleet experienced participants were crewed with 
members o f their own squadron.
Attrition from the Study
All participants that completed the scenario agreed to remain in the study. 
However, two fleet crews that completed the study scenario and the debriefrinterview 
were replaced in the data set because instructors allowed them to land on alternate 
runways at the home field. This option deviated from the scenario structure and intent to 
place the crews in an extremis naturalistic decision environment for the final scenario
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event. In order to control for unequal sample sizes two additional experienced crews 
were obtained.
Participant Demographics
Study participants were drawn from the S-3 aviator population and ranged in age 
from 24 to 41 years old. All aircrews consisted o f  one pilot and one COT AC who had 
completed basic naval aviation flight training between 1983 and 2001. Novices had less 
than 100 hours in the S-3B. Experienced crews had between 700 and 5,000 flight hours 
in the S-3 A/B. The S-3 A was a  previous variant o f the S-3B modified to include 
enhanced tactical capabilities in the early 1990’s. Although many o f the “backend” 
systems were upgraded, there was little done to change the cockpit, the aircraft handling 
characteristics, or the “wings and engines” -related performance capabilities of the 
aircraft Accordingly, senior pilots and COTAC’s with experience in both the A and B 
models were considered to simply have a greater number o f hours in the S-3 aircraft.
Combined crew flight hours of crew assignments for the study scenario are 
displayed in Table 2. Crews I through 8 were novice crews and crews 9 through 16 were 
fleet experienced crews.
Table 2




3 4 5 6 T 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Combined 
Crew Flight 90 
Hours
88 52 70 183 180 130 54 3050 4200 1570 1630 4600 1600 1650 5650
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The participants’ total aircraft model flight hours, simulator hours, and recency of 
simulator and flight times are reported in Table Ai, Appendix A. Table 3, below, 
presents the range and mean o f S-3 flight time for both novice and experienced groups.
Table 3
Individual (Pilot and COTAC) and Combined Crew S-3 Flight Hours
Crew Level Pilot Pilot Mean COTAC COTAC Combined Combined
Range of Hours Range of Mean Hours Crew Range Total Crew
Hours Hours Mean
Novice 12-80 54 24-100 53 52-183 52
Experienced 650-3700 1569 730-2100 1425 1600-4600 1497
Representativeness o f the Sample
The representativeness of both experienced and novice aircrews in the sample 
population reflect the general range o f flight time in the S-3 community. The training 
command sample o f novice aviators included 16 o f  the 75 students that annually 
complete the familiarization phase o f  instruction at the Fleet Replacement Squadron 
(FRS). The sixteen study participants represent approximately 20 % o f novice crews in 
the S-3 community. Four of the ten S-3 fleet squadrons were represented in the study 
sample and the eight crews o f two represented approximately 10 % o f the total front seat 
aircrews (pilots and COTAC’s) assigned to fleet squadrons in the S-3 community. 
Instructor/Subject Matter Expert Raters
Observers who were experienced flight and simulator instructors rated pilot and 
COTAC crews’ process performance. Subject Matter Experts (SME’s), with at least five 
years instructor experience and between 1100 and 2700 hours o f flight time in the S-3 A 
and/or S-3B were personally selected to participate in this study based on their 
reputations as exceptional, “non-threatening” instructors by both student and peer 
evaluations that are conducted routinely at the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS). A
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total o f  eight process raters (seven civilian and one military) used scenario-specific rating 
instrument to evaluate participants. At least two pilot and two NFO (i.e., COTAC) raters 
were used for each crew. Depending on availability, between one and four trained senior 
evaluators participated in the actual simulator event and debrief/interview. Other process 
raters evaluated aircrews from audio, visual and simulator instrument panel data 
collected on the computer debriefing system that recorded the data during the event.
In order to control for experimenter-expectancy bias a group o f  at least four 
observers (several crews had five observers) rated process and an independent group of 
four outcome raters were used for the final outcome ranking to decrease learning of 
influence techniques, to randomize expectancies, and to increase the generality o f  results. 
A fixed outcome data set for each crew were presented to the second set o f independent 
raters (active duty and reserve) that were not involved in the study and were not assigned 
to squadrons o f  the study participants. Demographics for process raters are contained in 
Table A2 o f  Appendix A.
Protection o f Human Subjects 
Administrative approval for conducting and publishing this study was sought 
from cognizant authorities o f eight organizations: (a) the university from which the 
doctoral degree will be granted, (b) the commander that oversees United States Pacific 
Fleet Air Forces, (c) the administrative authority for S-3B fleet squadrons and training 
simulators, and (d) the five squadrons from which participants in the study were 
assigned. Appendix B contains the approval to conduct the study from the United States 
Navy by the direction o f  the Commander o f  the Naval Air Force Pacific Fleet as well as
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the approval o f from the S-3 community leadership at North Island Naval air Station. 
Appendix C contains the participant consent form.
All participants were told they could opt out o f the formal study after the 
simulator event and still obtain an “off the record” debrief. All crews that participated in 
the scenario agreed to remain in the study. Two crews were disqualified because 
instructors during the scenario event used non-standard procedures. The researcher did 
not receive any negative feedback: on the conduct o f the study from study participants or 
their respective commands. The data collection environment provided a safe, realistic 
venue to present and provide aircrews with multiple opportunities to assess and respond 
to critical safety o f  flight problems both during and after the simulator session.
Scenario Design Elements 
Since it is usually optimal to have comparable degrees of detail and precision in 
the scenario design as are experienced in real world flight (Cook & Campbell, 1979) the 
study scenario was designed to represent a combination o f  actual atypical and emergency 
events that have or could occur in the S-3B aircraft. Because “decision making is highly 
contingent on the demands o f  the task” (Payne, 1982, p. 382) the final study scenario 
event design reflects a range o f  dynamics associated with task demand to elicit different 
types o f  problem solving and judgment. A variety o f cues and situations were developed 
for the study scenario to reflect elements and factors that are potential issues in the S-3 
crews’ operational decision making environment. The naturalistic environment as 
described by Orasanu and Connolly (1995) may include several or all o f  the following: 
(a) ill-structured problems, (b) uncertain dynamics, (c) changing, ill-defined or
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competing goals, (d) crew action/feedback loops, (e) time stress, (0  high risk, multiple 
players, and (g) consideration, o f  organizational goals and norms.
Using the naturalistic decision making elements as guidance, the specific contexts 
for scenario tasks were obtained from a combination o f (a) recent S-3B mishap and 
training data, (b) an S-3B cognitive task analysis for decision skills curriculum 
development, and (c) the framework developed by Hammond, Hamm, Grassia &
Pearson (1997) that describes the cognitive properties that distinguish intuitive and 
analytical approaches to decision making. As recommended by Hammond et al. (1997) 
intuition-inducing task conditions were used to set the final decision apart from previous 
tasks. The intuition-generating characteristics that set the final decision environment 
apart from previous events were as follows:
• a shorter response period allowed
• a larger number o f  cues required
• simultaneous cues given
• perceptual rather than objective measurement of cues (i.e., ill-structured)
• a low rather than high decomposition o f the task required
• no organizing principle available from standard operating procedures (SOP’s), 
previous training, or experience (i.e., unstructured)
• a low rather than high certainty that the task(s) could be accomplished safely and 
within established procedures
A synopsis o f the specific naturalistic decision elements and appropriate 
procedural, tactical, and strategic crew responses (S. K. Hunt, personal correspondence, 
December 10, 2001) associated with each o f the seven scenario trigger cues in the study 
scenario is contained in Appendix: D. The elements associated with each o f  the seven 
process ratings were developed and reviewed by four senior instructors. The review took
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into consideration the instructors’ knowledge o f both experienced and novice aircrews’ 
time to acknowledge recognition o f  problem cues, time to troubleshoot aircraft 
indications/respond to cues/information, and manage and coordinate accumulated and 
projected tasks.
The prototype scenario design was tested with two novice and two experienced 
aircrews to validate data collection categories, criteria, and protocols and included 
determination of: (a) the strength of trigger stimuli in the scenario events, (b) 
requirements for performance evaluation criteria, (c) validation o f  most pertinent aircrew 
and aircraft parameter outcome criteria, (d) post-hoc aircrew interview/debrief protocol 
and questions, (e) reliability o f digital playback file capture, and (f) the most robust 
multivariate statistic for data analysis.
Based on the initial evaluation of the scenario, modifications were made to the 
scenario brief and instructor protocol guidelines to eliminate aircrews’ selection of 
alternative courses o f action (i.e., land on a different runway). Additionally, adjustments 
made in the scenario event stressors forced more rapid rates o f data processing and 
decision making by aircrews in each subsequent scenario event.
Process Variable Definitions
The scenario process variables were defined in a joint effort between the 
researcher and senior instructors using previous S-3 mishaps, training trends, and prior 
cognitive and skill task analysis results used for decision skills integration into the FRS 
syllabus. Events were selected that induced or “triggered" procedural, analytical, and/or 
an adaptive intuition-inducing cognitive state based on the task: properties and time
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
available. Table 4 summarizes task elements related to each o f the seven scenario events 
observed for process scores.
Table 4




Cue /Trigger Structure of 
Problem
Crew Task
1 Normal flight instruments
N/A Takeoff under normal 
conditions
2
Illumination o f 
flashing red 
Master Warning 




Panel Lights in direct 
line o f  vision o f  
Starter Light. Well- 
defined procedures 




3 Checklist Normal structure interrupted by Tower
Complete checklist. Dump 
fuel.
4
Oil pressure gage 
indication drops 
significantly in No. 
2 engine
Ill-structured 
significant safety o f 
flight issue with only 
remaining engine.
Retard throttle to IDLE and 
monitor engine. Crew unable 
to follow procedure that 
requires shut down o f  engine to 
preclude fire and possible loss 





light No. 1 engine)
Ill-structured under 
extremis
Consider contingencies for 
single-engine approach and go- 
around profiles.
Monitor No. 2 engine. 
Selectively choose/abbreviate 
sections o f checklists to 
comply in time available. 
Dump fuel if  not done.
6
No arresting gear 




Contingency planning- Brief 
loss o f No. 2 engine. Brief 
wave-off and hook skip 
contingencies.
7
Fouled deck at 






Crew must determine i f  they 
can land and stop by 
intersection.
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Outcome Variable Definitions 
Instructors that assisted with the scenario design defined outcome variables a 
priori. The variables that made up the final aircraft position and configuration “snap shot” 
data were used to identify priorities in the quality of the crews’ execution o f  the final 
event decision. The simulator data sets obtained from the computer debriefing system 
display and data analysis software, reported in Appendix E, were used for the outcome 
ranking o f  all crews. The outcome data sets included: (a) airspeed, (b) altitude, (c) angle 
o f attack, (d) flap position, (e) gear position, (f) hook position, (g) fuel remaining, (h) 
speed brake position, (i) emergency hydraulics pump (EHP), (j) visual speed indicator 
(VSI), (k) heading, and (I) geo position.
Final Scenario Design 
The final scenario design established a simple baseline takeoff and departure 
procedural decision that could be compared to less structured situations requiring more 
complex decision making to resolve unclear and/or unstructured problems as the flight 
scenario progressed. The last o f seven scenario events established a novel situation that 
required a creative problem-solving decision strategy. The seven process scores are 
based on the crews’ recognition o f and reactions to the events as sequenced in the study 
scenario. As described earlier, the task condition for the final event was distinguished by 
the greatest number o f intuition-generating characteristics (i.e., lack o f structure). The 
novelty o f  the truck in the runway on final approach leaves the crew with no standard 
procedures or rules to guide them in their response. The study scenario events are 
depicted on the scenario timeline in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Scenario timeline and event flow.
Sequence o f Procedures 
Data were collected over a two-week period for novice crews and five-month 
period for fleet crews. Upon reporting for the scheduled simulator event, participants 
received a letter from the researcher with a brief explanation as to the nature o f  the study 
and the selection criteria for participants (i.e., experience level and no previous exposure 
to the study scenario). After discussing the consent form with the participants and upon 
receiving signed permission to use participant simulator and debrief data for study 
purposes, a  personal background data form was given to the participants to complete.
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Flight Simulator Scenario Protocol
Participants had 10 minutes to conduct a crewmember brief after the instructor 
gave them the conditions for the scenario. The 20-minute scenario event was conducted 
as outlined on the evaluation sheet. The study scenario was given under as similar as 
possible conditions in the flight simulator for all crews. The instructor/raters used the 
scenario event timeline as guidance for event cue initiation and for tower 
communications. Instructors used their discretion to respond to crew inquiries and to 
manage the seven scenario events within the 20-minute time allocation.
Data Collection and Replav Device
A prototype data collection device, customized for the S-3B operational flight 
trainer, digitally captured flight simulator data and is depicted in Figure 2. This system 
was used to digitally recall and display data from selected cockpit instruments and 
controls, a  three-dimensional model o f  the aircraft, and an audio/video file o f the aircrew.
Figure 2. Digital debriefing system screen, display.
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Although the entire event was captured on a digital file, instructors were able to 
“mark” specific portions o f  the flight event for immediate access during the debrief to 
aid both instructors and participants in the recall o f  events and to support instructional 
points. Field notes recorded aircraft geographical position flight path patterns and 
served as a back-up to the digitally recorded files. After completion o f the scenario the 
participants were escorted back to the briefing room and reminded that the 
debrief/interview would be audiotaped. The 40 to 60-minute tape recorded 
debrief/interview with the researcher and between one and up to four instructors, and up 
to three instructors, was conducted in a debrief room with a debriefing station to replay 
digital debrief files.
Debrief/Interview Protocol
During the debrief/interview, semi-structured questions were used to guide the 
debrief interview. Crew and crewmember self-assessments were prompted using probe 
questions originated (Klein et al., 1986) to elicit specific information about situational 
awareness and decision elements. These questions were augmented by task-specific 
instructor and researcher queries and comments. Participants’ post scenario 
interview/debrief data were recorded and transcribed by the researcher and coded a 
posteriori from interpretations o f those data. Content analysis o f decision processes 
revealed by the participants in the post-scenario interview/debrief focused on participant 
verbalization and self-assessment o f  their reconstructed experiences (both apparent and 
tacit). Baseline interview questions related to situational awareness issues and decision 
strategies are found in the Instructor Guide (Appendix F). There was no mention o f 
process ratings during the interview/debrief. Field notes were taken during the debrief
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by the researcher as a back up for the tape recording and to establish the position o f  the 
crewmember for transcription as their comments were audio taped.
During the debrief/interview relevant portions of the flight event “marked” by 
instructors was used to replay flight information (i.e., flight instrumentation, aircraft 
aspect) as well as communications and crew behaviors. The digital files enabled 
instructors and aircrews to access marked portions o f the flight for recollection and/or 
clarification o f event experiences. The recall of self-reported situational assessments and 
judgments were obtained on a tape recorder for both individual and crew interactions. At 
the completion o f the debrief/interview, the tape recorder was turned off so comments by 
the researcher, instructors, and/or the participants could be made “off the record.” The 
debrief concluded with delivery o f  copies o f  the signed consent forms to participants. 
Procedures for Raters
Crew process performance data were obtained from operationalized study 
variables in the flight scenario. Raters used the criteria established for the process 
variables in the scenario instrument to guide their evaluations. Process raters also 
independently recorded general observations o f the actual simulated event. Raters not 
present for the event watched the digital audio/visual files o f the scenario session and 
recorded their process ratings and general comments on the evaluation sheet for each 
crew.
At the conclusion o f process data collection for all crews a separate set o f  data 
related solely to aircraft parameters, configuration, and spatial orientation in the final 
“snapshot” o f the event was created. The final outcome data sets for the 12 crews were 
de-identified o f crew numbers and replaced with randomly assigned alphabetical
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designators to eliminate a possible source of rater bias. These outcome data sets were 
then presented to an independent group o f four outcome raters to rank order using their 
expert judgment. The final outcome ranking process took 90 minutes and was facilitated 
and observed by the researcher and one instructor. Each o f  the four subject matter expert 
raters first independently ranked crews on outcome data provided using a ranking sheet 
that required written justification for the order o f their rankings. After individual 
rankings were completed a discussion o f rating priorities and a multi-voting process was 
used to gain rater consensus for a collective judgment o f the final outcome ranking o f all 
crews. Outcome rater demographics and their independent and consensus outcome 
rankings o f the sixteen aircrews are found in Appendix G.
Process Rating Instrument 
Instructors used a scenario-specific evaluation instrument with a five-point 
ordinal rating scale to measure process variables. Independent crew process performance 
rating by expert observers was guided by criteria based on best practices associated with 
crew coordination and diffusion o f tasks in events requiring sensitivity to a configuration 
o f an entire profile o f cues, safety o f flight considerations, technical skills and decision 
making skills. The study rating instruments reflected the evaluation o f group processes 
and outcomes for a multi-crew aircraft. Rating criteria were designed to ensure as much 
convergent and discriminant validity as possible across raters.
Process rating criteria were designed to generally capture multiple aspects of 
crew behavior and degrees o f  satisfactory workload sharing and operational risk 
management with consideration o f  safety o f flight, adherence to standard operating 
procedures when practical, creative problem-solving, technical competency and crew
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coordination in different types o f problem solving contexts. Since group processes “are 
not simply a sum o f individual processes (e.g., perception, attention, cognition) but are 
categorically different and include communication, information transfer, management 
processes, team problem solving and decision making” (Kanki, 1996, p. 136) team 
dimensions were incorporated into both the specific and common flight evaluation 
criteria.
The Team Dimensional Training (TDT) evaluation instrument validated with 
Navy aircrews (Smith-Jentsch, Johnston & Payne, 1998) was modified for use as the 
overall guidance for team rating criteria required for all study variables. The six cockpit 
resource management (CRM) elements used to measure U.S. Air Force C-5 aircrew 
proficiency (Spiker, et al., 1999) were also integrated into the overall aircrew process 
performance criteria as well. Additionally, context-specific best practice standards were 
identified in the rating instrument (Appendix F) to promote discriminant validity. These 
standards were included in the scenario instructor guide timeline to direct raters to 
established criteria for standard crew behaviors expected during each o f the seven 
decision events.
Analysis o f Reliability o f Instructor Ratings 
Snedecor’s analysis o f variance formula, derived from Fisher’s work on intra- 
class correlation (Ebel, 1951) was used to estimate the reliability for instructors’ averaged 
ratings o f aircrew process performance, to validate rater inter-rater reliability, as well as 
to validate the measurement instrument designed specifically for the study scenario.
Since individual ratings are less reliable than composite ratings the estimate o f  reliability 
o f  average ratings instead o f  individual ratings was used in this study to compute
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statistical significance of data. The reliability o f those averaged ratings was o f  primary 
concern. Given that compared averages came from different groups o f  four to five raters 
the between raters variance was included as part o f  the error terms. Appendix H contains 
individual scenario event and summed process scores for all crews.
O f the seven process ratings listed in Table 5, it can be seen that in five areas the 
averaged agreement coefficient o f  raters (N=8) shows a high degree o f agreement within 
the groups o f raters. Group averaged ratings are close to or exceed the .80 level o f  
significance generally considered the standard for acceptable inter-rater reliability 
(Cronbach, 1990). The two variables, take-off/departure and checklists interrupted, do 
not meet Cronbach’s criterion for acceptable inter-rater reliability. In the take­
off/departure event there was virtually no variability in the ratings across either raters or 
crews. For the second variable, checklists interrupted, this scenario component 
represented a broad range o f tasks interrelated with checklist discipline specific to this 
scenario segment.
Table 5





















Raters' r .14 .84 .61 .89 .76 .76 .83
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Data Collection
Data collected for this study included: (a) participant and aircrew demographic 
information, (b) aircrew process performance ratings during the simulated flight event,
(c) simulator data including aircraft configuration and temporal measures o f  aircrew 
recognition o f low oil pressure mdication(s), (d) post-scenario participants) self-reported 
performance issues and strategies from debrief/interview session, (e) simulator flight data 
and audio/video recordings o f crew performance, and (f) researcher and subject maner 
expert field notes. These data were analyzed for any significant relationships between 
participant crew decision-making strategies and their final crew outcome ranks.
Cross-Case Comparison Analysis Strategy 
Analysis o f qualitative data began with a content analysis o f the sixteen aircrews’ 
debrief/interview transcript data. This content analysis was then merged with instructor 
observation comments, researcher field notes, raw and summed process ratings, and 
outcome performance rank-ordered data to conduct a secondary concurrent integrated 
analysis. This initial exploratory analysis included an “extreme case” comparative 
analysis o f the overall highest and lowest performing aircrews in both experienced and 
novice groups and identified the emerging constructs or themes associated with 
individual and team attributes related to decision-making. As described by Tashakkori 
and Teddlie, this type o f analysis strategy results in an initial “identification o f groups of 
individuals who are similar to each other in some respect” (1998, p. 133). An additional 
strategy for interpreting these data included a  comparison of participant aircrews’ 
heuristic rules to “optimal” rules provided by subject matter experts since investigation 
o f  heuristic permits the exam ination of discrepancies between actual and optimal
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behavior which then raises questions regarding why such discrepancies exist (Einhom, 
1980).
Statistical Assumptions
The goal o f  the statistical tests was to explore for possibly demonstratively 
different performance processes and results by comparing the sample means o f  data 
collected between and among the novice and experienced groups. The goal o f the 
statistical tests was to validate the assumption that the crews with the greater number of 
flight hours would obtain better process and outcome ratings than the novice crews. The 
alpha level used was at a 95-percent confidence interval to determine if  relationships 
existed among identified study variables (i.e., crew experience levels, crew process 
measurements, and effectiveness measurements o f scenario outcome).
Chronology of Analysis
Inferences from the initial qualitative examination o f data expanded with 
statistical analyses and further qualitative investigation. Data patterns and relationships 
were explored using several frames o f  reference. First, descriptive and inferential 
statistical analyses (MANOVA) explored the effects o f crew experience on process 
ratings and outcome rankings. The relationship between process and outcome scores 
was also assessed. Second, comparative analyses were completed with the data related to 
the central propositions of the study: (a) a non-parametric and multivariate analysis 
(multiple ANOVA’s) provided construct validation and confirmed and expanded the 
relational inferences made from the initial qualitative analysis, and (b) correlational 
analysis using the ‘Tearson product momenf ’ explored data to identify process 
characteristics that seemed to be related to outcome. Third, further qualitative
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decomposition o f  all crew data related to process and outcome was conducted to 
investigate supportive descriptive trends to determine if  effects were limited to some 
subset o f all areas considered m the study (e.g., Were scores uniformly pointing in the 
same direction or did some appear more important than others?). Fourth, selected case 
studies representing high, mid-range and low performing crews in both process and 
outcome ranks were compared for differences in the integrative complexity o f each 
aircrews’ decision-related metacognitive activity (i.e., information gathering/processing 
and decision making), communications, etc. Participant remarks during debrief 
interviews concerning their aviation skills (e.g., procedural, representational, flight 
management, decision making, etc.) related to their reconstructed reality o f the scenario 
process elements were used to confirm and expand the inferences derived from previous 
data analyses.
Fifth, a more in-depth investigation o f the crews receiving the highest, mid-range, 
and lowest process and outcome rankings was conducted to seek out differences in crew 
decision making characteristics and functioning. A crew transcript o f  major decision 
points was developed from audio/video files o f each crew’s flight performance and was 
then compared to the debrief interview data transcript for a more comprehensive analysis 
o f team behaviors in coordination and communication o f strategic, tactical and 
procedural decision making. In conclusion, a variety of reporting techniques were used 
to establish the best combination o f exhibits to portray the complexities o f the 
participants reactions and interactions during the scenario, the interrelationships among 
variables, and the comparison o f  study findings to existing naturalistic decision making 
theories and selected aviation decision models.
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Limitations o f  the Study 
Overall, the process evaluation instrument reflects both real crew differences and 
measurement fluctuations, although there was little variability in the takeoff/departure 
element o f the process scores. This was due to a lack o f defined measurements to 
accurately assess variations in this baseline measurement procedure. As far as the 
reliability o f the raters to accurately measure crew performance, the estimated aggregate 
internal consistency (mean reliability) for the group o f raters on 6 o f the 7 process ratings 
was at or very close to an acceptable level (.80).
Because error variances affect both the reliability and validity o f measures, 
scoring methods for the instrument, characteristics o f the participants (lack of 
preparation, anxiety), and/or lack o f precision in the data collection instrument may have 
contributed to measurement error. Although outcome raters used their individual 
judgment for rank ordering crews before a consensus vote, there may have been pressure 
to conform their beliefs in line with those aviators who were more senior in the group.
One threat to internal validity m this study may have been the criteria established 
for the scoring o f two o f the seven items in scenario the measurement tool. As discussed 
previously, there was little variance in the take-offI departure item that served as a 
baseline for procedural compliance. Most crews on a normal take-off do not deviate 
from standard operating procedure. In another category, checklist interrupt, the construct 
was most probably too complex and expanded into more time in the phase o f flight to be 
a single category because raters found more to comment on than was originally intended. 
Additionally, problems with the instrument may have occurred because instructors are 
unfamiliar with using criterion-based evaluation tools. Instructors typically use grade
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sheets that simply list the skill/behavior to be observed without defined evaluation 
criteria. An ordinal scale o f unsatisfactory, below average, average, and above average is 
used. Grading is generally non-standardized and moves from lenient to higher standards 
as the instructor gains an experience base in evaluating a particular event.
Summary
In recognition o f  the complexity o f the issues to be studied a cross-case study 
comparison approach using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies was 
employed. Decision making process performance and execution measurement and 
analysis required a decomposed variable-oriented quantitative approach but also called 
for an investigation o f individual cases to gain an understanding of decision process 
characteristics and related crew functioning.
A triangulation o f  data generation, collection sources, separation o f  process and 
evaluation criteria and raters, and analytical methodologies supported the reliability and 
validity o f the study data and findings. More specifically, the design o f  this study 
included data generation and collection sources to include: (a) domain-specific tasks 
designed to elicit various decision strategies, (b) a criterion-based evaluation instrument 
to capture differences in crew process performance, (c) a simulator event process and 
outcome data collection and replay tool, (d) an interview protocol to generate crew self­
refection and self-assessment on metacognitive and interactive processes, (e) 
observations o f  participants recorded in researcher and instructor field notes, and (f) 
judgment o f outcome by independent raters.
Integration o f  the analysis methodologies supported the integrative evaluation o f 
the data. Quantitative data was analyzed with descriptive and statistical tests to
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investigate differences in crew process performance, execution o f the final decision in the 
scenario (outcome), and the relationship between process performance and outcome 
ranking. Qualitative analysis incorporated cross-case meta analysis by flight hour and 
performance levels, an in-depth cross-case analysis of three process and three outcome 
levels o f  performance from various theoretical and practical perspectives.




Data related to each of the three hypotheses and three research questions are 
presented and discussed in five sections of this chapter in the following order: (a) aircrew 
process ratings related to Hypothesis 1; (b) aircrew outcome rankings related to Hypothesis 
2; (c) the relationship o f process and outcome ratings related to Hypothesis 3; (d) decision- 
making strategies related to the first two research questions, and (e) critical characteristics 
and factors that defined the most successful crew outcomes related to the third research 
question.
After a brief overview of the study simulator scenario, cross-case analyses o f sixteen 
case studies are reported using expert ratings and rankings, instructor/ subject matter expert 
comments, instructor observations recorded during the simulator event, participant 
interview/debrief transcripts, and simulator flight data files with associated digital 
audio/video files of the sixteen aircrews. The quantitative analysis looked at how highly 
experienced crews differ from less experienced crews with regard to process performance 
and outcome rankings. The qualitative findings are presented collectively in a cross-case 
analysis between and among performance levels. The qualitative assessment focused on the 
differences in two main areas: the coordination o f the decision making process between the 
crewmembers (including leadership, teamwork, information gathering and use), and the 
criteria essential to critical thinking processes and strategies associated with evaluating the 
situation and dealing with uncertainty (strategic focus, technical skills, risk assessment, etc.).
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The differences in adaptation o f crew behavior in decision-making strategies that emerged at 
various levels of process performance (high, mid-level, low rankings) are included along with 
common crew performance characteristics associated with high and low performing groups. 
Chapter 5 will interpret the crew data with respect to differing domain experience, cognitive 
effort, crew leadership, and crew coordination as considerations for selection of decision­
making strategies and the execution of those decisions under conditions involving various 
degrees o f uniqueness, uncertainty, and time limitations.
The Scenario
The demands o f the process tasks are related to the task properties and the time 
constraints within the scenario. As the scenario progresses from a sequence o f structured 
events to a succession o f less structured events and then to a completely unstructured 
event, the appropriate response strategies change. The aircrews were exposed to seven 
process events in a good weather, nighttime scenario. The first event involved a normal 
takeoff and departure from the home field that served as a baseline procedural evolution. 
The second event presented a Starter Caution Light on the No. I engine that required a 
commonly practiced procedural response involving an intentional engine shutdown and 
an expeditious return to the field. The third event required the crew to prioritize 
checklists and apportion available time to complete high priority items while being 
interrupted by the control tower to be informed o f  another inbound emergency aircraft.
The fourth event began a series o f  more complex, unstructured situations as 
highlighted in Figure 3 below. Process event 4 began with the presentation o f a  low oil 
pressure indication on the only remaining engine. This cue was not as obvious as the 
previously introduced Starter Caution Light due to the ergonomics o f the instrument 
panel (i.e., placement o f the engine oil pressure gages, the relatively small size o f the
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engine oil pressure gages, and a conflicting warning light logic sequence which under 
certain circumstances does not visually or aurally draw attention to an oil system 
malfunction).
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Figure 3. Highlighted unstmctured scenario events starting with low oil pressure indication.
The fifth event involved preparations for a single-engine approach to the field. 
This required crewmembers to coordinate more checklists, dump fuel to reduce their 
landing weight, monitor the engine condition, work together to restart the previously 
secured No. 1 engine as a back-up to the deteriorating No. 2 engine, communicate with 
the control tower, plan for contingencies, and make related flight path adjustments under 
extremis conditions. During the sixth event, the control tower informs the crew that the
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airfield arresting gear, required by standard operating procedures for a single-engine 
landing, is not available. The seventh and final event challenged the crew with an in­
close "foul deck" call from the control tower while the crews were under an extremely 
high workload. This novel event presented crews with a set of circumstances that 
required them to execute a nearly instantaneous decision to either continue the approach 
or initiate a go-around (wave-off).
Quantitative Cross-Case Analysis Findings 
Aircrew Process Ratings
Hypothesis 1 predicted that process ratings would be higher for experienced 
crews than novice crews. In general, experienced crews had higher process scores than 
novice crews. Figure 4 shows the difference between each crew’s summed process score 
and the average process score across all 16 crews. Most crews followed the general 
pattern in the predicted direction o f performance evaluation. Crews 1-8 are novice crews 
and crews 9-18 are fleet experienced crews.
-a.oo
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Figure 4. Comparison o f individual crew sum process score to all crew average.
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The mean, differences in scores between novice and experienced crews for the 
seven process variables are reported in Table 6 and discussed below.
Table 6
Mean Difference o f  Process Scores Between Novice and Experienced Crews
Process Variable Mean Score Difference
Take-off/Departure .0313
Starter Caution Light for No. 1 Engine .5125
Checklist Discipline .3125
Low Oil on No. 2 Engine 1.2501
Approach Priorities 1.0000
Game Plan for No Arresting Gear 1.0750
Foul Deck 1.1875
A more comprehensive look at the component process ratings for each o f the 
seven scenario events is shown in Figure 5. This figure corresponds to the level o f 
granularity upon which statistical analyses were based. A significant main effect for 
experience on process ratings was obtained using a multivariate analysis o f variance 
(F =  5.974, 7 df, p  — .011). Given this overall statistically significant effect, the next 
question is to what extent do the processes within individual components contribute? A 
between subjects test summary table (Appendix I) reports the statistical significance of 
individual analyses o f variance (ANOVA's) for each o f the seven scenario events rated.
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Mean process ratings o f novice and experienced crews with confidence
These post-hoc ANOVA's revealed no statistically reliable effect for the simpler 
events (takeofffdeparture, Starter Caution Light illumination on No. I engine, 
interruption during checklists) in the initial part o f the scenario. Differences in means for 
the four remaining process events were significant using a  95% confidence level: (a) 
recognition and handling o f low oil pressure, F = 8.61, 1 df; p  =  011, (b) determining 
appropriate priorities, F= 12.10,1 df; p  =. 004, (c) no arresting gear game plan for 
landing a multi-engine aircraft with only a  single properly functioning engine without the 
use o f field arresting gear as required by Standard Operating Procedures (SOP),
F =  10.39,1 df; p  = .006, and (d) making an “instantaneous” decision to continue landing 
or eject prior to or after the No. 2 engine failed as a result of low oil pressure, F =  24.12,1 
df; p  <  .001. The results indicated that the means for the experienced groups' process 
scores for these four areas were significantly higher than the means for the novice group.
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Aircrew Outcome Rankings
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the execution o f the final decision results (outcome 
scores) o f  experienced aircrews would be higher than novice aircrews. As predicted, the 
superior ratings received by experienced crews, as a group, was statistically significant. 
The outcome data used by raters reflected the concluding “snapshot” o f  aircraft 
configuration and position relative to the landing environment. Raters' determination of 
most preferred aircraft and aircrew status was directly related to the aircrews’ final 
decision to: (a) take the aircraft around again (in its degraded state) for another attempt to 
land, or (b) land immediately on the runway available and stop, or egress via an on-deck 
ejection prior to the stalled truck.
A one-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test was conducted to “evaluate 
the assumption that the two samples are randomly and independently drawn from 
similarly shaped populations with unknown but equal variation” (Berenson and Levine, 
p. 430, 1998). With the sum o f outcome rankings o f the novice crews being 45 and the 
sum rankings o f  the experienced crews being 91 the probability that these outcome 
performance scores would have naturally occurred is p  = .01. This analysis shows that it 
is unlikely that seven o f eight experienced crews would fall in the top 50% o f the 
performance scores, while seven o f  eight would fall in bottom 50% if  they had been 
drawn at random from a homogeneous population. Therefore, the superior ranking of 
experienced crews relative to novice crews was statistically significant.
Relationship between Process Scores and Outcome Ratings
The third study hypothesis predicted that aircrew process ratings would be 
positively correlated with the decision outcome ratings for a specific in-flight emergency
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involving uncertainty was only partially supported with quantitative analysis. In Figure 
6, the composite outcome scores are depicted on the vertical axis and the process ratings 
are summed across the seven scenario events and shown on the horizontal axis. Each 
symbol represents one o f  the sixteen crews, with solid circles representing experienced 
crews and open squares representing novice crews. The number above each symbol 
represents each crew's combined total S-3A/B flight hours. In this figure, the summed 
process ratings for experienced crews are generally clustered to the right o f those from 
novice crews. The vertical axis represents outcome ranking scores with the rating of 1 
































Figure 6. Relation between outcome ranking and summed process scores for all crews.
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The mean rank order for experienced crews was 11.375, and 5.625 for novice 
crews. Each crew’s flight hours relative to their process and outcome rank order are 
reported in Table 7. Novice crews 1 and 8 show a relatively good performance within 
their peer group and experienced crews 9 and 12 had comparatively poor performance 
judged against their peers. As can be seen in Table 7, in all but two cases, higher process 
scores and better outcome rankings distinguish experienced crews from novice crews.
Table 7
Aircrews' Combined Flight Hour Rank Compared to Process and Outcome Ranks







12 13 16 14 9 10 11 15 4 3 7 6 2 8 5 I
7 15 9 14 11 13 12 *6 8 2 5 10 4 *6 3 I
10 9 13 12 6 16 11 14 5 7 8 15 I 3 4 2
Note. An asterisk denotes that these two crews received identical summed process 
scores.
Figure 7 depicts the overall final process and outcome score rank order for all 16 
crews by assigned crew number, hi the right column the top half of the outcome rankings 
consist o f seven o f the eight experienced crews (crews 9-16) while 7 o f 8 novice crews 
(crews 1-8) fell in the bottom half o f  the outcome score rankings. Crew 16 had the 
highest process performance while Crew 13 had the highest outcome performance. As 
Figure 7 illustrates, there was distinct movement between process and outcome ranks. 
Yet, six o f  the eight crews who scored in the top 50% o f  summed process scores 
remained in the top 50% o f outcome rankings. Although four crews shifted between top
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and bottom ratings, there was a  fair amount o f stability within the process and outcome 
rankings*
Process Rank Outcome Rank
C^Raw Score
Figure 7* Comparative ranking change between summed process score rankings and final 
outcome rankings of all aircrews*
Analyses for the first two hypotheses clearly show that novice and expert crews 
represented two distinct populations with respect to both process and outcome* Due to
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this lack o f  comparability, the experienced and novice groups were kept separate for 
correlation analyses. For novice crews, the process outcome correlation did not approach 
significance ( r  =  142, d f  =  7, p  = .736).
A strong positive correlation (r = .64, p  — .088, df = 7) was found within 
experienced crews, although the correlation was not statistically significant with the 
sample size used. Within the expert crews, notable positive correlations were observed 
between outcome rankings and more complex, unstructured decision contexts at the end 
o f  the scenario. Correlations between outcome and two process scores that approached 
significance were found in two events. These were Foul Deck on Final ( r = .663, d f =  7, 
p  =. 073) and the No Arresting Gear Game Plan ( r  =  .682, d f = 7, p  =  .062). The 
correlation between process rating sum and the outcome (i.e., decision to eject) was also 
statistically significant (r = .695, p  = .056, df = 7).
One o f  the more complex situations in terms o f identifying and working with 
available information was recognition and handling the low oil pressure in the remaining 
engine although there was no statistically significant correlation o f the time it took crews 
to recognize the drop in oil and ultimate outcome score. The mean time for novice crews 
to recognize a severe oil pressure drop in the No. 2 engine was 248.38 seconds (SD 
201.14) compared to the experience crew mean time o f 156.88 seconds (SD 180.82). 
Temporal data related to crew recognition o f the low oil pressure is contained in 
Appendix J.
One o f  the objectives o f this study was to identify and investigate issues related to 
sample size. A power analysis using a Fisher Z approximation was conducted to 
determine the sample size needed to detect a statistically significant effect “giving
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consideration not only to the level o f  significance and the power o f  the test, but also to 
the effect size” (Hinkle, Wiersma, & Ju ts, 1994, p. 312). If  the correlation o f  .64 
observed for experienced crews in this study reasonably approximates the correlation 
existing in the larger population, the probability o f detecting a statistically significant 
correlation (p == 05) would be .80 with a sample size o f 16 crews.
The next section presents the findings o f the three research questions associated 
with capturing the task specific thought protocols and performance skills o f  crews 
performing at three different levels (high, mid-range, and low) as defined by the 
quantitative analysis process and outcome rankings. Cross-case analysis findings include 
comparisons of process and outcome rankings with differences in decision strategies in 
uncertain, extremis circumstances requiring rapid situational and risk assessment.
Qualitative Cross-Case Analysis Findings 
Selected naturalistic and aviation decision making theories and models guided the 
qualitative analysis. A variety o f data sources describing participants real-time decision 
making in a dynamic environment were analyzed to answer the three research questions 
for the study. The three research questions sought the reasons for differing quantitative 
process and outcome findings o f experienced versus low flight time crews challenged 
with identical in-flight emergencies involving uncertainty: (a) What adaptive 
recognitional/metacognitive decision-making strategies emerge from aircrews? (b) In 
what way do adaptive/metacognitive decision-making patterns differ among successful 
and less than successful aircrews? and (c) What characteristics/factors seem to define the 
most successful aircrew outcomes?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
Emergent Adaptive Strategies
Analysis o f  data related to the first research question discovered that during the 
final three events in the flight, all crews attempted to adapt previous decisions to the 
shifting circumstances. Although crew effectiveness in adjusting to changing conditions 
and increased uncertainty differed. The crew's ability to meet performance requirements 
depended on collective experience, individual cognitive and technical skills, as well as 
their overall proficiency in crew coordination. Findings from the available data show that 
all crews' decision strategies were reflected in the scenario process performance scores 
and the final outcome rankings. It is significant that the ability to successfully recognize 
the need to adapt a strategic plan and follow through with an altered plan to successfully 
meet the requirements o f a novel situation showed the highest degree o f variation 
between experienced and novice crews.
Table 8 represents the range o f decision-making and information processing 
constructs that were revealed during data analysis o f the six crews representing high, 
mid-range and lowest scoring crews in process and outcome rankings. These decision 
strategies reflect a variety o f  methods employed by aircrews to attempt to control and/or 
transcend uncertainty during the flight scenario. Crews used these tactics to prioritize 
and reduce workload and increase focus under severe time constraints. As described in 
Table 8, these techniques assisted crews in identifying, sorting and managing limited 
and/or ambiguous information as well as assessing risk, and managing their workload. It 
Is important to note that the success o f  a  particular strategy was dependent on the timing 
and circumstances in which it was applied in the scenario.
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Table 8




Crewmember(s) devises a game plan that 
completely negates their need to deal with the 
uncertainty
Uncertainty Eliminated
Crewmember(s) adopts a tactic of “forced 
resolution” and takes deliberate action intended 
to resolve the uncertainty by eliminating other 
options as clarification/solutions
Uncertainty Acceptance (or) 
Uncertainty Carried Forward
Crewmember(s) recognizes and identifies 
elements containing uncertainty factors yet 
chooses to press ahead regardless
Uncertainty Ignored
Crewmember(s) acknowledges uncertainty 
factors and then simply ignores them and 
presses ahead with a “blinders on” mentality
Situation Acceptance Crew member(s) accepts situation with no attempt to resolve uncertainty or plan around it
Activity Acceleration
Crewmember(s) accelerates the completion of 
routine administrative items in anticipation o f 
upcoming periods o f  high workloads or entering 
into more demanding or dynamic environments
Information Seeking and Use
Info Gathering Expedition
Crewmember(s) sets out to find additional cues 
to help resolve uncertainty (either visually: 
instruments, sight picture, control positioning or 
verbally: asking questions o f other 
crewmembers and or external resources)
Information Firewalling
Crewmember(s) intentionally delays or ignores 
(compartmentalizes) reception or introduction 
o f  new information (Relative to external 
sources: crew denies the information source the 
opportunity to communicate via the radio or 
some other means, i.e. “stand-by")
Assimilation Avoidance
Crewmember(s) acknowledge the presence and 
availability o f  new or additional information but 
simply chooses to “leave it alone” and not 
process or act on it
Curiosity Flat line No attempt to gather additional information
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Patterns o f Decision Making and their Relation to Performance Levels
In general, the findings related to the second research question established that 
aircrew experience leveL strongly influenced strategies employed to successfully meet 
performance requirements under different naturalistic circumstances. The more 
successful, high flight hour crewmembers more adeptly processed and shared information 
given interrupted routines and insufficient time to support their original strategic goals. The 
ability to recognize cues and similarities in patterns, to rapidly assess dynamic and/or 
novel situations, and to make the necessary adjustments and achieve a successful result 
were demonstratively related to the crews' domain knowledge, experience level, and team 
skills.
These findings support the relationship between best possible results (i.e., 
outcome ranking) in the study scenario and the successful use o f metacognitive skills to 
continuously self-monitor, critique, and correct thinking strategies to assess and project a 
“simulated” course o f action in a situational model to achieve optimum results under 
novel, dynamic conditions. This adaptive decision making process applied by individuals 
to meet severe decision making requirements was flamed and described in the 
recognitional primed decision (RPD) model (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 
1985; Klein, 1989) and related studies. These studies have shown that under dynamic 
conditions o f the naturalistic decision environment, experts use a more intuitive approach 
to meet the demands o f  rapid troubleshooting and mental simulation to select the first 
reasonable course o f action that will satisfy immediate problem requirements. The 
optimal cognitive processes used to rapidly gather and assess relevant information for 
accurate situational assessment and decision making both consider and surpass the 
procedural or more analytical approaches. The routine procedural and analytical decision
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making strategies either do not meet the situation requirements or use more time than is 
appropriate (or available) for the circumstances.
Key functions o f recognition/metarecognition processes. The recognition 
/metacognition (R/M) model complements the RPD model by addressing the 
metacognitive aspects o f the situational assessment and decision-making process. As 
defined by Cohen et al. (1996) meta-recognitional processes “determine when it is 
worthwhile to think more about a problem; identify evidence-conclusion relationships 
within a situational model; critique situational models for incompleteness, conflict, and 
unreliability; and prompt collection or retrieval o f new information” (p. 206).
Participant retrospection o f their conscious thinking processes fell into functional 
areas associated with adaptive decision making. Time consuming, concurrent option 
weighing to achieve an optimum solution was replaced by selection o f the first acceptable 
sequential option. Data from crew debriefs were analyzed for "fit" into the three 
functional areas o f the meta-recognitional cycle: (a) critiquing or accurately 
evaluating/characterizing the problem, (b) monitoring a course o f action to assess 
whether the methods and results o f the decision process will be satisfactory, and then (c) 
correcting or regulating the plan with a sequential evaluation o f options with a 
commitment to the first acceptable alternative rather than trying to optimize by waiting 
for analytical results (Cohen et al.,1996).
Aircrew self-reports o f  strategies and process content. The study findings support 
that the ability o f the aircrew as a whole, not simply individuals in the aircrew, to adapt to 
the cognitive requirements for decision tasks m each phase o f the recognitional cycle is 
crucial to using adaptation strategies successfully. Because the R/M model goes beyond
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the processes used in situational, assessment, it is valuable in its use here to frame and 
describe the aircrews’ meta-recognitional cyclical processes in dealing with uncertain and 
novel situations in the three distinct areas described above. This model was adapted to 
assist in discovering patterns in team performance by overlaying the cockpit-specific 
analytical scheme developed by Orasanu, Dismukes, & Fischer (1993) to predict types o f  
errors based on different cognitive requirements for various decision making situations in 
a multi-crew cockpit. A sample of participant quotes that relate to situational assessment, 
determination o f a game plan, and crew coordination issues were integrated with the 
adaptive decision making described in the R/M cycle described above and analyzed within 
the cockpit decision error framework. These data allowed comparison of types o f 
decision-making strategy used (analytical, option-based, and adaptive/creative) as well as 
comparison and analysis o f process errors in the details o f content o f the metacognitive 
process reported by the aviators during the debrief/interviews.
Examples o f pilot and COT AC (navigator and co-tactical officer) recall o f 
metacognitive activity are presented in the following succession o f quotes and are 
characterized as they relate to the three functional areas o f the meta-recognitional cycle 
described above. As a reminder, crews 1 through 8 are novices and crews 9 through 16 
are fleet experienced crews. Note that Crew 12, an experienced crew, was ranked 15 of 
16 in the final outcome ranking and that Crew 5, a novice crew was ranked 6 o f  16 in the 
outcome ranking.
In general, the content o f  metacognitive thoughts o f  experienced crewmembers as 
quoted below reflect that they were frequently searching out information and verifying 
their situational assessments. The starter caution light and low oil pressure events
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provided opportunities to observe crews as they worked through the information 
gathering and decision-making cycle by recognizing and verifying cues, working together 
to make certain that cues were being interpreted correctly, assessing resources, and 
setting priorities within time constraints. However, the debrief/interview provided an 
opportunity to gain greater insight into the metacognitive/meta-recognitional process as 
relayed by experienced and novice aircrews. Samples o f  these tacit processes are 
provided starting with the first phase o f the R/M cycle.
Critiquing or accurately evaluating/characterizing the problem. The pilot o f Crew 
13 as well as the COT AC o f Crew 9 is evaluating the initial cues associated with a 
problem while facing a deteriorating situation. They continue to use their critical 
information seeking and use skills to further evaluate the problem to look for and ensure 
secondary indications are correctly interpreted and evaluated.
“I think once we noticed the oil pressure dropping in the second gage then at that point in 
the decision [making process] and once we saw that that’s [field arresting gear] not 
engaged then it's get the plane on deck as soon as possible and whatever field [amount o f 
available runway] we land with we land with.” (Pilot, Crew 13)
“The first thing you do when you shut down the engine is to make sure all the lights [on 
the advisory panel] that you get correspond to what you expect to see. It was also the one 
light that can trick you [the Engine Oil Pressure light does not reset to re-illuminate if  
there is subsequent loss o f  oil pressure on the remaining engine]...” (COTAC, Crew 9)
The quote below from the Crew 12 pilot (crew 12 ranked 10 o f  19 in process and 
15 o f 16 in outcome rank) provides insight into several o f  the underlying issues related to 
this crew's poor performance. The pilot misjudged the level o f risk based on a lack of 
knowledge, his oversimplification o f  the problem, and his neglecting to consider viable 
options. He treated the option to re-start the No. 1 engine as a rule-based decision. By 
not moving forward and accepting a calculated risk associated with this somewhat
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unorthodox procedure (restarting a previously secured engine) he accepted the 
uncertainty in the situation (time remaining for the No. 2 engine until it stopped 
functioning) and lost the opportunity to generate a potential back-up option in case the 
No. 2 engine failed (due to loss o f oil pressure) prior to reaching a position from which 
either a safe landing or a successful ejection could be accomplished.
“I set myself up to start up theNo.l at the beginning indications that the starter 
was having problems. [Pilot seems to indicate that once he recognized the 
possibility o f losing the No. 2 engine [due to low oil pressure] he configured the 
No. I engine switches so that the crew would be ready to attempt a no. 1 engine 
re-start rapidly.] So we had ourselves in the position where all I had to do was 
starter switch “engage”. At least I hoped so. So I thought we were ready to clean 
up on that. I didn’t see the need to start it though. I sure wasn’t going to 
compound the emergency.” (Pilot, Crew 12)
Examples of uncoordinated task performance are described in the two quotes 
from the novice pilot in Crew 2 that follow. Although the pilot was able to retrieve 
procedurally prescribed responses normally associated with a failing engine, he did not 
keep his COT AC in the information loop. Later in the flight, still uncertain about the 
reliability o f the No. 2 engine, the pilot did not take into consideration the coordinated 
tasking required to restart the No. 1 engine while simultaneously flying the final 
approach. Even under normal circumstances the final approach is a high workload 
sequence o f  events.
“ ... with one fluctuation and a little bit after I had to figure out a few things. We 
did have an engine vibration problem. With the simulator it makes it really hard 
to tell that so I was thinking we just did that precautionary aspect treating it that 
way because I was already at IDLE. [Indications associated with both engine 
vibrations and low oil pressure situations require the throttle to be retarded to the 
IDLE position.] You know, slowing down my descent, cycle bleed just in case 
that was it. That or T-5 thing [referring to an instructor introduced simulator 
malfunction designed to draw the crew to scan near the oil gage.] I  didn’t  see an
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issue there because I wasn’t revving up on it [the remaining engine]. The next 
aspect was pending engine failure. I mention that because I don’t  know how well 
I verbalized it.” (Pilot, Crew 2)
“I’d rather risk screwing up an engine [identification o f potential problems 
associated with restarting the No. 1 engine with a faulty starter indication. The 
implication being that the pilot is willing to risk damaging or setting the No. I 
engine on fire i f  it provides a better chance to save the jet]. All I have to do is 
shut it down because it’s going to go bad. I’d rather risk that engine than risk 
losing the No. 2 engine and forcing an ejection. Once I bought that turn right 
there -the turn away from the runway...that’s it. [Concern he has enough altitude 
and airspeed to only make a single turn. I f  that turn is away from the airport then 
he'll be committed to ejecting from the aircraft over the water.] We have a 
certain amount o f minutes before we can make it around again, turn to 29. Okay? 
Well, we’re doing that right now—we’re doing that already, we’ve bought 
[committed to] that already so we have time to breakout the Checklist, if  I say so, 
and try to start No. I [engine]. We’ve already bought [committed to] what we 
want. That’s the logic o f it-1 mean, trying to start No. 1”. (Pilot, Crew 2)
Monitoring a course o f  action. As the crewmembers' quotes below explain, the
experienced COT AC o f Crew 11 continued to monitor and adjust the plan o f action to
keep the crew’s focus on making an expedited landing. The pilot o f Crew 14 also
displayed assertive creative problem solving skills as he considered the requirements to
land in a situation that did not allow the optimal time to complete checklists and to
evaluate and discuss multiple options and contingency plans.
“At that point, when I told you [pilot] to go ahead and don’t worry about the gear 
speed limitation [speeds in excess o f  the prescribed speed limit run the risk o f 
damaging either the aircraft or the field arresting gear equipment, or both] I was 
actually just monitoring our progress and the amount o f time that the engine had 
left. I  was very much interested in getting the airplane back to the runway.” 
(COTAC, Crew 11)
“I think that [truck in intersection] was probably the hardest decision... the 
runway is semi-clobbered...Do you still want to continue with this knowing there 
is no short field gear? [Both NATOPS and SOP's require arrested landings in 
single engine landing configurations.] I  think we paused fora second and then 
continued with it. (Pilot, Crew 14)
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In contrast to the aviators in crews 11 and 14, COTAC's in crews 15 and 12 did 
not interpret the situation correctly which led to their neglecting relevant information and 
delaying the completion o f essential tasks. The inappropriate conclusion by the COT AC 
in Crew 15 indicates that even after he was aware o f the low oil pressure indication (an 
obvious indication o f the rapidly deteriorating condition o f the only remaining engine), 
he lacked sufficient situational awareness to grasp the 'big picture" and recognize the 
severity o f  the situation. In this scenario, attempting to divert to another field over 
populated areas was not a viable option due to: (a) the diminished amount o f thrust that 
the No. 2 engine was producing, and (b) the highly questionable amount o f time that the 
engine could be expected to continue to operate.
Crew 12 was the only crew not to identify the low oil pressure on the No. 2 
engine as indicated by the No. 2 Engine Oil Pressure gage. When the control tower 
informed them o f  white smoke trailing from their starboard engine this crew chose not to 
engage in any additional troubleshooting or information gathering activities. Instead, 
they simply acknowledged that the white smoke coming from the engine signaled that 
there was a problem that complicated their situation. (In this case, the lack o f  awareness 
of the cause o f  the problem with the No. 2 engine resulted in the pilot executing a wave- 
off without associating throttle advancement with engine failure.) The Crew 12 COT AC 
decided that getting the checklists completed should be the priority and therefore he 
attempted to delay the approach and landing in order to complete his portion o f the 
routine cockpit activities. This COTAC oversimplified the problem and failed to 
recognize that any o f  the prescribed procedural responses found in NATOPS (the aircraft 
operating manual) did not account for the circumstances he was facing. Without
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adjustments to expedite a normal approach profile (and associated COTAC routines)
there was a very high likelihood that the single remaining engine would quit or fail in the
time taken to complete the prescribed "normal" procedures.
“We were below "max trap" [maximum aircraft fuel weight allowed to make an 
arrested landing] when I figured dumped fuel is no good to us in case, for some 
reason, we need it back at some point even though we had made the decision to 
land and I know we’re below max trap. More fuel is better than no fuel.” 
(COTAC, Crew 15)
“... I didn’t verbalize it, but I thought briefly about just setting ourselves up for 
the final so we could just go land instead of having to deal with the DELTA 
pattern [orbiting overhead the field in a prescribed flight path]. But then I was 
like, T know we’re single engine and I know we’ve got at least two more 
Checklists to do. So, yea, let’s just go ahead and orbit in the DELTA pattern.” 
(COTAC, Crew 12)
“So at that point, I’m thinking, hey, we can still make a normal single-engine 
landing. The nosewheel steering was functioning. We did eat the arrested 
landing. That was just precautionary and I was thinking, Let’s go ahead and 
continue per NATOPS and just land.”(COTAC, Crew 12)
Correcting or regulating a plan. The following participant quotes are examples of
experienced crews describing the retrieval and review o f situational constraints as well as
their generation and evaluation of options that led to successful outcomes in the final
scenario task.
“ I was [high] on purpose because I wanted to keep power back to try to save the 
engine as much as I could in case we needed to use It and then I was like, Well, 
we’re not going to go around [wave-off] unless something really goofy happens. 
So when the Tower said [there was a truck in the runway] at that point I wasn’t 
thinking I wasn’t going to go around unless I was actually going to land on top of 
something. I just wanted to land at the end o f the runway then when you told us 
all those things. So, instead o f landing a  normal trap [field arrestment] and 
landing by the gears [field arresting gear], land at the end slow [below normal 
approach speed] and just get on the brakes and try to stop.” (Pilot, Crew 10)
" ... one o f  the things that I  was thinkmg about that i f  it’s real —i f  the runway Is 
completely clobbered and we’re going to need the distance we could go to the 
taxiway and land on that. But that never really became an issue. I briefly toyed
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with that idea and then disregarded it for landing on the runway and try and get it 
stopped.” (COTAC, Crew 11)
“Just from experience you know you can pretty much normally stop by that point 
[the intersection where the truck was located] and if  we couldn’t it would be a 
fairly low speed taxi clear, maybe depart the runway at a low speed, or maybe a 
high speed turn off into a taxiway. It was what was going on through my mind." 
(Pilot, Crew 14)
As typical o f many o f the novice crews, Crew I pilot appears to recognize the 
urgency o f the situation and makes adjustments to reduce the routine number of 
checklists down to just the Landing Checklist. However, he does not project what he will 
need to do to get in a "good landing position" and fails to precisely monitor or correct his 
approach to land. He lacks the forethought and technical skills to affect his desired 
outcome in the time available. This pilot terminated his first approach attempt to make 
the runway, used valuable time to come around again and then executed a wave-off on 
his second approach.
“Shut Down the No. 1 engine -that’s obligatory. Get plane on deck after low oil 
recce [recognition] in No. 2 [engine], that’s when I knew that everything, all the 
checklists we really need to do, all we really needed to do was just get the plane 
on deck. Really it was just the Landing Checklist. We need to get in a good 
landing position.” (Pilot, Crew I)
As illustrated by the preceding quotes from aircrews in the three stages of the 
R/M cycle, it appeared that although novice groups were working through portions o f the 
cycle associated with adaptive decision making, they were not identifying or using the 
higher levels o f cognitive work required to meet the requirements o f  the decision tasks 
that were facing them. The crews that choose to wave-off were unable to adapt their 
decision strategy to correct and adjust their plan for the best possible outcome. As a
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result, the lower performing crews relied on more familiar procedural and analytical 
based solutions to a  novel problem that required an adaptive strategy for the best possible 
outcome. Beyond the selection and use o f an appropriate decision making strategy to 
meet unique situational requirements, there are also crew attributes and crew functioning 
characteristics that represent distinctions that separate process performance levels and 
outcomes. In this scenario crew coordination between crewmembers and effective levels 
o f  crew communication were crucial in the last minutes o f the flight to correct and refine 
the plan o f action.
Novice Crew 6, in particular, provides one of the clearest illustrations o f  the 
importance o f crew coordination as part o f the joint situational assessment and decision- 
making cycle in a multi-crew aircraft. This crew’s performance also illuminates the 
necessity for maintaining a high degree o f crew coordination throughout the flight. Crew 
6 was ranked 14 o f  16 in process performance and was ranked last in the outcome of their 
final decision in the scenario. One o f the significant problems in this crew was the pilot 
and COTAC had different objectives that led each one to execute contrary game plans. 
The pilot had made a determination to eject while the COTAC was still focusing on 
continuing the landing. These divergent motivations caused a fair amount o f  crew 
disconnection in the final seconds prior to the crew abandoning the aircraft. Appendix K 
contains significant dialog o f  this crew’s interactions during the last portion o f the flight.
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Decision Making Process Pattern Differences among Case Studies at High. Mid-Range 
and Low Performance Levels
The second research question o f  interest was whether there were differences in 
decision strategies between crew process performance levels. Another issue investigated 
was whether strategy differences correlated with better or worse outcome ratings. In 
order to explore these issues, process related data and metaperceptual data from three 
crews with the highest (16), mid-range (3), and low (2) performance levels were analyzed 
and sorted by strategies associated with situational awareness and selecting a course of 
action.
The qualitative analysis results mirrored the quantitative findings: that the most 
prevalent differences in strategy selection occurred in the most novel decision context 
(i.e., whether to land or wave-off to attempt another landing). The qualitative 
investigation also found that there were distinct differences in the approaches of crews 
16, 3, and 2 for resolving the uncertainty in all the increasingly unstructured events. 
Figure 8 represents a comparative overview o f the specific procedural, analytical and 
adaptive decision strategies employed by these three crews during the final scenario 
events. The larger font indicates the type o f strategy that was most pronounced during 
that phase of the flight. The low oil pressure indication and approach events have been 
combined. These two events were combined in the comparative analysis o f  crew 
decision making because the recognition o f the low oil pressure condition occurred at 
different points in the approach for each of these crews. The three event sets depicted in
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PROCEDURAL/ ADAPTIVE Truck on Runway
PROCEDURAL/ a n a l y t i c a l PROCEDURAL I  ADAPTIVE
PROCEDURAL I  ADAPTIVE
PROCEDURAL/ ANALYTICAL
Figure 8. Decision strategies employed by high, mid-range and low process ranking; 
crews (crews 16, 3 and 2)
Tables 9 through 11 present a linear “snapshot” description o f  the cyclical crew 
procedural, analytical and/or adaptive decision making process represented in Figure 8. 
Aircrew activities are categorized by participants' metacognitive self-reports and 
observed actions related to the final sequence o f significant events in the study scenario. 
In-Depth Case Analysis
Table 9 records the data related to the crews' overt and metacognitive processes 
related to the recognition and reactions to low oil pressure in the No. 2 engine (i.e., only 
remaining engine). During the low oil pressure and approach event, all three crews 
discuss and weight options at this decision point in the scenario; yet there is a  marked 
difference in the resulting focus and game plan developed by each crew. Since there is
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no distinct adaptive strategy used at this point in the scenario, Table 9 reflects only 
procedural and analytical categories. The more experienced, higher performing crew 
(16) is clearly focused and able to proceed with the approach to land since they have 
accomplished/coordinated the completion o f aircraft configuration changes, checklist 
routines, contingency planning, and landing preparations thus far in the flight.
Unfinished cockpit routines and lack o f communication and cooperation in the novice 
crews starts to catch up to both Crews 3 and 2.
Table 9
Specific Examples o f  Strategies Used by Aircrews under Conditions of Uncertainty and 
Increasing Time Constraints during Low Oil/Approach Events









SOP/Checklists Fuel Dump 
Completed in transit. 
All Checklists 
Completed except no 
Before Air Start. 
Checklist forNo. 1 
re-light attempt 
discarded for sake of 
expediency.






Did not complete SE 
Checklist. No Approach 
Checklist. Wave-offBrief 
conducted at 30 miles out. 
Orbited to dump fuel at 20 
miles out.
Analytical/






low oil pressure. Pilot 
checks aircraft 
position heading for 
populated area
With field in sight (4.3 
miles) Pilot requests to 
DELTA overhead then 
recognizes low oil 
pressure
No recognition of low oil 
from gage or scan of 
engine tape fluctuation. 
Tower calls to inform of 
smoke from No. 2 engine 
(Table continues) |
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Into (cue) use Pilot,44 Give 
consideration to No.
1 restart.”
Pilot changes flight 
path on approach to 
avoid populated area 
in case of ejection. 
Still confident he can 
land.
COTAC, “Things are 
not looking good.”
Does not report low 
oil to COTAC until 
transmission from 
tower about white 
smoke from No. 2.
Crew confused. Asks for 
clarification on whether 
smoke is from wing or 
engine. Pilot associates 
smoke with low oil and 
takes radios. Tells ATC to 
cancel EFR (Instrument 
Flight Rules) and proceed 
direct to field (visually) 





create a  plan
Continue on shortest 
route to field. Pilot 
talks through options 
related to restart. 
COTAC (meta) 
Takes a while for 
starter to degenerate 
(from own 
experience).
Pilot aware of No. 2 
low oil pressure. 
Wants to get down 
ASAP for arrested 
landing on 29 but may 
have to shut down #2 
and eject Tells 
COTAC to “start in on 
those checklists.”
—
Plan accepted? Yes. Pilot to Tower, 
“we’re going to do a 
full stop landing.” 
COTAC (metacog) — 
weights probabilities 
of fate if different 
runways missed
Yes Yes. COTAC tells tower 
“we’re going to bring it 





If can’t make field to 
land on numbers- 
Eject over water
Eject COTAC to Pilot “I 
recommend we don’t do a 
wave-off.” COTAC (meta) 
“keeping fingers crossed 





No discussion COTAC dismisses 
Tower call about 
white smoke from 
starboard (#2) engine 
as Tower’s probable 





Efficient Expedited Landing Slow
Note. A dashed line (— ) denotes no activity observed or reported by the crew.
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Data in Table 10 represent actions and thoughts from the same three crews while 
they are flying with one engine o f extremely questionable reliability on their final 
approach. The crews were informed that there was no arresting gear on the only 
available runway. Both NATOPS and standard operating procedures direct crews 
conducting single-engine approaches to make arrested landings. An arrested landing 
allows the aircraft's tail hook to engage the arresting cable strung across the runway. 
Engaging this cable drastically reduces the aircraft's landing roll out and eliminates the 
need to use aircraft systems that may be degraded or taken "off-line".
At this point in the flight Crew 16 generated a plan that forced resolution o f  the 
uncertainty issues. A  vigilant execution o f  a plan to achieve a strategic goal (i.e., “let’s 
land”) with expert technical skills enabled Crew 16 to fly a precise final approach. The 
crew achieved their goal by focusing their cognitive resources and eliminating irrelevant 
issues and information. In other words, they decided to press ahead and land without 
diverting their attention to non-priority issues. In actuality, this is an elegant and 
extremely pragmatic solution to an exceedingly complex problem. This crew determined 
that all their engine problems would become inconsequential (or irrelevant) i f  they simply 
landed and stopped the jet on the available runway. Crew 16 provides an excellent 
example o f an adaptive decision strategy called satisficing (Simon, 19SS). Satisficing is 
an approach "for making a choice from a  set o f  alternatives encountered sequentially 
when one does not know much about the possibilities ahead o f tim e. . .  there may be no 
optimum solution for when to stop searching for further alternatives. . . "  (Gigerenzer & 
Todd, 1999, p. 13). Crew 16 successfully uses a recognition process that obviates the
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need for further information and adopts a  realistic option to land immediately and 
foregoes an attempt to generate an optimum solution.
Table 10
Specific Examples o f Strategies Used by Aircrews under Conditions o f Uncertainty and 













SOP/Checklists All Checklists 
completed.






Pilot initiates Landing 
Checklist at 3 miles. 
Does not reset Fire Pull 
Handle in No. 1 re-light 
attempt (from memory).
Analvtical/WeiehineOptions
Operational Pace Quick/efficient Pilot senses 
immediacy but does 
not relay to COTAC
Rushed-pilot attempts 






Pilot too high on first 




Does not stress No. 2 
engine. Utilizes time to 






Pilot wants to attempt to 
Re-start No.l at 800 ft on 
3-mile approach (after 
being talked out of it 
earlier by COTAC). 
COTAC wants to finish 
landing checklist Pilot 
wants to troubleshoot. 
COTAC “We’re opening a 




refuses to backup Pilot 
with Checklists 
(Table continues)
















COTAC to Tower-"We’re 
going to bring it down... and 
remain on deck if  we’re not 
going to stop by the end o f  





Sense o f  urgency by pilot 
but not COTAC until Pilot 







Pilot informs COTAC he 
has “30 seconds to 
complete checklists”.
-----
Info (cue) Use Pilot more 
"comfortable” with 
Runway 29 than 36
COTAC responds, “ That 
No.2 engine?”(Still 
unaware o f No. 2 engine 
status)







delays further info 
from Tower
Tower told to "Stand- by"
-----
Accept risk- 




“The only thing T 
wanted was an 
arrested landing.”
Pilot (metacognition) 





with no attempt 




COTAC informs pilot he’s 
at 900 ft with 2.5-descent 
rate. Pilot responds,“ We 
have to get down with the 
airplane.” Pilot: "We've 
got 15 psi-on that right 
engine so we’re going to 
be getting out o f  this Jet or 






Plan accepted? Yes Yes ___
Note. A  dashed line (— ) denotes no activity observed or reported by the crew.
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Crews 2 and 3 are still dealing with issues o f  uncertainty resulting from a lack o f 
information, poor communications, and less than optimum task management which are 
interfering with their ability to mentally “keep ahead” o f the aircraft. The Crew 3 pilot 
has not communicated the low oil pressure problem to his COTAC. Now the decision 
making process is slowed by the COTAC‘s need to re-sort and recognize internal and 
external communications about uncertainties in information and time constraints.
Crew 2 is dysfunctional in terms o f their ability to achieve consensus internal to 
the cockpit, let alone coordinate with the air traffic controllers to talk about further flight 
clearances. The pilot is attempting to raise the probability of sustaining controlled flight 
by attempting an in-flight restart o f  the No. I engine. The COTAC simply accepts the 
uncertainty o f  the situation (i.e., the possibility that the No. 2 engine may fail at any time) 
and does not want the additional tasking (consulting the published checklists) affecting a 
potentially better outcome. The COTAC asserts that the probabilities o f  needing the 
back-up engine are outweighed by the possibility o f a restart “explosion” over a 
populated area. The pilot does not assert his positional leadership to order the COTAC to 
initiate the Checklist "challenge and reply" routines. The pilot attempts to re-light the 
No. I engine by himself from memory without the benefit o f the written procedures 
(available only to the COTAC in the checklist). The timing o f this request was rejected 
by the COTAC as more work than the COTAC could deal with at this stage o f the flight 
relative to the impending final approach and landing, the aircraft’s mechanical state and 
his own lack o f  “mental reserves."
Although there are attempts at adaptive strategies, novice crews 2 and 3 take too 
much time analyzing and creating options to effectively deal with the situation. They
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appear to be waiting for “someone” to provide them with direction or guidance (in this 
case the airport tower) or for something to happen (perhaps the failure o f the No. 2 
engine) to force them into a decision. Crew 3 attempts to increase the pace o f the cockpit 
routines, as they perceive scant minutes available for them to complete the remaining 
non-essential for safety o f  flight procedural tasks normally associated with a landing 
sequence. However, they stay in the analytical mode far too long while they attend to 
unresolved issues concerning aircraft status. Similarly, Crew 2 COTAC does not adapt to 
the situation; he spends valuable time relaying two plans to the control tower instead o f 
backing up the pilot.
In comparison, high performing crew 16 continues at an efficient pace, employing 
good technical skills for the approach and good information exchange in the cockpit. 
There is no discussion o f  contingencies. In contrast to the other crews, the pilot o f  Crew 
16 begins to focus the entirety o f his attention on landing and adopts a mindset that filters 
out or eliminates all non-essential (i.e., non-landing) stimuli and influences. He commits 
full concentration to completing an "arrested landing." The COTAC provides aggressive 
pilot backup by minimizing external communications during this critical phase o f  flight.
In the last most difficult and time constrained decision in the scenario the crews 
are faced with a novel, dangerous situation that they must resolve while continuing to 
sustain the high workloads, sustain potential energy to reach the runway, scan for other 
aircraft, and configure the aircraft for landing. The aircrews’ strategies to deal with a 
compounded novel set o f high-risk conditions in a dynamic environment are outlined in 
Table 11 that follows.
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Table 11
Specific Examples o f Strategies Used by Aircrews under Conditions o f  Uncertainty and 
Severe Time Constraints during Final Approach Tower call about Truck at Runway 
Intersection



































create a plan ----- —
COTAC (meta) 
"How ami 
suppose to tell a 








Pilot waves off 
and crew ejects 




Yes. Several if 
they had landed. 
(Table continues)
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COTAC makes altitude calls. Pilot unsure 
o f truck location (in middle o f  runway or 





Pilot does not verbally respond. COTAC 
(meta) “Pilot righting the jet- maybe he 
didn’t realize how low he was.” Pilot 
unsure o f  ability to stop aircraft before 
truck. “We would have probably hit it.” 
Pilot knew putting throttle to firewall 
would not give them another attempt at 


















Crew lands on 
numbers and 







no attempt to 




Pilot expected to eject. Pilot to control 




Yes. Ejected over water at 100 feet. 
However, COTAC tried to get call out 
after pilot calls for ejection over water. 
COTAC is late to pull handle (attempts 2  
tunes) to eject to ensure search and rescue 
(SAR) effort gets underway.
C- Standby 701 is ejecting 
P- Eject, eject, eject 
C- Ready?
-----
Note. A dashed line (— ) denotes no activity observed or reported by t ie crew.
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The strategies used by both Crews 2 and 3 to circumnavigate the uncertainty o f 
the truck position on the runway and/or the ability to stop or eject prior to the truck led 
them to wave-off on the final approach- The wave-off required full power to be applied 
to the only remaining, but already degraded and poorly performing engine- This 
application o f  power resulted in an immediate, catastrophic failure o f  the No- 2 engine.
As evidenced by crew processes up to this point, these novice crews have varying 
difficulty with setting and maintaining goals, adjusting to requirements o f  the operational 
tempo, retrieving and applying basic systems knowledge, time management, and task 
management skills.
The control tower transmission concerning the truck at the intersection o f  the 
runways was in effect firewalled (i.e., a strategy used to intentionally delay or prevent 
incoming information (S. K. Hunt, personal communication, February 2,2002)) by both 
the pilot and the COTAC o f Crew 16. This very experienced crew had never flown 
together. Yet, they developed a mutually shared mental model o f the desired result that 
prompted both crewmembers to apply an apparent “non-receive” mode to some stimuli. 
Crew 16 intentionally ignored the possibility that more information was available from 
the tower to carry out their decision plan. (This crew ranked as the second highest 
performers of the sixteen crews in the outcome ranking, hi the debrief, the pilot indicated 
that he was unaware o f the tower informing them o f the fouled runway condition.) 
Although luck may have played a  part in the successful outcome o f this crew, the 
information delaying strategy played a  significant role m their final outcome.
Appendix L presents the strategies used in the final scenario events by the highest 
(Crew 13), mid-range (Crew 11), and lowest (Crew 6) crews in the outcome rankings.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
The findings from these crews, as well as the other thirteen crews, are presented below in 
a  composite overview o f  crew characteristics related to decision-making strategies that 
had the greatest bearing on overall performance in the study scenario.
Critical Characteristics and Factors that Define Most Successful Performance Outcomes 
Findings related to the third research question show there are multiple 
commonalties in the crew characteristics and functioning in a number of areas o f 
performance related to the most successful crews' decision-making strategies and 
patterns. Among the higher performing crews, that is crews ranked in the top quadrant in 
both sum process scores and outcome rankings (i.e., Crews 16, 15, and 13), the following 
patterns were observed in the areas most directly related to overall performance in this 
study scenario.
Decision planning. The most successful aircrews set up a focused strategic game 
plan, with a firm commitment to land, immediately after their first in-flight emergency 
presented itself and accelerated their activities in order to expedite their return to the 
field. The most successful crews appeared to visualize or imagine their desired results 
and worked backward to design the requirements to get there. The best performers 
synthesized their experience and knowledge structures to meet the scenario requirements.
Information gathering and use. The best performing aircrews: (a) shared 
responsibility for efficiently gathering and handling selective information, prioritized 
incoming communication by immediate workload and its relevance to the strategic goal, 
quickly executed Checklist memory items (e.g., selected portions o f a few checklists 
were reviewed silently by COTAC's or intentionally skipped), and completed remaining 
procedural items; (b) did not expend energy or time pursuing new, readily available, or
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irrelevant information unrelated to the desired outcome; (c) resolved ambiguous 
information; (d) interwove task execution and communication with brief periods o f cross 
talk to keep each other apprised o f aircraft configuration changes, position relative to the 
field, checklist status, and upcoming actions; (e) used consensus building at each major 
decision point; (f) expressed high confidence and comfort level with self and crewmate;
(g) did not verbalize a wave-off as part o f  their contingency plan(s) as they had 
determined early on that this was an unrealistic option.
Pace o f activities. The pace set by the highest performing crews was expedient 
enough to “stay ahead o f the jet” but not rushed. There was no delay in the decision to 
return to handle the existing emergency and configure the aircraft for immediate landing 
at the field. Multitasking was also handled efficiently with a division of labor, as was 
“protection” and back up for the other crewmember as necessary to render assistance and 
prevent task overload that might have led to slips and mistakes.
Time awareness o f communications and task requirements. High performing 
crews were acutely aware o f tune elapsed (from the initial recognition o f loss of the No. 2 
oil pressure) and time remaining in terms o f their perception o f how long an engine could 
continue to operate in a low oil pressure condition. They mapped time available into 
their perception o f  current state of the environment (e.g., airspace, aircraft state, etc.). 
They devoted cognitive resources to maintaining high levels o f  situational awareness to 
maintain focus on crucial existing and impending tasks. Better performing crews were 
driven by this heightened cognitive state so they could allocate the appropriate amount o f 
time to exchange information at any point in or phase o f the flight. There was a  cadence 
o f strategically timed cross talk throughout the flight. Conversely, they delayed acting on
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or receiving inbound information if  they felt it would distract them from focusing on 
crucial existing or impending tasks related to the accomplishment of their clearly defined 
strategic goals (or game plan). High performers remembered and stored data to share 
during the occasional seconds between tasks or during periods o f low workload. This 
was accomplished by anticipating opportunities to communicate or receive information 
the next chance they got in the flight. Only a clear mutual vision of all necessary tasks 
allowed this synergistic exchange.
Crew coordination/cooperation. Teamwork and leadership were also keys to 
successful overall performance, hi the S-3 community the pilot is designated as the 
aircraft commander responsible for the overall safe conduct o f a flight. Crew 
coordination reflects the notion that the crew is a  team and a “we” mentality existed in 
the most effective crews. For example, in several instances, the pilot o f Crew 16 gave 
positive reinforcement to the COTAC's scan and back-up actions. In general, 
crewmembers were responsive to the other’s judgment and requests. I f  a crewmember's 
judgment was questioned or clarification was required, it was done in a professional 
manner.
Risk assessment and management. Experienced crews rapidly and accurately 
assessed both probability and severity o f the risk and made the strategic decision to land 
as soon as possible. They continued to evaluate compounded risk as the variables 
changed while effectively prioritizing a hierarchy o f hazards that allowed then to deal 
with the most severe hazards first. High performing crews used correct application of 
systems knowledge in risk taking (e.g., awareness that the re-start o f the No.l engine 
would dramatically reduce the risk o f  losing the aircraft). The most successful crews also
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determined that landing the aircraft with a fouled deck was a better option with less 
inherent risk than attempting a wave-off and they did not take time to plan for 
contingencies in their final decision to land.
Familiarity with the landing environment and aircraft performance capabilities. 
The set up for approach (aircraft positioning) to land at the very beginning of the runway 
played a critical factor in the outcome o f this scenario. High performing crews used their 
knowledge o f the distance to the runway, runway length, and intersection locations to 
make strategic decisions. The most successful pilots/aircrews displayed an instinctive 
ability to accurately perceive trends in aircraft’s airspeed, altitude and relative distance to 
the intended point o f landing. The development of, and the reliance on, this sort o f 
perceptual skill set is integral to precise, safe landings with any aircraft, let alone one 
experiencing mechanical difficulties. Pilots that flew better-controlled approaches had 
the ability (both in terms o f motor skills and highly developed perceptual skills) to 
establish and maintain desired descent rates and approach speeds. This allowed them to 
target the end o f the runway (versus the normal landing point some 700 feet beyond the 
runway threshold) once informed that the arresting gear was out o f service.
Crews that were in a position to land and did so adapted the standard S-3 
approach pattern and deviated from the primary landing aid (i.e., Fresnel lens) used to 
guide pilots in for a simulated carrier approach on the landing field. This lens consists of 
five lighted cells that indicate the relative glide slope position (high, on target or low), 
and is commonly referred to as the ball. The ball is used both on a carrier deck and on 
landing fields (for training purposes) to guide pilots to the third o f  four wires available to 
catch the aircraft’s tailhook as it approaches the landing surface. Figure 9 roughly
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depicts the differences in aircraft carrier and field landing aircraft arrestment points using 
the Fresnel lens. On Runway 29, the lens provides vertical guidance to a point well 
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Figure 9. Comparison o f  target points from side and top perspectives o f landing 
approach paths on an aircraft carrier and landing field using a Fresnel lens.
Generally, the more experienced pilots elected to disregard or make adjustments 
to fly the ball low as soon as they recognized the need to touch down with the m axim um  
amount o f  pavement between the aircraft and the intersection. The better performing 
pilots were then able to utilize the 720 feet o f otherwise “over flown” runway that was 
typical o f  an approach flown using the ball for vertical guidance. (S. K. Hunt, personal 
communication, February 19, 2000).
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Summary
Data analysis revealed that individuals and teams who had the ability to use their 
domain knowledge and experience to recognize the need to break away from procedural 
and analytical process rules to cope with naturalistic contexts had better process scores 
and outcome ranks. Both process and outcome rankings were good discriminators 
between novice and experienced crews although process and outcome correlation seemed 
to be limited to experienced crews. The study findings clearly reflect the skillful use of 
advanced cognitive processes by high performing crews to adapt information gathering 
and decision making strategies to dynamic situations. The quantitative analysis found 
statistically significant differences in process performance in four scenario process 
elements between the two levels o f flight experience represented in the groups. Based on 
this finding the qualitative inquiry focused on identifying and understanding the 
distinctions that characterized the varied performance levels.
The qualitative investigation found that there were indeed clearly different 
approaches to decision-making strategies including risk perception and management in 
better performing crews. Most experienced crews described adaptive strategies they used 
to rapidly identify and prioritize relevant risk factors that required immediate response. 
On the other hand, most novice crews continued to use procedural and analytical 
decision-making strategies under real-time, dynamic situational demands and overlooked 
the cognitive adjustments required to carry out their initial plan to land. Ultimately, the 
crews' perception o f risk was predicated on their perception o f the circumstances.
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CHAPTERS
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In addition to a summary o f  the study, this chapter synthesizes the cross-case 
findings from the analysis o f the main study populations and discusses the consistency of 
these findings with the theoretical frameworks o f  naturalistic decision making 
researchers. The chapter concludes with the researcher’s interpretation o f the study and 
the potentially profound implications for aviation training advancements and 
recommendations for further research.
Summary o f the Study 
This empirical study examined five interrelated elements: (a) to investigate the 
relationship o f experience on aircrew process ratings and decision results (outcome); (b) 
to determine any relationship between process ratings and outcome rankings; (c) to 
distinguish the decision-making strategies o f aircrews; (d) to determine i f  decision­
making strategy patterns o f successful and less than successful aircrews support or refute 
theoretical concepts/models for naturalistic behavioral analysis; and (e) to identify crew 
performance characteristics o f  the most successful crews.
Summary o f the Methodology 
The case study approach was selected to provide meaningful data to identify the 
thought processes used by more and less effective aircrews. Case study comparisons 
sharply defined how individual and aircrews management o f uncertainty differed under
103
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varying degrees o f  event structure and time constraints. Data for this study consisted of 
instructor evaluations o f 8 novice and 8 experienced aircrews consisting o f one pilot and 
one COTAC (co-pilot tactical coordinators). Aircrew performance in a flight simulator 
scenario provided a  realistic environment to observe and rate aircrew performance over 
seven events o f  increasing complexity and uncertainty. Digital files o f  the flight event 
were then used to cue retrospective verbal reports o f crewmembers' metacognitive 
processes related to situational awareness and decision making. Crew outcome rankings 
were generated from independent rater judgments o f  optimum crew and aircraft 
disposition at the end o f the scenario. The research into the underlying issues related to 
differences in aircrew processes and outcome was guided by results o f  the inferential and 
descriptive statistical analyses o f  process score and outcome ranking data.
Summary o f  Key Findings 
Study findings, from both the descriptive and inferential quantitative and 
qualitative cross-case analyses, provide multiple lines of evidence towards the same 
conclusion and are summarized below. These findings confirm the findings o f  other 
researchers in naturalistic decision making and are interpreted as they relate to the study 
hypotheses and research questions in the sections that follow.
■ The overall superiority o f process scores received by experienced crews was 
statistically significant.
■ Scenario events with sequentially increased uncertainty and limited response time 
served as good discriminators o f  process ratings with statistically significant 
differences between the groups in the last four more complex events.
■ The superior outcome rankings o f  experienced crews were statistically significant.
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■ Strong indicators o f  a positive relationship between process and outcome 
(r =  .64) was limited to the experienced group. There was no strong 
process/outcome relationship found with novices (r=  .16).
■ Debriefing/interview data provided specific instances o f thought protocols that 
revealed differences in strategy selection and application between higher and low 
performing aircrews.
■ Higher performing crews demonstrated better ability to use adaptive strategies to 
identify relevant concerns, to evaluate risk, and to develop a practical solution 
with no increase in effort within the time available.
■ Less experienced or poorer performing crews were driven by procedural and 
analytical concerns at inappropriate times and did not make the cognitive 
adjustments required to relinquish a linear systematic approach for flying when in 
an extremis situation.
Hypothesis I:  Experienced crews receive better process score ratings than novices in 
handling a specific in-flight emergency involving uncertainty
Process ratings. Quantitative analysis centered on a two-factor (experiential) 
multivariate analysis o f variance, with seven dependent measures (decision points). In 
general, experienced crews demonstrated more consistent performance with less 
deviation in mean and variance differences in process scores across all events compared 
to less experienced crews. The last two event conditions (i.e., no arresting gear and 
fouled deck) clearly illustrated the importance o f an aircrews’ ability to recognize the 
need to modify their routine situational assessments and decision-making processes. 
There were distinct differences between performance groups in dimensions such as 
pattern matching, memory for domain-relevant facts, conflict resolution, risk assessment, 
cockpit resource management, and decision strategy and execution. The most 
experienced crews exhibit "clusters o f  skills that tend to make their performance more
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stable, less error prone, and more efficient than novices or intermediates (Seamster, 
Redding & Kaempf, 1997, p.29).
For example, the high performing crews executed a strategic game plan without 
major re-analysis o f their plan every time the scenario context changed and engine time 
remaining became more uncertain (i.e., low oil pressure in remaining engine, arresting 
gear not available, and truck in runway intersection). In general, experienced crews were 
able to draw on their experience and domain knowledge to intuitively recognize the need 
for creative adaptive action and adjusted their flight paths to land without use o f arresting 
gear. Seven o f the eight experienced crews deviated from procedural requirements for an 
arrested landing and touched down at the closest possible point on the runway. This was 
a risk tradeoff between eliminating “room for error” provided by a normal approach path 
and giving the crews the use of additional runway to stop prior to the truck in the 
intersection (i.e., fouled deck).
Experienced crews with hundreds o f carrier deck and airfield landings possess the 
confidence and knowledge that with adjustments to the landing approach, the aircraft was 
capable o f  stopping prior to the intersection. Conversely, inexperienced crews tended to 
fly less disciplined (i.e. less controlled) approaches with higher unintentional deviations 
in airspeed, altitude and approach paths (not to be confused with glide paths) than their 
experienced counterparts.
Seven out o f eight novice crews that had established a game plan to land elected 
to wave-off. When the arresting gear was unavailable most novice crews could not 
"break set" with the routine field arrestment landings they are required to execute in all 
training events. Unlike the more experienced crews, most novice crews did not take into
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consideration the uncertainty o f the circumstances in their risk assessment and 
management of the situation. These crews subsequently planned their approach path 
without considering there may not be an opportunity for a second chance to land. Four 
out o f  five novice pilots did not follow through with their intended plan to land, even 
without the arresting gear, because they realized they had not flown a precisely controlled 
approach pattern (i.e., did not have the automated basic domain skills (i.e., stick and 
rudder skills) to make the last minute correction). Furthermore, the inexperienced crews 
had problems retrieving and using information under stress about runway available until 
the intersection, and/or lacked the confidence to follow through with their intentions (i.e., 
several o f the pilots took last second direction from the COTAC to wave-off).
Hypothesis 2: Decision results (outcomes) o f experienced aircrews are rated as higher
quality than those made by novice aircrews
Outcome rankings. The complexity o f the decision problem in the final decision 
to land or eject was the major determinant o f outcome ratings. Inexperience with a 
compound emergency in an unstable landing environment and inexperience in dealing 
with time-critical situations prevented most novice crews from making the optimum 
decision in this case. The interpretation o f the experiential factors and patterns that relate 
to the required cognitive effort and time involved in this decision process is summarized 
as follows: (a) experienced crews did not consider options to deviate from their original 
strategic plan to land immediately, and (b) inexperienced crews more often proposed and 
considered more than one option when landing gear was de-rigged and then again when 
an obstacle was placed in the runway.
1
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Hypothesis 3: Aircrew process ratings are correlated with the decision outcome ratings 
Process scores' inter-relationship with outcome rankings. Analysis o f process and 
outcome scores showed a main statistical effect for flight experience. The study results 
suggest that experience was a significant factor in aircrews that received higher scores in 
the scenario's later decision points. The experienced crews generally achieved higher 
process score totals as well as higher outcome scores from independent rankers. No 
strong apparent relationships were found between novice process and outcome scores. 
However, there was a positive correlation with experienced crews between outcome 
ranking and two process events (no arresting gear game plan and fou l deck game plan). 
Process and outcome rating analysis revealed several important aspects related to overall 
performance. The major findings from deconstructing performance attributes o f high and 
low performing aircrews that support quantitative results in terms o f ability to predict 
process and outcome performance are: (a) the most notable distinction in aircrew 
performance occurred in less structured decisions under severe time pressure that 
required an adaptive response to the decision problem to satisfy immediate safety o f 
flight concerns, and (b) there exists a longitudinal effect o f an aircrew’s strategic, tactical, 
and procedural planning and execution, beginning in the brief and continuing throughout 
the flight.
The researcher used empirical generalizations made from quantitative analysis 
beyond the significant effect size itself to guide the qualitative inquiry. Since the 
difference in process scores between experienced and novice crews were expected, the 
research questions focused on the reasons for these differences. Although rule-based 
decisions were applied well by almost all crews throughout the scenario, the performance
i
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o f most novice crews deteriorated when unanticipated problems demanded creative 
thinking during the latter stages o f  the scenario.
The evidence clearly indicates that experience is a primary factor in the ability to: 
(a) concisely recognize and assess risk in atypical situations; (b) apply domain 
knowledge, skill and experiences to perceive time available to save the aircraft and crew; 
(c) adjust a  plan to respond to situational dynamics, and (d) consider only one option at a 
time. These findings are supported by decision research findings: increases in task 
complexity drive altered evaluation and choice strategies used to make both high and low 
risk choices (Payne, 1985).
Research Question I: What adaptive recognitional/metacognitive decision-making
strategies emerge from aircrews?
Emergent recognitional/metacognitive strategies. Beyond domain knowledge, 
expert performers use meta-recognitional skills that include rapid information search and 
prediction o f  option success to inform adaptive decision-making processes. Key research 
findings throughout naturalistic decision research summarized by Means, Salas, Crandall 
and Jacobs (1993) support the description o f the strategies reported by the aircrews to 
simplify complex problems while maintaining flexibility in thought processes as well as 
reactions to unfolding events. Adaptive recognitional/metacognitive strategies were used 
to systematically search for information, and quickly identify, characterize and frame 
problems.
Crew use o f  adaptive strategies supports naturalistic decision making theory that 
the most successful crews would have employed adaptive strategies as time pressure and
i ■
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need for more immediate action grew stronger as the scenario progressed. Interview 
analysis revealed that adaptive "satisficing" or "good enough" (Simon, 1955) strategies 
emerged in the more uncertain and time critical portions o f  the study scenario to 
effectively achieve immediate short-term and long-term goals. These decision-making 
strategies characterized by the effort and accuracy trade-offs in the more progressively 
uncertain decision-making environments in the study scenario were consistent with the 
findings o f  Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1988, 1990).
Data analysis yielded two multi-dimensional matrices to synthesize the decision 
strategies employed by study aircrews under different levels o f uncertainty. The 
conceptual categories used to develop the matrices were based on the ideas o f Klein,
1983; Payne, 1985; Humphreys & Berkeley, 1985; Endsley, 1995, 1997; Orasanu etal., 
1993; and Cohen, et al., 1996. These matrices proved useful in identifying critical links 
in the crews’ performance in the study scenario during increasing time constraints and 
uncertainty. Variations in the range of adaptive strategies used by individuals/crews for 
information gathering, processing and decision making are included in Tables Mi and M2 
o f Appendix M.
Figure 10 graphically portrays the range o f responses and crew interactions/ 
actions related to the cognitive efforts o f  aircrews in a multi-crewed aircraft in the study 
scenario. Process data used to develop this explanatory model evolved from the data 
compiled for building the matrices in Appendix M. Data sum m arized  included a priori 
crew explanations o f  thought processes and actions regarding processes o f  information 
gathering, goal development, risk assessment, and subsequent technical, tactical and 
strategic decision making under various conditions o f uncertainty and time pressure. The
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explanatory model captures the decision-making temporal, considerations and associated 
level o f  interaction between crewmembers and with external sources associated with 
updating situational awareness, risk assessment, strategy revision and implementation. 
Various strategies depicted in Figure 10 were used by aircrews to manage uncertainty and 
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Figure 10. Explanatory model o f the range o f responses associated with aircrew decision 
making in a scenario involving naturalistic conditions
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The findings support that the effective use o f critical thinking skills and processes
as framed in the Recognition/Metacognition (R/M) model (Cohen, Adelman, Tolcott,
Bresnick, & Marvin, 1993; Cohen, Freeman, & Wolf, 1994) resulted in superior
outcomes. The explanatory model created with study data, illustrated in Figure 10,
supports Cohen’s focus on “an integrated picture o f how knowledge structures are created
and adjusted in dynamic environments” (Cohen, 1993a, p. 49). The findings o f  this study
support that success o f the processes used to manage uncertainty were dependent on the
complexity o f the problem “manipulated through variations in the number o f alternatives
in the choice set, the number o f  dimensions o f information (attributes or outcomes) used
to define an alternative, and the amount of time available for making the decision”
(Payne, 1985, p. 7). The next section will discuss the way in which the crew processes
identified for managing uncertainty influenced performance in the scenario.
Research Question 2 : In what way do adaptive/metacognitive decision-making patterns 
differ among successful and less than successful aircrews?
Differences in decision-making patterns of high and low performing crews. 
Interview analysis revealed that recognitional/metacognitive strategies were required in 
the more uncertain and time critical portions o f  the study scenario. Aircrews that could 
quickly identify the first option in a sequence o f  options that would immediately “satisfy” 
requirements to make a safe landing had better outcomes. Aircrews that had problems 
prioritizing and/or tried to justify their decision-making process (in several cases to 
authorities rather than themselves) by falling back on standard operating procedures 
and/or weighing multiple options (often using biased probabilities or logic) were not as 
successful in optimizing their outcomes. For certain tasks in the scenario, as well as in
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operational settings, procedural and analytical strategies will result in better performance 
(Klein, 1997a) but this scenario was designed to force the use o f adaptive decision 
making for the best possible results.
Experienced aircrews were more often and better able to use past experience to 
adapt interactions between crewmembers that resulted in quicker situational assessments 
and better decision-making focus to achieve optimal results. As depicted in the 
Recognition-Primed Decision Model (Klein et al., 1986) and used by experts in various 
field studies (Klein, 1997b), this adaptive critical thinking process focuses on the 
sequential evaluation o f options for immediate “best fit” in a dynamic situation rather 
than a  time-consuming weighing o f  options for the best possible solution and/or 
preparation to justify actions.
With regard to satisfying the immediate landing requirements in the scenario, the 
core differences in performance between novice and experienced aircrew outcomes 
included: (a) more experienced crews were better calibrated in the strategic outcome goal 
and the closer they got to the threshold they focused narrowly and sharply on the 
commitment to the landing option alone (i.e., only information pertinent or germane to a 
accomplishing a safe landing was processed; (b) novice crews tended to 
discuss/investigate non-landing options and even invented additional non-landing options 
while on the final approach to land. Novice crews did not select or correctly apply 
appropriate decision strategies for this final event involving a truck on the runway during 
final approach.
The rule-based decision strategies used by most novice crews were not flexible 
enough to work in a  novel situation. The procedural analytical, option-weighing
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strategies were too time consuming and/or inappropriate probabilities o f error/success 
were placed on options. Interview analysis revealed that recognitional/metacognitive 
strategies were employed by the more experienced crews to guide, limit and stop 
information search in the final time-critical events that called for satisficing. This finding 
supports the use o f critical thinking strategies for quick retrieval o f assumptions and 
identification o f  relevant information; that have been identified as: (I) critiquing or 
accurately evaluating/characterizing the problem, (2) monitoring a course o f action to 
assess whether the methods and results o f the decision process will be satisfactory, and 
then (3) correcting or regulating the plan with a  sequential evaluation of options with a 
commitment to the first acceptable alternative rather than trying to optimize by waiting 
for analytical results (Klein, 1993; Rouse & Valusek, 1993; Cohen et al., 1996).
Since a “vital element in all strategies is a  specification o f both the amount and 
order in which information is processed” (Maule, 1985, p.71) the information gathering 
and use by aircrews was o f primary interest in the data analysis. The finding that the 
individual/crews’ perception o f  their circumstance had a major effect on their risk 
perception o f a situation led to the investigation o f information processing strategies and 
judgments. Errors in information gathering strategy or errors in use o f  strategy to 
evaluate and characterize the situation or problem were a major determinant o f the final 
outcome in the scenario performance. Aircrew uses o f  judgmental rules, known as 
heuristics, were used to break down difficult tasks into simpler ones. Although the use of 
heuristics is “valid in some circumstances, in others they lead to large and persistent 
biases with serious implications for decision making” (Slovic, Fischhofif & Lichtenstein, 
1982).
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Lower performing crews were poor at information gathering to use for strategic 
judgments- They commonly did not work at “staying ahead o f the jet” (i.e., planning and 
identifying potential risks in light o f their strategic goals). Novice crews routinely 
became involved in completing the tasks at hand (e.g., orbiting in the vicinity o f field to 
complete troubleshooting drills/checklists) and attempted to make even more time 
available (e.g., attempted to execute the full instrument approach procedure rather than 
taking vectors or commencing a visual approach) for these relatively irrelevant tasks. 
Novice crews also devoted cognitive capacity to inappropriate concerns and 
demonstrated an over-reliance on and unfamiliarity with checklists. One o f the most 
obvious differences between novice and experienced crews in this scenario seems to 
hinge on their willingness, or lack thereof to abbreviate, deviate from, or in some cases 
completely ignore checklists items. Once the experienced crews ascertained the need to 
land immediately there was a relentless concentration on getting the jet "on deck."
Novice crews, on the other hand, never really seemed to recognize or generate the same 
sense o f urgency "to get at least the important stuff done" that was repeatedly seen in the 
experienced crews.
Although most novices displayed many attributes o f  good performing crews they 
were either not consistent and/or they were driven by procedural and analytical concerns 
at inappropriate times. Applying rule-based solutions that they thought would help to 
define and control the situation drove many novice crews. There were multiple examples 
o f novice crews substituting dogmatic compliance of checklist for the intent o f the 
checklist (i.e., flight safety). For most novice crews, the regard for prolonging the flight 
with “clean-up” issues outweighed the urgency to get the aircraft on the ground. For
I
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Crew 1, this mindset became extreme to the point o f substituting checklist compliance for 
aircraft control. In the debrief the COT AC explained the crew’s priorities for “taking the 
time to go through all the checklists” and remarked, “ ...we just need to get through the 
landing checklists and get them done otherwise this plane is not going to fly anymore.”
As the number o f  competing, high priority tasks began to increase in both size and 
importance experienced crews very clearly demonstrated a "triage-like" task management 
mentality. There was a need to address everything at a satisificing level in the time 
available. Accordingly, these crews relied upon their experience and well-developed 
sense o f judgment to cut comers wherever and whenever appropriate as they performed 
safety o f flight tasks such as checklists, systems monitoring, troubleshooting, navigation, 
and coordinating with the control tower. Experienced Naval aviators recognized this 
situation required a "gear, flaps, hook, land" mentality in which all other checklist items 
become secondary. Their communications with the control tower became somewhat 
terse directives (e.g., "We'll be taking a trap on 29" vs. the normal request for landing 
advisories or clearances) and the general concern for their equipment became much more 
"survivalist" vs. "maintenance friendly" in nature. The willingness o f  experienced crews 
to restart, and quite likely completely destroy a two million dollar engine in order to save 
a  $30 million aircraft is a  perfect example o f  this type o f "triage" task management. 
Everything that was important received attention, obviously not as much attention as was 
ideal, but at least enough to get the je t landed on the runway.
The process scores reflected a degree o f  aircrew accuracy in identifying relevant 
cues, organizing the information into a judgment and then using appropriate decision­
making strategies over a series o f  judgments. According to Arkes and Hammond’s
I
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model o f judgment analysis, “judgment is a cognitive process similar to inductive 
inference” (1992, p. 7). Since high judgmental accuracy is considered an essential 
attribute o f high performance it was expected that low judgmental accuracy would be 
reflected in lower performance and scores. Sample quotes representing a crewmember's 
use o f heuristics, developed as a  result o f various studies in judgments o f  probability, are 
presented in Table 11.
Table U
Sample Heuristics used in Risk Assessment by Aircrews
Heuristic (rule) Crew
/position
Example of Use in Predicting Risk
Im aeinabilitv- novel 
situation evaluated by  
imagining contingencies 
(w ith no experience to use) 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973)






“ We didn’t have short field gear so that’s a factor. We 
might have been able to stop; we might not. So they weren 't 
going to get the truck moved so we would probably have hit 
it if we landed. There’s no way E could have stopped it 
there."




(Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973)
C rew l2  
P ilot 
Waved-off 
15 o f  1dm 
outcome 
ranking
“I don’t think E would have stopped in time. 1 think 1 might 
have been able to stop it. However, that’s not always the 
case even when E slam on the brakes. That was 50/50. E 
would say from my experience landing in this jet that the 
brakes aren’t what they ought to be. That would have been 
a 50/50 chance of us plowing into the truck. So weight the 
odds ofthatifthe other engine can keep going and both 
those chances are real bad.”
Illusory Correlation- over­
estim ate o f  strength o f  
associative bond  
(Chapman &  Chapman, 
1969)






“Well, E wasn’t  thinking about how far the intersection was. 
All I heard was ‘intersection’ in my mind. Now sitting here 
E can stop and think about how many times I’ve stopped the 
jet before the intersection. But E was thinking along the 
lines of conservatism, 1 guess, and not sure whether it could 
stop in time.”
Evaluation o f  Coniunctive- 
likelihood plan w ill succeed  
through series o f  events 
(Bar-Hfllel, 1973)






“You know if we can’t stop by the time we get to the 
intersection then most likely we’re not going to be able to 
stop. There’s the long field gear but there’s some other kind 
of problem [involved]. So, this jet easily stops within 4,000 
feet on runways. Ef we weren’t  stopped by that point you’re 
slow enough to go off or at that point you’re ejected.”
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In conclusion, the major issues related to poor performance included: (a) 
unresolved issues in learning/training (systems knowledge, technical skills, crew 
coordination, etc.), (b) inability to improvise when safety o f flight called for abbreviated 
or expeditious handling o f checklists, (c) fear o f  not being able to justify a decision to 
deviate from published procedures or regulations when warranted by airborne 
emergencies, (d) inability to strategize to keep the goal with the biggest payoff in focus,
(e) lack o f  confidence in their technical skills, and (f) lack o f assertiveness as pilot in 
command.
Crew characteristics and factors that defined the most successful crew outcomes. 
The attempt to develop a  stereotypical definition o f an effective crew by studying the 
range o f  performance between novice and experienced crews was more complex than 
originally anticipated. A consolidated list o f  attributes related to different performance 
levels was revealed through various data sources in the study. Attributes of high 
performance were found in lower performing crews but not to the extent and consistency 
found in better performing crews. Poor performance characteristics were also found 
across all crews. In general, novice crews exhibited more o f  these characteristics than 
experienced crews as evidenced by the process and outcome rankings. A summary o f 
specific crew characteristics related to performance levels is located in Appendix N.
Substantial flight tune alone was not a qualifying factor in distinguishing “expert” 
performers in the study scenario. Two cases underscored that other factors may be 
involved with flight performance beyond, or in spite o f an accumulation o f flight hours. 
The crew with the least amount o f  total flight time m the S-3 exhibited many o f  the 
characteristics o f  expertise and team skills associated with aircrews at the other end o f  the
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flight experience spectrum. The essential factor in successful performance by this novice 
crew was the ability o f  each crewmember to adjust his cognitive style as well as his 
workload prioritization to meet emerging requirements. For work in a crew environment, 
this meant that as context and task characteristics changed each crewmember 
relinquished/adjusted his viewpoint or workload as necessary. Traditional teamwork 
includes balancing positional duties in a “divide and conquer” approach with “back-up” 
for procedural compliance and situational awareness (i.e., aircraft altitude, airspeed, and 
positioning relative to an acceptable approach path profile). In the case o f  the poor 
performing experienced crew, the pilot’s overbearing attitude towards the COT AC whom 
he outranked and complacency in verifying identification o f problems or procedures (e.g., 
started to shut down wrong engine, never associated smoke with low oil pressure, elected 
to wave-off) were not representative o f  an experienced fleet aviator.
The higher performing crews displayed more o f these traits and were more 
consistent in demonstrating these expert capabilities than the average or lower 
performing crews. The goal o f  the cross-case study analysis was to find the extremes o f 
performance and create a stereotypical definition o f a good crew. Therefore, case studies 
o f aircrews ranked highest, mid-point and lowest on the process and outcome score 
continuum were analyzed to reveal differences in areas found to be primary determinants 
o f  process and outcomes. Performance differences that grew progressively greater as the 
difficulty level o f the scenario increased were found in the following areas: (a) 
knowledge and skills involving aircraft control, (b) leadership, (c) cue recognition, 
identification and response, and (d) strategic focus aligned with tactical and procedural 
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The experienced crews reacted differently to apparent inconsistencies in the 
situation and did not deviate from their original strategic plan as the novice crews did on 
the final decision. As reflected in the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model, a 
comparison o f  options was typically not done by experienced personnel in the final 
scenario events. Once they entered the “end stage’ they remained with their original plan 
to return to base and land as soon as possible regardless o f the distractions presented to 
them in the scenario. Inexperienced crews more often created options when informed 
that the landing gear was de-rigged and then again when informed that there was an 
obstacle on the runway. This supports the notion that novice crews’ prior training and 
inexperience in landing at the field under extremis situations was a major factor in their 
inability to make a choice from dynamic sequential options. As one novice pilot 
explained, his reliance on procedural responses remains consistent in the transition from a 
training command single-seat jet, where "pretty much if  things don’t work perfectly- 
eject" to piloting a multi-seat jet where "you definitely change how you handle
emergencies to improve crew coordination, taking more time with your procedures to
make sure you get them right, and not place yourself in more extremis can make a big 
difference.”
The study findings support that flight experience is the major determinant in a 
crew's ability to react more quickly and more accurately to complex situations involving 
uncertainty and severe time constraints. This conclusion is supported by previous 
research findings using gambling predictions (Payne, 1985; Payne, Bettman, and 
Johnson, 1988) that a  decision-maker has a  multitude o f strategies to select from to 
predict outcomes depending on the trade-off between costs and accuracy given
i
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constraints o f the situation. The metacognitive processes shared by the crews during the 
debrief interview suggest that a  crewmember’s personal sense o f confidence as well as 
his comfort level with the other crewmember’s ability to back-up and carry out the 
specific tasking requested is important to effective team performance. This required 
crewmembers to deal with some “distracting” concerns by internalizing concerns, 
alternate options, etc. O f equal importance was communicating succinctly and clearly at 
appropriate times. In one case, an experienced COT AC internalized his processing o f the 
probabilities of missing different runways at the field. He then continued to use 
metacognitive processes to plan contingencies as a means to allow the pilot to focus on 
making final adjustments to land the aircraft. With poorer performing crews, there were 
many instances o f a crewmember relaying concerns in inappropriate ways and times that 
negatively affected strategy processes and resultant outcomes.
Implications for Training
This study context reflected a realistic context to investigate the use o f 
adaptive/recognitional strategies that approximate the accuracy of normative rules with 
substantial savings in effort. Study findings supported that the use o f well-defined 
behavioral and cognitive constructs provide a more robust approach to aircrew evaluation 
and training feedback than skill-based training guided by post-hoc analysis o f mishap 
data. More defined decision problem representations allow for identification o f  the 
aircrew attributes that really matter in performance at both the novice and expert levels 
and capture conditions conducive to human error.
Cognitive dimensions added to observable evaluation criteria created both a 
multi-dimensional evaluation and a crew self-assessment tool. Technical skills were
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complemented by metacognitive attributes such as goal identification, ability to assess 
effort and accuracy required o f various strategies, and consequences o f  actions or options 
not selected. Fleet crews exposed to the challenging study scenario as a part o f their 
NATOPS qualification all agreed that the scenario, in concert with the more in-depth 
debrief, provided a better learning experience than provided by routine qualification 
evaluations. With this multi-faceted approach to evaluation, training objectives can be 
improved to reflect better-defined essential behaviors and processes for both individuals 
and teams. Improve and standardize events and performance evaluations focused on 
critical thinking skills will promote solution-oriented interactive briefs, focusing on 
specific behaviors keyed to training goals.
Metacognitive and meta-recognitional focused verbal protocols are a great 
addition to the debrief as well as the classroom discussion and “provide accurate record 
o f how an individual internally represents ideas, and in certain situations provide an 
appropriate measure o f information processing” (Simon, 1979, p.69). Use of cognitive 
oriented questions by the instructor involves asking the crewmembers about the potential 
as well as the actual impact o f their thoughts and actions so they can generalize lessons 
learned beyond a particular scenario. The debriefing protocol, including the study 
cognitive probes, is now routinely used by instructors at the S-3 Fleet Replacement 
Squadron (i.e., training command). Instructors have found that these types o f questions 
provide both them and the aircrew with a  better understanding o f the crewmember(s) 
underlying processing activity.
Scenario-based training with cross-case analysis is also useful, as in this case, to 
identify possible improvements in operational performance. Additionally, decision trees
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built from crew performance data can be a useful format to ensure correct and rapid 
execution o f immediate action and non-normal procedures in flight manuals and 
checklists.
Recommendations for Future Research
There has been considerable research in the area o f multi-crew/team training yet 
cognitive approaches to team training have received very little empirical attention. The 
adaptation o f available empirical data for practical use and in training warrants further 
study. For example, in this study the variables in the data collection instrument were 
sufficient to measure the constructs o f the study but findings reveal that there are more 
defined constructs available to capture team requirements for decision-making processes 
in naturalistic contexts. Although traditional training data collection and evaluation 
practices identify the behaviors and outcomes associated with performance issues they do 
not commonly seek out efficacy and accuracy o f the underlying thought processes.
The generation o f more complete data on attitudes, cognitive processes, and skills 
in a realistic, challenging context will result in identification o f  data categories that are 
more significant to aircrew performance assessment and feedback for all levels of 
training and operations. Further research using naturalistic decision making models and 
theories incorporated in the research design, using both quantitative and qualitative 
comparisons o f domain experts/novices m realistic real-time events, will add relevant 
details and issues related to the process o f  decision making for both individuals and 
aircrews. To date, cognitive task analysis to study expert/novice differences has been 
generally limited to elicitation of past events with experts in a  domain (Hoffman, 
Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998).
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The use o f  a realistic context to study decision making in the field provides 
opportunities to elicit memories immediately after an event rather than days, months or 
years after an experience. For example, the inclusion o f novices in a task analysis can 
generate data to better define problems to be addressed in training. Probing questions 
that engage the novice to think about his inferences, motivations, attitudes, and 
coordination responsibilities related to the decision-making process highlighted areas not 
routinely addressed in the curriculum (e.g., different mental representations and 
assumptions o f  the problem that led to opposing problem solving strategies, overt or 
covert deliberate disregard for the other crewmember’s rationale for a plan o f action, 
inability to behave adaptively to trade-off standard requirements for an effective level of 
effort to satisfy immediate operational requirements, etc.).
Employing a digital simulator data collection, debrief and data analysis device to 
capture events by time or category is an invaluable aviation-research tool that combines 
"real-time" aircrew and aircraft performance data. Immediate retrospective recall by 
participants provides more opportunities for participants to verify the timing and context 
o f events. The timeliness and availability o f  details o f  this approach to data collection 
provide more opportunities for an aviator's robust reflections on decision thought 
protocol and/or insight into a particular cue, judgment, use o f analogues, plans, options, 
etc. as well as unrecognized potentially dangerous precursors to those events (Klein et al., 
1986).
Summary
This chapter provided a final synthesis and summary o f findings related to the 
hypotheses and related research questions and discussed the consistency o f these findings
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with the theoretical frameworks o f naturalistic decision making researchers. The focus of 
this type o f  decision-making analysis follows on Cohen’s (1993b) argument that formal 
decision making models do not capture the adaptive characteristics o f  real-world 
behavior and that "improvements in decision making need not require imposing 
analytical methods" (p. 99). Although lack o f comparable studies prohibits precise 
comparisons, this interpretation o f both the statistical and qualitative data supports the 
data and theories o f other investigators studying novice and expert performance in 
aviation and other domains. Naval aviation has proved a useful area for studying the 
relationship between experience and how an individual selects a strategy based on the 
problem context. The study o f  aircrew performance process and outcome differences in 
terms o f their operational decision-making abilities provided insight into the essential 
structure o f various motivations, acts, choices, and decisions made by aircrews that both 
reflect and contribute to decision-making theories. Multiple methods o f analysis provide 
better prospects for greater understanding o f  aircrew decision making, judgment, and 
problem solving skills (e.g., considerations o f feasibility, constraints and relevant 
tradeoffs) and is a distinctive approach to gain insight and understanding o f adaptive 
approaches to decision making from multiple perspectives.
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Days Since Last Flight 1
Days Since Last Sim 3
S-3B Flight Hours 45
Other Flight Hours 370
Combined Flight Hours 415
S-3B Sim Hours 35





Days Since Last Flight 21
Days Since Last Sim 3
S-3B Flight Hours 38
Other Flight Hours 532
Combined Flight Hours 570
S-3B Sim Hours 62





Days Since Last Flight 8
Days Since Last Sim 11
S-3B Flight Hours 12
Other Flight Hours 350
Combined Flight Hours 362
S-3B Sim Hours 45





Days Since Last Flight 7
Days Since Last Sim 1
S-3B Flight Hours 40
Other Flight Hours 260
Combined Flight Hours 300
S-3B Sim Hours 30
Combined S-3 Sim And FliahtHrs 70








190 605 # 302.5
35 70 35
80 160 80
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Crew 5 Pilot COTAC Crew Total Crew Mean
Age 26 26 26
Gender M M 2M
Crewed Events Together 3
Days Stnce Last Flight 26 24
Days Since Last Sim 9 16
S-3B Flight Hours 105 78 183 91.5
Other Flight Hours 245 100 345 172.5
Combined Flight Hours 350 178 528 264
S-3B Sim Hours 75 73 148 74
Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs 180 151 331 165.5
Pilot COTAC Crew Total Crew Mean
Crew 6 26
Age 25 27
Gender M M 2M
Crewed Events Together 0 0 0
Days Since Last Flight 4 23
Days Since Last Sim 3 9
S-3B Flight Hours 80 100 180 90
Other Flight Hours 275 100 375 187.5
Combined Flight Hours 355 200 555 277.5
S-3B Sim Hours 100 100 200 100
Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs 180 200 380 190
Crew 7 Pilot COTAC Crew Total Crew Mean
Age 27 24 25.5
Gender M M 2M
Crewed Events Together 0
Days Since Last Flight 26 4
Days Since Last Sim 6 0
S-3B Flight Hours 80 50 130 65
Other Flight Hours 378 100 478 239
Combined Flight Hours 458 150 608 304
S-3B Sim Hours 100 100 200 100
Combined S-3B Sim And Fliaht Hrs 180 150 330 165
Crew 8 Pilot COTAC Crew Total Crew Mean
Age 26 24 25
Gender M M 2M
Crewed Events Together 4
Days Since Last Flight 10 3 13
Days Since Last Sim 14 17 31
S-3B Flight Hours 30 24 54 27
Other Flight Hours 340 110 450 225
Combined Flight Hours 370 134 504 252
S-3B Sim Hours 40 40 80 40
Combined S-3B Sim And FliahtHrs 70 64 134 67
(tabie continue





Crewed Events Together 
Days Since Last Flight 4
Days Since Last Sim 3
S-3B Flight Hours 950
Other Flight Hours 250
Combined Flight Hours 1200
S-3B Sim Hours 100*
Combined S-3 Sim And Flight Hrs 1050









120*  220  110
2220 3270 1635
Crew 10 Pilot COTAC Crew Total Crew Me;
Age 36 40 38
Gender M M 2M
Crewed Events Together 2
Days Since Last Flight 0 337
Days Since Last Sim 127 338 232.5
S-3A/B Flight Hours 2200 2000 4200 2100
Other Flight Hours 1600 100 1700 850
Combined Flight Hours 3800 2100 5900 2950
S-3A/B Sim Hours 250* 120* 370 185
Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs 2450 2120 4570 2285
Crew 11 Pilot 11 COTAC 11 Crew 11 Total Crew 11 I
Age 30 28 29
Gender M M 2M
Crewed Events Together 8
Days Since Last Flight 5 11
Days Since Last Sim 15 36
S-3B Flight Hours 1000 570 1570 785
Other Flight Hours 240 152 392 196
Combined Flight Hours 1240 722 1962 981
S-3B Sim Hours 100 100 200 100
Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs 1100 670 1770 885
Crew 12 Pilot 12
Age 28
Gender M
Crewed Events Together 
Days Since Last Right 4
Days Since Last Sim 6
S-3B Flight Hours 900
Other Flight Hours 265
Combined Flight Hours 1165
S-3B Sim Hours 85
Combined S-3B Sim And Fliaht Hrs 985
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Crew 13 PILOT 13 COTAC 13 CREW 13 CREW 13
TOTAL MEAN
Age 41 34 37.5
Gender M M 2M
Crewed Events Together 5
Days Since Last Flight 2 15
Days Since Last Sim 210 19
S-3A/B Flight Hours 2500 2100 4600 2300
Other Flight Hours 1340 280 1620 810
Combined Flight Hours 3840 2380 6220 3110
S-3A/B Sim Hours 300 400 700 350
Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs 2800 2500 5300 2650
Crew 14 Pilot 14 COTAC 14 Crew Total Crew Mean
Age 32 27 29.5
Gender M M 2M
Crewed Events Together 15
Days Since Last Flight 2 1
Days Since Last Sim 7 7 7
S-3B Flight Hours 650 950 1600 800
Other Flight Hours 2150 90 2240 1120
Combined Flight Hours 2800 1040 3840 1920
S-3B Sim Hours 150 120 270 135
Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs 800 125 925 462.5
Crew 15 Pilot COTAC Crew Total Crew Mean
Age 36 33 34.5
Gender M M 2M
Crewed Events Together 
Days Since Last Flight 0 55
25
27.5
Days Since Last Sim 14 76 45
S-3B Flight Hours 650 1000 1650 825
Other Flight Hours 290 150 440 220
Combined Flight Hours 940 1150 2090 1045
S-3B Sim Hours 150 125 275 137.5
Combined S-3 Sim And Fliaht Hrs 800 1125 1925 962.5
Crew 16 Pilot COTAC Crew Total Crew Mean
Age 41 38 39.5
Gender M M 2M
Crewed Events Together 
Days Since Last Flight 385 4
0
194.5
Days Since Last Sim 1342 125 733
S-3B Flight Hours 3700 1950 5650 2825
Other Flight Hours 300 120 420 210
Combined Flight Hours 4000 2070 6070 3035
S-3B Sim Hours 200 200 400 200
Combined S-3 Sim And FliahtHrs 3900 2150 6050 3025
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Table A:
Process Score Rater Demographics
Rater Designator//
Affiliation
Age Years as S-3 
Instructor
S-3 Flight Hours Other Flight 
Hours
I Pilot/Civ 59 7.5 1900 2100
2 Pilot/Civ 54 4 1100 4000
3 Pilot/Civ 54 5 1100 17,000
4 NFO/Civ 36 3 1200 750
5 NFO/CIv 36 4 2350 250
6 NFO/Civ 40 11 2100 7000
7 NFO/Civ 39 9 1005 1400
8 NFO/Mil 38 7 2760 500
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APPROVAL TO CONDUCT RESEARCH WITH NAVAL AVIATORS ASSIGNED 
TO VS-41 AND SEA CONTROL WING, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET SQUADRONS
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER NAVAL AM FORCE 
UNTTEO STATES FACOTC FLEET 
F.O. BOX 3S70S1 
SAN OIEOO. CAUFONNU U llS IO S t
1542
Sec N45/ y.fr 5
MAY 2 2 2000
University of San Diego 
Office of the Provost 
5898 Alcala Parte 
San Diego, CA 82110
Attention: Human Subjects Committee
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Ms. Constance Gillan has discussed with me her proposal to conduct flight-training research involving 
North Island based personnel under my command’s cognizancei Her proposed comparative study of 
novice versus expert decision-making and situational awareness will require full access to S-3 aircraft 
flight simulator data as well as personal interviews and observation of involved subjects. I fully support 
this endeavor.
Research of this precise nature into cognitive aircrew processes in the time-critical cockpit environment 
is sorely needed. As a member of the Naval Aviation Human Factors Quality Management Board since 
1897,1 have closely monitored Department of Defense, academic and commercial efforts in this area as 
partof our charter to significantly reduce human error aviation fnishaps. Ms. Gillan's proposed research 
could provide data and conclusions directly applicable to that effort.
I stand by to enable and assist Ms. Gillan in her research in every way possible. For questions, I maybe 
contacted at (619) 545-2788. or e-mail to keeooer robert.hflcnap.navv.mil.
Sincerely,
R. H. KEEPPEFf 
Captain, U.S. Navy 
Force Safety Officer 
By dftectkxi of the Commander
Copy to:
-COMSEACONW1NGPAC (N013)
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DEPARTMENT OFTHE NAVY 
COMMANDER. SEA CONTROL WING. U S. PACIFIC FLEET (92135-713 1) 
COMMANDING OFFICER. SEA CONTROL SQUADRON FOUR ONE (92135 7098) 
NAVAL AIR STATION. NORTH ISLAND. CA
University o f San Diego 
Office o f the Provost 
Attn: Human Subjects Committee 
5998 Alcala Park 
San Diego. CA 92110
Gentlemen.
Ms. Constance Gillian has approached the Commanding Officer o f Sea Control Squadron 
FOUR ONE and me about conducting flight-training research using students at the Sea 
Control Squadron FOUR ONE training command and fleet aviators assigned to Sea 
Control operational fleet squadrons located at Naval Air Station North Island. She ha> 
proposed to collect observational data related to situational awareness and decision 
making from novice and more experienced flight crew performance in a full flight 
simulator scenario followed In debrief interviews with study participants
Both the Commanding Officer o f  Sea Control Squadron FOUR ONE and I have reviewed 
Ms. Gi!lan‘s doctoral disscitation study proposal. We believe that her research w ill 
provide significant benefit to the advancement o f  human factors initiatives and conduct * »i 
training both at Sea Control Squadron FOUR ONE and throughout naval aviation 
training. We fully support her research effort and will stand by to assist her in anv w.iv 
we can. If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to call me at (619) 545 -5 JL5»»
1542
Ser NOW 0444 
21 JUNE 2000
1542
S e rN O O / 108 
21 JUNE 2 0 0 0
Sincerely.
Commander. U. S. Navy 
Commanding Officer
Captain. U. S. N'av \  
Commander
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Sample Participant Consent Form
Constance (Connie) Gillan is conducting research toward a doctorate in Leadership Studies at the 
University of San Diego under the direction of Dr. Mary Woods Scherr. You have been asked to 
participate in this study because you are in a full-time training status or a fleet aviator. Connie is 
conducting an investigation into how aircrews with varying levels of experience in the same aircraft model 
may differ in their use of decision-making strategies and how they process decisions.
Your participation will involve permitting Connie and two instructors to remain in the event brief and 
debrief as well as observe and evaluate your actions in a 20-minute simulator event from the instructor 
console. The researcher and instructors will make video and audio recordings using the Computer 
Assisted Debriefing System (CADS). The researcher and instructors may also make written notes 
during the simulator event and associated briefs, debriefs, and interviews with your crew as necessary 
and may photocopy the evaluation sheet for the observed event. To ensure you remain anonymous no 
names will be used on the observation/evaluation sheet or anywhere in the data collection, analysis or 
final research paper. Your crew will have a code associated with it for all purposes of the study data 
collection, analysis, and reporting/publishing of the study. You may view all notes and evaluations 
associated with your study event as well as the transcripts of the debrief/interview. No one other than 
the researcher and observer/evaluators will have access to the raw data. There may be persons outside 
the command that will assist in transcribing the interviews and compiling the raw scores for analysis.
Participation in this study is voluntary and data collected will be used for training purposes only. You may 
refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without penalty. You may request that video and digital 
recording be stopped at any time and files/tapes erased. You may refuse to have files/tapes viewed by other 
persons other than the researcher and instructors) for your event. Approximately one hour of additional 
time beyond the scheduled event time will be required to respond to a series of open-ended questions about 
your situational assessment and decision making processes in the simulator event
There may be no direct benefit to you from these procedures although you may gain experience and 
feedback in a scenario that you may or may not have been exposed to previously. The results of this study 
may help in the advancement of decision making research, design of aircrew training and operational 
procedures in aviation.
If you choose to participate in the scenario you must pledge not to discuss it with other crews until 
informed that the data collection and analysis phases of this study are complete so the integrity of the study 
is not compromised.
You may call the University of San Diego Human Subjects Committee Office at (619) 260-6889 to inquire 
about your rights as a research subject and/or report research related problems to your Commanding 
Officer.
Connie has explained this study to you and answered your questions. If you have other questions or 
research related problems, you may reach Connie at 545-1823 or send her e-mail at cgillan@adnc.com. 
Research records will be kept anonymous and confidential and will be destroyed after three years 
(requirement for research purposes).
You have received a copy of this consent document to keep.
I, the undersigned, understand the above explanations and on that basis, I give consent to my voluntary 
participation in this research.
Signature o f Subject Date
Naval Air Station North Island. San Diego, CA
Signature o f Principal Researcher Date
Signature o f Witness Date
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Scenario Synopsis and Naturalistic Decision Making Elements for each Event 
Event 1; Takeoff and Departure
Synopsis: No abnormal indications were presented during this segment o f  the scenario.
Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems 
Uncertain dynamic environments 
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 




Organizational goals and norms
Difficulty Level: Low
Cues: Normal Take-off and Departure
Appropriate Response: Perform in accordance with normal procedures and operations.
Event 2: Starter Light No.l Engine
Synopsis: Significant safety o f flight related event—flight manual procedures require the 
engine to be secured and for the crew to return for a landing while exercising single 
engine approach and recovery procedures. Depending upon the circumstances, it would 
not be unusual for a crew to declare an in-flight emergency if  the situation deteriorated or 
became more complicated than a simple single engine approach.
Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems 
Uncertain dynamic environments 
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 




Organizational goals and norms
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No — well defined procedures 
Middling
















Cues: The flashing red Master Warning Light which is located in an exceedingly 
prominent spot on the instrument glare shield (directly in front o f each crewmember’s 
seat and dead center in their forward line o f view) will illuminate as will the slightly less 
commanding Starter Caution Light on the systems annunciator panel.
Appropriate Response:
Procedural: Immediately execute the “boldface” steps (those procedures which have
been committed to memory) associated with the Starter Caution Light In- 
Flight procedures. Then complete the remaining steps o f the Starter 
Caution Light In-Flight emergency procedure using the Pocket Checklist 
(PCL) as a reference.
Tactical: Initiate a turn towards a suitable airport
Strategic: Start planning for a single engine recovery
Event 3: Checklist Interruption (Other aircraft inbound)
Synopsis: While the crew was engaged in completing a checklist associated with the 
Starter Caution Light procedure they were informed o f another aircraft proceeding to the 




Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals











Yes (internal and external) 
Yes
Difficulty Level: Relatively straightforward and simple
Cues: The information associated with another aircraft inbound to the field with the 
potential to cause a delayed recovery for the scenario crew was very clearly provided by 
Air Traffic Control (ATC). The cues associated with particulars o f  the emergency 
declared by the crew o f  the other aircraft in close vicinity were curtly com m unicated by 
ATC.
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Appropriate Response:
Procedural: Acknowledge the information related by ATC that references the other
aircraft with an emergency inbound.
Tactical: Crews should announce their intentions to continue inbound for an
arrested landing in advance o f the other emergency aircraft.
Strategic: Crews should-emphasize their desire and intentions to get on the deck as
soon as possible without becoming distracted by the other emergency 
aircraft.
Event 4: Low Oil No. 2 Engine
Synopsis: significant safety o f  flight related event on par with a Starter Caution Light in­
flight. The biggest difference between the two Emergency Procedures was the issue of 
immediacy in terms o f how quickly the offending engine would need to be secured. In 
the case o f the Starter Caution Light in flight, continued operation o f  the engine with the 
light illuminated could result in a catastrophic and potentially explosive engine failure.
In the case o f the Low Oil pressure indication the Emergency Procedures require the crew 
to retard the engine’s throttle to “IDLE” and then wait to see how the engine responds. If 
the Low Oil indication persists, the procedure requires the engine to be secured (shut 
down) to preclude the engine from seizing which would most likely cause an engine fire 
and quite possibly a catastrophic failure o f associated systems.
In this scenario, the crew is presented with a very real dilemma. With one engine 
secured, the remaining engine presents a condition that would normally require the only 
remaining engine to be secured as well. (Note the S-3B is incapable o f  gliding without 
engine thrust. Furthermore, NATOPS specifically prohibits S-3 crews from attempting 
un-powered landings following a  dual engine failure/flameout.)
Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems
Uncertain dynamic environments
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals











Yes (internal and external) 
Yes
Difficulty level: Simple; only two options (either secure the failing engine or not),
but a greatly complicated decision making process due to the unprecedented nature o f the 
compounded emergencies and the lack o f  documented decision making guidance 
associated with this type of challenge.
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Cues: Under normal circumstances, the Master Caution Light would illuminate and then 
flash as the engine oil pressure decreased below a predetermined level. However, in this 
particular scenario there would have been no apparent “attention getting” warnings (no 
flashing lights, no aural warnings, etc.) associated with the decreasing oil pressure. 
Instead, the only cues available to the crew would have been an obscure indication o f 
decreasing engine oil pressure on a small, less than prominent, quarter-size, analog style 
engine oil pressure gage.
Appropriate Response:
Procedural: In this scenario, the crew would be force to apply a line o f rationale in
apparent conflict with the “standard” emergency procedures (i.e., even 
though the procedures for an isolated Low Oil Pressure indication require 
the engine to be secured; in this instance, a deviation from the procedure 
was necessary to keep at least one operating engine on line.)
Tactical: Expedite the recovery process by flying in the most direct manner to the
nearest airfield capable o f  recovering an S-3. The significant caveat being 
that consideration had to be given to the intended flight path and the risks 
associated with the pending loss o f the only remaining engine (i.e., if  the 
engine quit prior to reaching the field would the aircraft be in a position to 
inflict the least amount o f  collateral damage to personnel and property on 
the ground?)
Strategic: Reprioritize any game plans to address the increasingly likely failure of
the only remaining engine. If  the crew had not previously declared an In- 
Flight Emergency, it would have been appropriate to do so immediately 
following the crew’s comprehension o f their Low Oil Pressure condition.
Event 5: Approach Priorities
Synopsis: In anticipation o f both a single engine approach and its inherent potential for a 
single engine wave-off crews would normally dump fuel in order to both reduce their 
gross weight (so as to not exceed the arresting gear limitations) and to improve their 
single engine climb capabilities. Less weight implies more excess thrust available to 
improve the climb gradient. Crews should have given consideration to contingencies 
associated with single engine approach and go-around profiles.
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Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems
Uncertain, dynamic environments
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals








Yes but poorly defined 
High
Yes and increasing




Moderately difficult and increasingly difficult as the scenario
Cues: In Its capacity as a decision making guide the NATOPS Pocket Checklist (PCL) 
specifically states that fuel should be dumped “as required.” When confronted with the 
possibility o f a single engine approach and wave-off with only one marginally operative 
engine crews should have recognized the need to reduce their gross weight by dumping 
fuel.
Other cues such as the deteriorating condition o f the No. 2 engine, the likelihood that the 
aircraft would be unable to safely clear Point Loma in the event o f a wave-off and the 
need to determine the resultant direction o f turnout following the wave-off should have 
all contributed the crew conducting contingency planning.
Appropriate Response:
Procedural: Crews should dump fuel.
Tactical: Crews should request an approach type appropriate to their level of
extremes. A visual straight-in approach or vectors to the initial approach 
point would most likely result in the most effective aircraft positioning.
Crews should brief hook skip contingencies and wave-off techniques. 
Specifically, rudder application, rate o f throttle movement, and direction 
o f  turn following wave-off initiation.
Strategic: Crews should declare an emergency and requested priority handling from
Air Traffic Control (ATC).
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Event 6: Game Plan for Sinnle Engine Recovery without Field Arresting Gear
Synopsis: Due to the overall deterioration in the aircraft’ s mechanical condition and. the 
crew’s selection o f a landing field located in close proximity to a major metropolitan area 
contingency planning should have been discussed between the pilot and COTAC.
Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems
Uncertain dynamic environments
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals











Yes (internal and external) 
Conflicted
Difficulty Level: Difficult, given the number o f items either occupying or outright
demanding the crew’s attention finding time for contingency planning would have 
become exponentially more difficult as the scenario progressed.
Cues: The overall extremis o f the situation should have provided the most unobservant 
o f crews with a general idea that they should be developing a "Plan B".
Tower informed crew that arresting gear was unavailable; crews should have recognized 
this as a departure from the normal emergency profile.
Tower informed crew that the landing environment was fouled; this should have triggered 
an immediate discussion as to where they intended to position the jet in preparation for an 
imminent initiation o f the ejection sequence.
Appropriate Response:
Procedural: Continue to adjust the approach profile in order to accommodate the ever-
shrinking runway availability.
Crews should discuss their emergency egress criteria once it became 
apparent that they would be landing in a configuration with a large 
potential for a runway departure (or excursion) during the landing roll out.
Tactical: Continue to exercise all available options and discuss unacceptable safety
o f flight excursions that would necessitate an ejection.
Strategic: Maintain awareness o f the “big picture” by communicating intentions both
internally to each other and externally to Air Traffic Control (ATC).
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Event 7: Foul Deck Final Decision
Synopsis: Under normal conditions, any sort o f fouled deck condition would necessitate 
a wave-off even under single engine conditions. In this scenario, the opportunity to 
execute a  single engine wave-off was negated due to the progressively worsening 
condition o f the only operative motor. In other words, given the engine’s low oil 
condition the probability o f  inducing an engine failure due to the low oil condition by 
advancing the throttle, as was required by executing a single-engine go-around, was a 
very real likelihood.
Naturalistic Decision Making Elements:
Ill-structured problems
Uncertain dynamic environments
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals




Organizational goals and norms







Yes (internal and external) 
Unclear
Cues: Verbal communication from Tower. Conceivably there was the possibility o f this 
being a somewhat ambiguous cue due to a very terse report from the Tower during a 
period o f high workload for the crew (i.e., presence o f other factors competing for the 
crews' attention such as aircraft control, awareness or monitoring o f the dying engine, 
amount o f mental faculties devoted to contingency planning, etc.)
Appropriate Response:
Procedural: Either continue with the landing or initiate a wave-off.
Tactical: The generally accepted “approved response” for this scenario was for the
crew to either: (a) disregard the normal implications associated with a 
fouled deck (i.e., wave-off) and modify their profile and land anyway 
while attempting to stop well short of the intersection or (b) wave-off and 
purposefully position the aircraft over the runway in a safe ejection 
envelope.
Strategic: Scenario end game.
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CREW 1 CREW 2 CREW 3 CREW 4 CREWS CREWS CREW 7 CREWS CREWS c r e w io c r e w ii CREW 12 CREW13 CREW14 CREW1S CREW1S
FINAL SNAPSHOT EJECT EJECT EJECT EJECT LAND EJECT EJECT EJECT LAND LAND LAND EJECT LAND LAND LAMP LAND
Airspeed 119 120 .....115 119 ft 99 119 130 9 ft 9 115 . ft ff ___f* 9
Altitude 100 50 99 299 9 0 999 390 9 ft 9 500 a. ft ff 9
Angle of Attack 17 14 16 19 9 19 19 A n t> 9 19 9 ff 9 9 . .
Angle bank 0 0 5 0 J 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 ff <f .....ff
Flag Position takeoff takeoff Takeoff Takeoff takeoff Takeoff Takeoff Takeoff Takeoff Takeoff takeoff takeoff Takeoff Takeoff Takeoff
Takeoff
Gear Position Down Down Down Down Down Down Down up Down Down Down Up Down Down Down Down
taiihookPosltion Down Down Down Down Down Down Down Down Down Down Down up Down Down Down Down
Fuel Quantity (lbs) 10.3 jq 19,3 19 19,3 5 8 3 9.7 6.6 7.7 8,7 6.9 8
8,1 U
Speedbrake Position |N In IN IN OUT IN IN IN OUT IN IN IN
• OUT OUT OUT
Emergency Hyd Pump ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON UN UN
— ....... - --- --------------  - ■■ 100 800 1000 1000 1500
Vertical Speed Indicator Down 0 Down Down 9 0 Down A ff 9 ft Down ff ft ft 9.
Compass Heading 290 290 199 299 999 299 290 170 9 tt 9 360 ff ff ff It
Over water Runway Field/head tc North of
Geographical Position FIELD FIELD south FIELD FIELD 29 FIELD water ff ff ff field ff ff # #
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APPENDIX F
INSTRUCTOR GUIDE WITH SCENARIO PROTOCOL, TIMELINE, AND RATING
CRITERIA
155

















Scenario Instructor Guide with Scenario Protocol, Timeline, and Rating Criteria 
Time Allotted:
•  Crew Brief (10 minutes)
• Event (20 minutes)
•  Debrief (40-60 minutes)
Prerequisites: NATOPS qualification and completion of the FRS Familiarization Phase.
Event Ob jective: Perform within acceptable standards for safety of flight and coordination for flight operations required to 
takeoff from NASNI to W291 and return to NASNI under normal and emergency conditions.
Evaluation: Instructors will use evaluation criteria set forth in the evaluation document attached to conduct process and 
outcome evaluations. One set of instructors will evaluate and score aircrew process performance and another set of 
instructors will evaluate and score aircrew outcome performance. Standards are set in accordance with NATOPS, SOP, and 
best practices.
Video and data files may he used to reconstruct and evaluate aircrew performance in the scenario 
The Debrief/Interview will be recorded with a tape player.
Consent Forms/Research Brief:
• Researcher will explain the purpose of this scenario event and its conduct prior to the event. Consent forms shall be 



















•  The OFT will be conducted with the Pilot and COT AC positions, CADS is required.
•  The aircrew will control the aircraft during the entire period,
• The aircrew will make all the required radio calls to the appropriate agency on the correct frequency
• If equipment malfunctions during the first five minutes of the scenario event the trainer will be reset and the event will be
restarted from the initial conditions. If the trainer malfunctions after the first five minutes another scenario will be 
substituted for training purposes but will not be included in the research study.
•  Environmental Settings:
•  Night, VMC Conditions at NAS North Island
•  Temp- 20 degrees C.
•  Winds 290/12
•  Landing and Departing Runways 29 and 36
Aircraft Configuration:
•  Load out: Clean
•  Weight: 40,000 LBS -  (10,000 fuel/30,000 A/C)
•  Crew positions occupied: Pilot and COT AC (Co-pilot)
•  Initial position: Runway 29
Event Brief to Crew:
Takeoff position RWY 29 with both engines running. Complete Takeoff Checklist. Takeoff on Runway 29 NZY on NASNI HI 
departure to W 291. Operate in W291 for 0+30. Return to NYZ for VFR entry full stop landing.


















Directions for introducing Tower Comms/ Abnormalities:
• Instructors will introduce Tower communications and aircraft abnormalities in accordance with scenario timeline/script. 
Time stamp insertion of abnormal indications provided by instructor using the Computer Aided Debriefing System 
(CADS) marker. Also, mark crew verbal response/action upon recognition and completed response to cue.
Evaluation: Combine general standards, level of thought considered, and specific event set criteria.
Debrief (recorded): instructors and/or researcher may ask Debrief questions. Please remind crews that the 
debrief/interview is being recorded and to project voices. CADS will be used as appropriate.
•  The following questions will be asked in this order with clarifications requested at the instructors’ /researcher's call.
1. How do you think you did?
2. What would you like to talk about first?
3. What were the difficult decisions for you?
4. Why was each decision difficult?
. For each decision:
(a) What was your degree of confidence in your situational awareness (use a scale of 1-10, with 10 being the most confident)?


















(b) How many options were considered before you choose your course of action?
© Why did you choose that particular course of action?
(d) What other actions/tradeoffs did you consider?
(e) What did you think possible explanations were for conflicting or uncertain info?
(f) What one piece of missing information would have helped you most?
(g) What would you do differently if you were in this situation again?
5. As a crew, what were your biggest strengths? What could be improved? Would you change your brief?
6, What were some important “lessons learned” from this scenario exercise?


















Process Score Considerations - General Rating Scale
Scale Rating Definition
i POOR Observed performance is unsafe and potentially 
detrimental to the safe and orderly outcome o f the 
event, This includes instances where necessary 
behavior/procedures were not present and examples 
o f inappropriate behavior that were/could be 
detrimental to safety o f flight and/or flight 
operational effectiveness,
2 BELOW STANDARD Observed performance meets minimum 
requirements, but there is room for much 
improvement, This level o f  performance is less 
than desired for effective coordination and safety o f 
flight and flight operations considerations,
3 STANDARD Observed performance promotes and maintains 
coordination and safety of flight effectiveness, 
This is the level o f  performance that should 
normally occur during flight operations,
4 ABOVE STANDARD Observed performance is significantly above 
expectations. This includes instances where 
necessary behaviors/skills were present, and 
demonstrated performance was instrumental in 
safety o f flight and flight operations.
5 EXCEPTIONAL Observed performance represents a high level o f 
skill in the application o f certain behaviors and 
serves as a model for coordination, teamwork, and 


















Process Score Considerations (Level of Thought Exhibited)
1. Systems Knowledge -  cue/strategy associations; aircraft safety requirements
2. Aircrew Coordination -  Cross talk / in-flight ORM
• Information Exchange -  Articulate problem. Utilize all available sources of info, passing info without prompts, provide 
periodic situation updates which summarize big picture, ask for status info/status as required
• Communication -  Proper phraseology, completeness of reports, brevity, clarity
• Supporting Behavior- monitoring and correcting crew errors, discrepancies, avoiding task saturation/assisting with task 
shedding.
• Initiative/ Leadership - Take appropriate action in task prioritization/organization.Provide guidance/suggestions to crew 
or external agent. State clear and appropriate priorities. Work internal/external issues to alter or make plan work. 
Challenge assumptions.
Process Scores-Specific Standards for each Event Set
SCENARIO- CREW # /DATE
Event Event/Tower Comms Standard 1 2 3 4 5 Eval Notes
Time
0-6 min Takeoff/Departure
Tower- Standard Departure Comms




















Abnormal Indication; Established at 
6000ft/Heading 240
STARTER CAUTION LIGHT ON #1 
ENGINE
Execution of NATOPS memory 
items (TFI) followed by rest of 
checklist
1 2 3 4 5 Eval
8*9 min Checklist Interruption
When crew is going through No. 1 engine 
secure checklist:
TOWER; Be advised Viking aircraft at 30 miles 
with a pending emergency. M
Complete Checklist 1 2 3 4 5 Eval Notes
9min Low Oil Pressure Light On 
No. 2 Engine
Below 30 PSI
If crew does not notice -surging NG
Recognizes low oil pressure engine 
only operating engine 
Reduce throttle to save engine life 
Internal//external com -  need for 
immediate landing. Verbalized.
1 2 3 4 5 Eval Notes
10-12
min
Approach back to NASNI
If crew asks for arrested landing;
TOWER; " What is your weight for arrested 
landing? "
Crew initiates/ completes the 
following:
(1) Approach Checklist
(2) SE Landing Checklist
(3) Arrested Landing Checklist


















13 min If crew does not recognize low oil 
PS1 on final approach then:
TOWER:" Misty__you have white smoke 
coming from your starboard engine,"
14 min Approach Priorities: Aircrew coordination Contingency internal cockpit brief: 1 2 3 4 5 Eval Notes
loss of #2 Engine/waveoff, 
application of max power on #2 
ENG




TOWER: “Crash crew states the arresting gear 
is derigged with a burnt out motor. State your 
intentions.
Option 1- crew elects to wave- off. 
Full Throttle = Failed Engine
l 2 3 4 5 Eval Notes
If crew continues.'
TOWER; “Crash truck is stalled at intersection 
o f  Runways 29 and 36. w
Option 2- Crew acknowledges new 
info. Lands anyway
1 2 3 4 5 Eval Notes


















RETURN TO BRIEF/DEBRIEF ROOM
Reminder: Please record tim es from CADS clips shown in debrief on this sheet below with reference to discussion 
point/ or time,
CADS CLIPS USED IN DEBRIEF
CADS File Start/Stop Times: Topic; Start/Stop debrief time:
CADS File Start/Stop Times; Topic; Start/Stop debrief time;
CADS File Start/Stop Times: Topic: Start/Stop debrief time:
CADS File Start/Stop Times Topic: Start/Stop debrief time:
CADS File Start/Stop Times Topic: Start/stop debrief time:
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Table Gi
Independent Performance Outcome Ratings by Individual Raters
Rater 1 2 3 4
Military
Rank
CDR LCDR LCDR LT
S-3 Fit Hrs 2300 2900 2145 850
Designator NFO Pilot NFO NFO
Rank O rder of Crews by Individual Raters
1 (Best) 13 13 13 13
2 16 16 16 16
3 14 14 14 14
4 15 15 15 15
5 17 17 17 17
6 5 5 5 5
7 18 18 18 18
8 11 11 11 11
9 7 2 6 2
10 4 7 7 7
11 1 I 4 1
12 3 4 2 4
13 2 3 I 3
14 8 12 3 12
15 12 8 8 8
16 6 6 12 6
Note. 1 is highest crew rank for outcome score.
Table Gz
Final Consensus Outcome Rank Ordering of Study Crews by Outcome Raters
Rank O rder
___________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Crew
Num ber 13 16 14 15 17 5 18 11 2 1 7 4 3 8 12 6
Note, 1 is highest crew ran k  for outcome score.
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APPENDIX H
CREW RAW PROCESS SCORES (INDIVIDUAL EVENT AND SUMMED)
1 6 7


























4 Low Oil 2 Recce
Approach
5 Priorities
6 No Gear Plan
7 Foul Deck
Summed Scores 23 21 18 20 20 102
with total
Average Sum Score 20.4
Note. IP = Instructor Pilot, INFO = Instructor Naval Flight Officer (NFO)
Crew 1
IP INFO
3 1 7 5 8
3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 4 3
3 3 2 3 2
3 3 2 2 2
4 3 3 3 4
4 3 2 2 3
Crew 2
IP INFO
1 2 7 5 8
3 3 3 3 3
3 2 2 3 3
3 3 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 1
3 3 2 1 2
1 3 3 1 1
2 2 2 2 3


























4 Low Oil 2 Recce
Approach
5 Priorities




3 2 5 4
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 4
3 3 3 3
2 3 2 2
3 3 2 2
3 3 3 2
2 3 2 2





1 2 5 4
3 3 3 3
3 2 2 2
3 3 1 3
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2
2 3 2 2
3 3 2 2





















Rater 3 1 5 4
Event Description
1 TaKeoff 3 3 3 3
2 Starter Caution
(No, 1 engine)





3 3 1 3
4 Low Oil 2 Recce 3 3 1 2
5
Approach
Priorities 3 2 2 2
6 No Gear Plan 3 4 3 4
7 Foul Deck 3 3 2 4






3 2 7 4
3 3 3 3
1 2 2 1
3 3 3 1
4 4 2 2
3 2 1 1
3 2 3 1
3 3 1 2



























4 Low Oil 2 Recce
Approach
5 Priorities




3 2 7 4
3 3 3 3
4 3 2 2
4 3 3 4
3 2 2 2
4 2 2 2
3 2 2 1
3 3 1 1





1 2 7 2
3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4
4 3 4 4
5 4 4 5
2 2 2 2
3 2 4 3
3 4 3 2





Rater 3 1 7 6
Event Description
1 Takeoff 3 3 3 3
2 Starter Caution
(No, 1 engine)





3 2 2 1
4 Low Oil 2 Recce 4 4 4 4
5
Approach
Priorities 1 2 2 2
6 No Gear Plan 2 4 3 2
7 Foul Deck 3 4 4 4






1 3 7 8
3 3 3 3
4 5 3 5
3 3 3 4
4 4 4 5
3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4
4 4 4 4





















Rater 1 3 6 7
Event Deecriotion
1 Takeoff 3 3 3 3
2 Starter Caution
(No. 1 engine)





3 3 4 4
4 Low Oil 2 Recce 4 3 4 4
5
Approach
Priorities 4 4 3 3
6 No Gear Plan 5 3 4 4
7 Foul Deck 3 4 4 4






3 2 7 6
3 3 3 3
2 2 3 2
3 3 3 3
2 3 3 2
3 3 3 2
3 2 3 2
3 3 2 2










4 Low Oil 2 Recce
Approach
5 Priorities







1 3 6 7
3 3 3 3
3 4 3 3
4 3 4 3
4 4 4 4
4 3 4 4
5 3 5 3
4 3 3 3
27 23 26 23
Crew 14
IP INFO
1 3 6 7
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
4 3 3 3
2 3 3 4
3 2 3 3
5 3 4 4
5 4 4 4



























4 Low Oil 2 Recce
Approach
5 Priorities
6 No Gear Plan
7 Foul Deck







1 2 8 4
3 4 3 3
4 3 4 4
4 4 4 3
5 2 4 4
4 2 5 4
5 4 5 4
4 4 4 4




SUMMARY TABLE OF BETWEEN SUBJECTS TEST
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Crew Takeoff/Departure .00 1.00 .00 1.00 3 34
Experience Abnormal #L 1.05 1.00 1.05 137 .182
Checklists 39 1.00 3 9 1.31 371
Low Oil Recognition 635 1.00 6.25 8.61 .011*
Approach Priorities 4.00 1.00 4.00 12.10 .004*
No Gear GamePlan 4.62 1.00 4.62 1039 .006*
Final Decision 5.64 1.00 5.64 24.12 .000**
Process Sum Score 11539 1.00 11539 1432 .002*
Outcome Rank 13235 1.00 132.25 8.91 .010*
Ejection 235 1.00 2.25 18.00 .100
Fuel State .72 1.00 .72 .16 .001*
Error Takeoff/Departure .055 14 .004
Abnormal #1 7.469 14 .533
Checklists 4.159 14 .297
Low Oil Recognition 10.164 14 .726
Approach Priorities 4.629 14 331
No Gear GamePlan 6.227 14 .445
Final Decision 3374 14 .234
Process Sum Score 112.691 14 8.049
Outcome Rank 207.750 14 14.839
Ejection 1.750 14 .125
Fuel State 63.478 14 4.534
Total Takeoff/Departure 145.563 16
Abnormal #1 142.500 16
Checklists 153390 16
Low Oil Recognition 170.795 16
Approach Priorities 117310 16
No Gear GamePlan 170340 16
Final Decision 162.055 16
Process Sum Score 7231382 16
Outcome Rank 1496.000 16
Ejection 8.000 16
Fuel State 1126.960 16
16
Corrected TakeoffTDeparture 5.859E-02 15
Total Abnormal #1 8.519 15
Checklists 4.550 15
Low Oil Recognition 16.414 15
Approach Priorities 8.629 15
No Gear GamePlan 10.849 15
Final Decision 8.914 15
Process Sum Score 227.985 15
Outcome Rank 340.000 15
Ejection 4.000 15
Fuel State 64300 15
Note. * p <■ .05 * * p < .0 0 1





















Temporal Data for Low Oil Pressure Recognition
CREW 1 CREW 2 CREW 3 CREW 4 CREW 5 CREWS CREW 7 CREWS CREWS CREW10 CREW11 CREW 12 CREW13 CREW14 CREW1S CREW1S
OIL PRESSURE # 2 . ......... _ ..........
Oil Press UQht ON 7:00 1S;05 6:57 6:23 11:12 6:15 3:15 10:26 14:21 14:37 8;55 11:31 8:35 8:41 11:02 12:39
Oil Press Light Recognition NP NO 11:06 11:50 13:03 6:58 NO 10:30 14:53 NO NO NO 9:12 NO 11:08 14:21
Engine Fluctuation Recce NO NO NO 18:30 12:25 13:03
NO
14:11
Eng Smoke Association 11:00 21:25 13:32 ASSOC
Oil Press EP Recce Della 4:00 6:20 3:57 5:27 2:09 0:43 10:27 0:04 0:32 0:29 3:30 N/A 0:37 5:30 0:06 1:42
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APPENDIX K
CREW 6 INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT DEPICTING DECISION MAKING WITH 
OPPOSING MOTIVATIONS BETWEEN PILOT AND COTAC
CREW 6 FLIGHT SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION EVENTS
180
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Crew 6 Interview Transcript Depicting Decision Making with Opposing Motivations
Between Pilot and COTAC
Crew 6 Interview/Debrief Excerpt:
COTAC: [A difficult decision was] “an instantaneous decision when we were trying to 
wave-off and started losing altitude. That instantaneous decision to eject, probably at that 
point, there we were still at 100, maybe 150 feet probably. I didn’t see the VSI. I don’t 
know what we had on VSI...but if  we were at about 100 feet.”
Pilot: “That second o f looking up, I wanted to see where we were in relation to the 
runway. Because., i f  we were...I saw that we were dropping and (inaudible)”.
Instructor: “Okay. Is this where you decided to wave-off?” (Instructor starts in-flight 
recording file at point o f interest.)
Start Simulator Flight Recording
COTAC: "We’re going to land on 29."
Tower: "701. Roger."
COTAC: "I’m ready to go through the Landing Checklist."
Pilot: "Speed brakes are in."
COTAC: "Locked. Speed brakes are in."
Pilot: "Fuel is at 5.5. Hook is down. Wave the gear. Okay. Three down and locked. One 
mile on speed."
Stop Simulator Recording Begin Debrief /Interview excerpt
COTAC: "Yes. We waved-off right there."
Instructor: "This is where we gave you the compressor stall."
Start Simulator Flight Recording (continued)
COTAC: Okay. Three down and locked 
Pilot: Roger. Set to takeoff. Indicates 5%.
COTAC: No. 2 oil pressure is at 200. We just want to get down on deck now at this 
point.
Pilot: OK, let me guard you. We’re at 20 PSI. You’re zero on the VSI. We’re level
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COTAC: "200 feet"
Tower: "701. This is tower. Be advised there is a crash truck stalled at the intersection o f 
runways 18 and 29."
COTAC 701: "Get the crash truck o ff the runway. We’re coming on in."
Pilot: "We’re getting the jet pointed over towards the water. We’ll eject. Eject over the 
water. I over shot."
COTAC: "You still have your hyd[hydraulics] pressure. Do you still have control?"
Pilot: "Negative."
COTAC: "Eject, eject, eject!"
— (End simulator recordings Debriefing/Interview continues.)
Instructor: “Well, you had a  zero sink rate.”
Pilot: “I had to get it cleared out to the water.”
Instructor: “The water? You were on deck.”
COTAC: “You know, I don’t know if  that would have changed but my point. That’s 
what I’m saying I thought we were close enough to the deck that even if  we would have 
lost our engine we could land, get the brakes on even i f  we would have ejected. We 
could have ejected right before we hit the crash trucks. We had time to get that airplane 
slowed down so that we could either have saved lives on deck or stopped it and we could 
have ejected definitely later. Now, with an airplane with nobody in it going who knows 
where at 100 knots...so, at that point, i f  we were with the aircraft, we should stay with 
the aircraft.”
(End o f  Debrief/interview transcript excerpt)
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Crew 6 Flight Summary of Major Decision Events
Starter Caution Light
(1) Flight Ops — Pilot: Announced light and then commenced bold face.
Situational Awareness (SA) - COTAC: Immediately reviews No. 2 engine indications
(2) Tactical: COTAC: Declared an emergency with ATC and then requested vectors back 
to North Island while requesting to maintain current altitude.
(3) Flight Ops — Pilot: Instructs COTAC to break out the Pocket Checklist (PCL)
(4) Tactical — COTAC: Asks ATC to inform North Island that they will be needing the 
arresting gear.
Pilot observes No. 2 Engine Low Oil Pressure
(5) Flight Ops -  COTAC -  Tells pilot to “keep me posted” on that
(6) Flight Ops -  COTAC: Refers to PCL
Discussion on procedure identification
Vocalizes that they won’t be re-starting the No. I engine
[Instructor comment: COTAC is overbearing]
(7) Flight Ops — COTAC: Identifies need to dump fuel
Some mutual discussion on what fuel level to dump to 
Crew appears to settle upon 3,000 lbs. as a  workable 
number
(8) Flight Ops — COTAC: Talks to Base and informs them o f the situation.
(9) Tactical — Pilot: Tells COTAC to ask for a turn [to give them some time?]
(10) Tactical—COTAC: Requests to delta overhead at 3,000’ in order to set up for single 
engine landing
(11) Flight Ops — Pilot: Announces that he is maintaining his airspeed below landing gear 
extension speed.
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(12) Tactical — COTAC: Mentions that the No. 2 Oil Pressure is fluctuating and advises 
the pilot to head out over the water.
(13) Flight Ops — Pilot: "Dirty Up" [landing gear and flaps extended]
(14) Flight Ops — COTAC: Secures fuel dump “because we’re at 5,000 lbs.”
(15) Flight Ops / Tactical — COTAC: Briefs pilot tells him what to do in case o f a Hook 
Skip.
(16) Flight Ops / Tactical -  Pilot: “We’ll be keeping it on the deck.”
ATC informs crew that the short field gear is not available.
(17) Tactical -  COTAC: Asked for availability of long field gear.
Suggested to the pilot that once on deck they could “cut the 
engines "as i f  to coast into the long field gear.
(18) Tactical / Flight Ops — COTAC: drives the discussion on runway selection
(19) Flight Ops / Tactical -  Pilot: Decides to head back over the water while doing the 
checklists
(20) Flight Ops -  Pilot: Aircraft motors around a large portion o f the pattern at 200’ AGL 
while setting up for a second approach to the runway. [Instructor comment: This is 
unconventional and unsafe-]
ATC informs crew that there is a crash truck stalled on the runway
(21) Flight Ops -  COTAC: Tells tower to get the crash truck o ff the runway
Tower responds by saying that the truck can not be moved.
(22) Flight Ops -  COTAC: Directs pilot to wave-off 
End
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STRATEGIES USED BY REPRESENTATIVE HIGH, MID-RANGE AND LOW 
OUTCOME RANK CREWS (13,11, AND 6)
185
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High, Mid-Range, and Low Outcome Ranking Crew Strategies
Table Ll
Specific Examples o f  Strategies used by Aircrews under Conditions o f














SOP/Checklists Pilot: “Well, we’re 
not going to make an 
arrestment so we 
don’t need to go 
through that 
checklist. ”
No brief for an 
arrested landing, or 
hook skip, or wave- 
off contingencies. 
Pilot appears to 
advance the No. 2 
engine throttle close 
to MRT [Military 




Checklist. Did not do 
most o f arrested 
landing checklist. 
Aircraft is observed to 
motor around a large 
portion o f the wave-off 
pattern at 200’ AGL 
while setting up for a 
second approach to the 







Pilot: "Let’s try to 
keep it on deck 
because we may be 
losing No. 2 here. ”
—
COTAC asked fo r  
availability o f  landing 
gear
Info (cue) use COTAC: "Touch down 
and go fo r  (the) long 








COTAC drives the 
discussion on runway 
selection
(Table continues)















tradeoffs to create 
plan
Pilot: I f  we lose No.
2 we 're going to have 
to punch out. I f  the 
EHP goes then I  
might have to get the 
je t going to the left 
before we eject. ” 
"Okay?"
COTAC: “Okay. ” 
Pilot: "Out over the 
water."






Pilot: “If  we 
can’t stop 
we’ll have to 
get out of the 
airplane.”
COTAC asks for 
availability o f  long field 
gear. Suggested to the 
pilot that once on deck 
they could “cut the 
engines” [as if  to coast 
into the long field gear.
Plan accepted? C- "I agree. ” Crew decides 
to continue fo r  
landing.
Pilot decides to head 
back over the water 
while doing the 
checklists
Contingency Plan? No. Committed to 
land.
COTAC: ” We can put 
the hook down and 








Did not coverall 
contingencies when 
completing Hook Skip 
B rief
Attempt to gather 
more info?
— — —
Operational pace Expedited Expedited No sense o f urgency




Info (cue) use — — —
Attempt to gather/delay 
more info?
— — —
Accept risk- Press ahead 
with focused plan — — —
Contingency Plan? — — —
Accept situation with 





Note. A  dashed line (— ) denotes no activity observed or reported by the crew.
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Table h i
Specific Examples o f  Strategies Used by Aircrews under Conditions o f  Uncertainty and 



















Pilot knew stopping 
parameters —








COTAC asks ATC 
for options. Asks 
about runway 36. 
COTAC negotiates 
landing on Runway 
29 (Lindbergh not 
available).
—
Plan accepted? Both pilot and 
COTAC indicated 
their willingness to 
land during the 
debrief.













Yes. From ATC COTAC tells tower 
to get the crash truck 
off the runway. 
Tower responds by 







Plan carried out Yes, crew 
proceeded with 
approach.
Crew lands. No 
speed brake 
extension.
Crew ejects over 
runway
(Table continues)



















intersection was, I  
was comfortable 
landing prior to that. 
Knowing what the 














COTAC: "We need 
to land."
Pilot: " We '11 have to 
land and stop it. “
Pilot: "We'llput it 
down on the runway 









no attempt to 






Plan accepted? Yes. — —
Plan carried out Crew lands. — —
Note- A  dashed ine (— ) denotes no activity observed or reported by the crew.
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APPENDIX M
SUMMARY MATRICES OF ANALYTICAL AND ADAPTIVE STRATEGY 
PROCESSES FOUND IN STUDY CREWS
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Summary Tables of Adaptive Strategy Processes Used by Study Aircrews
Table Ml
Range o f  Adaptive Strategies used Under Uncertain Conditions with some Time Constraints in the Decision Making Process
Info/Cue
Search


































Pilot plan Crew Accelerate Flatline






COTAC plan Crew Delay Avoid































Info (Cue) Use Decision 










































Crew Accelerates Mutually 
exclusive agreed 
upon efforts
Avoid Accept & 
Firewall
Pilot Only If,, then 
P/T/S
Verbalized by Pilot 





Crew Delays Divergent efforts 
(Disagreement)










No new action Crew Division 
Agreement
None









Crew Division due to 
disagreement
Reject outright None Accepted from 
external source
Note, P/T/S denotes either or a combination o f  Procedural/Tactical/Strategic processes used for planning and action.
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APPENDIX N
SUMMARY OF CREW CHARATERISTICS RELATED TO STUDY 
PERFORMANCE LEVELS
193
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Summary o f  Crew Characteristics Related to Study Performance Levels 
Kev Attributes o f Successful/Optimum Performance;
Aircraft Control/ Safety
Ability to keep the big picture and accuracy o f ongoing /flight status/navigation 
requirements/aircraft location
Systems/procedural knowledge (willingness to abandon/change routine procedure for 
proper reasons)
Selectively choose strategic checklists and procedures within checklists as a safety trade­
off for accelerated landing,
Knowledge o f  aircraft capabilities and landing environment 
Establish priorities
Focus on aircraft configuration/altitude/airspeed for phase o f flight and situation
Familiarity with flight/landing environment
Distance from field when commencing approach plan
Intentional deviation from lens to make field
Override/modify SOP/ Checklists for safety o f  flight
Aviate for ejection contingency
Workload Management
Familiarity with Checklists (reliance on memory)
Error management/Self-correction 
Knowing when backup for pilot is required 
Knowing when back up by COTAC is required 
Ability to task shed or delay new info
Attitude/Supporting Behavior 
Confidence
Willingness to be assertive 
Positive reinforcement o f crewmember actions 
Willingness to discuss discrepancies 
Willingness to hear other points o f  view 
Willingness to disagree
Situational Awareness
Systematic screening/ analysis o f  info (past/current/future needs)
Recognize incompleteness o f  info and still act under severe time constraints
Recognize need to gather more info
Sort, filter, and prioritize info quickly/efficiently
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Decision Making 
Establish priorities 
Willingness to troubleshoot 
Resolve novel problem creatively 
Circumvent problem 
Comfort level with choices
Ability to assess when to override/dismiss other crewmember/extemal input 
Communication
Continuous cross-talk to keep SA calibrated between pilot and COTAC 
Adjustments to initial brief/plan/contingency plan based on changing situation 
Proper weight/acceptance o f external communications
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Key Attributes o f Poor/Sub-Optimum Performance:
Aircraft Control/Safety
Allow aircraft to exceed limits o f safe ejection envelope
Lack o f aircraft systems knowledge- inappropriate actions under conditions, confused 
reason for application, technically incorrect under condition/and or any condition 
Unfamiliar with basic aviation/naval terminology (e.g., starboard)
Workload Management 
Task avoidance
Careless/Hyperactive (e.g., almost shut down wrong engine)
Timing inappropriate for situation (too hasty or slow)
Verbalize but use wrong action for Checklist
Attitude/Supporting Behavior 
Fatalistic
Arrogance in making routine aircraft control decisions 
Desire for personal comfort overriding safety 
Refusing Checklist back-up request 
Undermining pilot’s authority
Situational Awareness
Unawareness or denial of urgency of situation 
Consumed with irrelevant issues
Decision Making
Inflexibility -Use o f lens as landing aid when landing requires deviation to make runway
touchdown for shortest stopping distance
Lack of intuition -  land using sight of runway in windshield
Poor use o f  available time
No/poor strategic planning and/or strategic contingency planning (internal/external)
Limited comfort level
Mixed motivation between crewmembers
Communication 
Not verbalizing issues
Use o f expletives that may be misinterpreted as call for ejection 
Blind acceptance o f external communications/info
Inappropriate communication (e.g., “yadda, yadda, yadda”, “one potato, two potato” to 
complete checklist)
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